PER CURIAM. Attorney Gary R. George appeals a referee's recommendation that his license to practice law in Wisconsin be revoked for professional misconduct consisting of committing criminal acts that reflect adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer. The referee also recommends that Attorney George pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding. The sole issue on appeal is the appropriate level of discipline.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding with directions, an order of the Circuit Court for Columbia County, Judge Richard L. Rehm.

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. The defendant, Eric D. Smith, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of the Circuit Court for Washburn County, Eugene D. Harrington, Judge. At a statutory refusal hearing, the circuit court revoked the defendant's operating privileges for refusing to submit to a test to determine the presence or quantity of alcohol. The circuit court determined that the defendant improperly refused to submit to chemical testing under Wisconsin's Implied Consent Law, Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (2003-04). The circuit court ordered the defendant's operating privileges revoked for twelve months. The charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant remains pending.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding with directions, an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Judge Patrick C. Haughney.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, affirming a summary judgment order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, Judge John C. Albert.

PER CURIAM. Rihm Motor Company appeals a judgment in favor of D&D Mechanized Trucking, Inc. Rihm Motor argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that it breached a contract with D&D. We affirm.

FINE, J. John R. Haas appeals a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of attempted burglary, as an habitual criminal, see WIS. STAT. §§ 943.10(1)(a), 939.32, 939.62 (2001­02), and possession of burglarious tools, see WIS. STAT. § 943.12 (2001­02). He also appeals orders denying his postconviction and amended postconviction motions. Haas claims that his due-process rights were violated when: (1) an out-of-court show-up identification was admitted at trial; and (2) the police destroyed exculpatory evidence. We agree, and reverse and remand for a new trial. Accordingly, we do not discuss his claim that his trial lawyers gave him constitutionally deficient representation. See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938) (only dispositive issue need be addressed).

PER CURIAM. Joseph Ellefsen appeals from a judgment of conviction of theft of a firearm and from an order denying his postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for conceding guilt on two counts during closing argument. We conclude that Ellefsen was not denied the effective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Aaron Allen appeals pro se from a circuit court order denying his postconviction motion filed under WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005­06). The circuit court held that Allen's claims of ineffective assistance by his postconviction counsel were procedurally barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994) (postconviction claims that could have been raised in prior postconviction or appellate proceedings are barred absent a sufficient reason for failing to raise the claims in the earlier proceeding), and State v. Tillman, 2005 WI App 71, ¶¶19­20, 281 Wis. 2d 157, 696 N.W.2d 574 (the Escalona-Naranjo procedural bar applies to defendants whose direct appeal was via the no-merit procedure, as long as the no-merit procedures were in fact followed, and the record demonstrates a sufficient degree of confidence in the result). Allen argues that neither case applies to his situation. We disagree and affirm the circuit court's order.

PER CURIAM. Kenneth Jackson appeals from a judgment of conviction of two counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child, two counts of third-degree sexual assault, and one count of child enticement. He also appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that convictions for both second-degree sexual assault of a child and third-degree sexual assault for the same acts are multiplicitous. He also claims he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to warn him of the prejudicial effect of a certain defense witness. We affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Tracy L. Singleton appeals from the order that denied his motion for postconviction relief under WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005­06). Singleton argues that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to argue that: (1) Singleton's plea colloquy was inadequate; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not tell him that the statute numbers and elements of the crime with which he was charged had changed; and (3) the trial court erroneously exercised its "sentencing discretion" when it allowed him to plead guilty without "clear evidence that the defendant had clear knowledge of what he is pleading to." Because we conclude that these arguments are barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 185­186, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Darrin Gruenberg appeals an order which denied most of his postconviction claims for relief under WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005-06). We affirm the order for the reasons discussed below.

PER CURIAM. Willie Buckley appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues on appeal that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his pleas. He argues that his pleas were involuntary and the result of ineffective assistance of counsel because he entered the plea believing he could preserve an issue for appeal. We conclude that the circuit court properly denied the motion for postconviction relief and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. On February 18, 2000, Randall D. Alston was convicted of various crimes, including attempted first-degree intentional homicide as a party to a crime and armed robbery. The judgment of conviction was signed by the circuit court's clerk. Alston filed a postconviction motion seeking "to annul" his convictions, arguing that WIS. STAT. § 972.13 (1999-2000) "does not [allow] the Clerk of Court to act independently of the Circuit Court to sign and render a Judgment of Conviction without the Written Direction of the judge." On that basis, he argued that his conviction was void and should be expunged. The circuit court denied the motion and Alston's request for reconsideration. Alston appeals. We conclude that Alston's appeal is without merit, and we affirm the judgment of conviction and the postconviction order.

PER CURIAM. John Babiak appeals from a judgment of conviction of repeated sexual assault of the same child and from an order denying his postconviction motion. He argues that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, that the prosecutor made improper and prejudical closing arguments, and that a juror was subjected to improper contacts with the sheriff's department. He seeks a new trial in the interest of justice. See WIS. STAT. § 752.35 (2005-06.) We affirm the judgment and order.

SNYDER, J. Timothy J. Lilley appeals from a judgment of conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, marijuana, and a judgment of conviction for burglary. His appeal goes to the circuit court's sentencing after revocation on both charges. He further appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Lilley contends that the circuit court deprived him of his constitutional right to receive credit for time already served by imposing consecutive prison terms. He also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to comments made by the prosecutor during sentencing and that the court improperly denied his postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing. We disagree with Lilley and affirm the judgments and order of the circuit court.

KESSLER, J. Ricky Elliot Scott appeals from an order denying his motion for reconsideration relating to his 2004 motion for sentence modification based upon a new factor, i.e., his assistance to law enforcement pre- and post-sentencing. Because we conclude that Scott's assistance does not satisfy the new factor test we set forth in State v. Doe, 2005 WI App 68, 280 Wis. 2d 731, 697 N.W.2d 101, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Marc A. Holm appeals pro se from an order increasing his child support for his minor daughter who lives in Pennsylvania with her mother, Pamela Braverman. Marc challenges the circuit court's handling of his visitation travel expenses and the imputation of income from the full amount of an inheritance and trust without accommodating his needs to pay debts, living expenses, and attorney fees. He also argues that there is no need for increased support to maintain the child's standard of living. We affirm the order of the circuit court.

PER CURIAM. Janet Anderson, p/k/a Janet Roach, appeals a divorce judgment. She claims the circuit court improperly failed to award her a marital property interest in retained earnings in a partnership in which John Roach had a 25% interest, and also improperly failed to award her a marital property interest in accounts payable to John. We conclude the assets were marital and therefore reverse and remand.

SNYDER, J. William S. Roush, Jr. appeals from two orders stemming from post-divorce proceedings intended to carry out and enforce the divorce judgment. He appeals from an order directing him to make past-due support payments and to pay attorney fees associated with Nancy Roush's actions to enforce the judgment of divorce. This order imposed and stayed a six-month jail sentence for contempt, set purge conditions, and awarded attorney fees and other costs to Nancy. William argues that the order should be reversed because he was not provided adequate notice of the substance of the underlying hearing and because the court's rulings reflect an erroneous exercise of discretion. He also appeals from an order finding him in contempt for failure to pay child support and maintenance out of his income rather than out of a court-ordered security fund. William argues that this order should be reversed because he was not in contempt on the date of the hearing. We affirm the first order, which addressed past due support and awarded attorney's fees and costs to Nancy; however, we reverse the subsequent contempt order because it is based on an erroneous application of the law.

KESSLER, J. Anthony J. Wilks appeals from an order dismissing the garnishment complaint against JP Morgan Chase (Chase) where the trial court dismissed the complaint because it found that Chase had not been properly served and, thus, that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Chase. Because the trial court did not hold the evidentiary hearing to which a plaintiff is entitled when the defendant asserts lack of personal jurisdiction, and Wilks did not waive that right, we reverse and remand for the required evidentiary hearing and such further proceedings as may be required.

PER CURIAM. Charlene and Barry Mertz appeal a judgment dismissing their complaint against Barbara and Duane Waldoch. The Waldochs cross-appeal. The Mertzes alleged a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court denied the Waldochs' motion to dismiss for failure to adequately state that claim. However, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon concluding that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred the action. On appeal the Mertzes challenge that ruling. The Waldochs cross-appeal the court's ruling that the complaint adequately stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We conclude that the doctrine of claim preclusion does not bar this action. We also conclude that the complaint adequately pleads the Mertzes' claim. We therefore reverse and remand.

NEUBAUER, J. Jennifer Scott appeals pro se from a forfeiture judgment after the trial court found her guilty of speeding. As best we understand it, Scott's primary argument is that insufficient evidence supports the finding of guilt, especially as it relates to the radar unit's reliability and accuracy. She also contends the speed limit was not shown to comply with federal requirements and that she should have been granted a continuance to retain an attorney upon learning that her non-lawyer father could not represent her at trial. Her arguments do not persuade us. We affirm.

HOOVER, P.J. Neil Noesen appeals an order affirming the Pharmacy Examining Board's decision reprimanding him and placing practice conditions on his license. The Board concluded Noesen violated the standard of care applicable to pharmacists when he refused to fill or transfer a patient's prescription for an oral contraceptive. Noesen asserts he was not given proper notice of the standard of care, the discipline violates his state constitutional right of conscience, and the Board abused its discretion by instituting formal disciplinary proceedings instead of issuing an administrative warning. We reject these arguments and affirm these portions of the order.

LUNDSTEN, J. This is a Fourth Amendment "community caretaker" case. Todd Kramer appeals a circuit court judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. Some unknown time after Kramer pulled his pickup truck over to the side of a highway with its hazard lights flashing, a police officer happened by. The officer decided to check on the stopped truck. With the squad's red and blue emergency lights activated, the officer pulled in behind the truck to inquire whether Kramer needed assistance. This inquiry led to the discovery that Kramer was intoxicated. Kramer argues that he was unlawfully seized by the time the officer approached Kramer's side window and observed signs of intoxication. We disagree. Assuming that a seizure occurred, we conclude that it was lawful because the officer was acting in a community caretaker capacity. We affirm the judgment.

SNYDER, J. Dawn M. Carrothers appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a), a fourth offense. First, she contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion under the circumstances to investigate beyond registration matters during the traffic stop. Second, she argues that the court made numerous errors regarding the exclusion and admission of evidence. Third, she asserts that the court erred in not ordering a mistrial after becoming aware of prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, she contends that the trial court erred in finding that WIS. STAT. § 343.305(2) does not violate the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

HOOVER, P.J. Susan Vinje appeals a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense. Vinje argues the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to suppress because the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J. Jason Kestler was convicted based on a no-contest plea of fifth offense operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI) and operating after revocation. The sole issue is whether the initial Terry stop of Kestler's motor vehicle was transformed into a custodial arrest before probable cause existed to arrest Kestler. Because a reasonable person in Kestler's position would have believed that he was under arrest at some point before officials had probable cause to arrest Kestler, we conclude that the Terry stop was transformed into an illegal custodial arrest. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in denying Kestler's motion to suppress evidence acquired during the illegal arrest. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction.

DYKMAN, J. Robert Bartlett appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), fourth offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). Bartlett contends that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle for failing to display a yearly renewal sticker. He also contends that his sticker, located to the left of the lower right-hand corner of his license plate, was not in violation of the law and that, therefore, his continued detention after the officer saw the sticker on his license plate was unlawful. The officer had sufficient grounds for an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion that Bartlett was violating WIS. STAT. § 341.15(1m)(a), and thus Bartlett's detention was lawful. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. John Justinger appeals from the judgment of the circuit court that dismissed his complaint against Diane Bogenschuetz. Justinger argues that the circuit court erred when it considered documents Bogenschuetz filed with the court after the deadline for filing responses to a summary judgment motion had expired, and when it granted Bogenschuetz's motion for reconsideration and dismissed Justinger's complaint on a ground that had not been addressed by either party. We conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it did not exclude the late filed responses, but that it erred when it dismissed the complaint on a basis that had not been argued by either party. Consequently, we reverse the matter and remand for a new trial on this issue.