DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This case is before the court on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06). It relates to an appeal from a nonfinal order of the Waukesha County Circuit Court, Ralph M. Ramirez, Judge. Judge Ramirez granted the State's (State) motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum from defendant Ronald Schaefer (Schaefer) that sought to obtain police investigation reports in Schaefer's case before his preliminary examination.

PER CURIAM. Herr Well Drilling, Inc., appeals the circuit court's order dismissing this action. The issue is whether the circuit court properly dismissed Herr Well Drilling's breach of contract claim against Zong Vang and his wife Lao Yang. We affirm.

CURLEY, P.J. Warren Jamaal Wells appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree intentional homicide while using a dangerous weapon, as a party to the crime, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 940.01(1)(a), 939.63 (amended Feb. 1, 2003), and 939.05 (2001-02). Wells seeks a new trial, contending that his confession was improperly entered into evidence when his pretrial motion to suppress was denied. He claims that his confession was not voluntary because it was elicited by coercive acts and undue pressure from police. We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances surrounding Wells' interrogation, the police were neither coercive nor applied undue pressure to overpower his ability to resist. Because Wells' confession to police was voluntary and properly admitted into evidence, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Jennifer Ward appeals a judgment convicting her of first-degree reckless homicide in the death of her seven-month-old nephew. Ward made three incriminatory statements to police, first at the hospital, second at the sheriff's department later that day, and third the next day at the sheriff's department. She argues that her statements and waiver of counsel were involuntary because: (1) she had suffered a seizure when she was informed of the infant's death; (2) she suffered from back pain and headaches during the interrogations; (3) she was held incommunicado; and (4) the police used deceit to trick her into confessing. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

ANDERSON, P.J. Caprice S. I. challenges her conviction for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of WIS. STAT. § 941.23. She contends that she did not go armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon. The undisputed facts of this case establish that a dangerous weapon, a padlock with a shoestring attached, was concealed in the pocket of a coat in a locker secured by a functioning padlock. We reverse Caprice's conviction because under these facts, the weapon was not readily accessible to her.

PER CURIAM. Kevin Thomson appeals a judgment, entered upon a jury's verdict, convicting him of two counts of burglary. He also appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Thomson argues a new trial is warranted because a newspaper article published the day before trial, as well as a comment by the State's key witness, impermissibly put the fact of Thomson's prior convictions before the jury. We reject his arguments and affirm.

ANDERSON, P.J. Adam J. Patterson appeals his conviction arguing that he is entitled to a new trial for one or all of the following reasons: because he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel, because the trial court erred in permitting hearsay evidence, in the interest of justice. After extensive review of the record, we conclude that the real controversy has not been fully tried. We therefore exercise our discretionary reversal authority and, in the interest of justice, grant Patterson the new trial he seeks.

PER CURIAM. Antonio McDade appeals from an amended judgment of conviction imposing a previously withheld sentence-after-revocation, and from a postconviction order denying his motion for resentencing. The issue is whether the original plea bargain had been completely fulfilled at the original sentencing hearing, despite the withholding of sentence, or whether the State's obligation extended to McDade's sentencing-after-revocation hearing. We conclude that the scope of the plea bargain was limited to McDade's guilty plea in exchange for the State's recommendation at the original sentencing hearing; the plea bargain was no longer in effect when McDade returned for sentencing after revocation for violating the conditions of his probation. Therefore, we affirm.

PETERSON, J. George Lis, Sr., appeals a judgment of conviction for two counts of unauthorized use of personal identifying materials and an order denying his motion for plea withdrawal. The key question in this appeal is whether Lis's crimes continued after the fraudulent accounts he opened were closed. We conclude they did not. As a result, we reverse the judgment and remand with directions to allow Lis to withdraw his pleas.

PER CURIAM. Sylvester Harrington appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that the circuit court relied on inaccurate information when it sentenced him and, consequently, he is entitled to be resentenced. Because we conclude that Harrington has not established that he is entitled to be resentenced, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Jimmie D. Gray appeals from the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that the postconviction court erred when it denied his motion for plea withdrawal or sentence modification. Because we conclude that the postconviction court did not err, we affirm.

DYKMAN, J. Christopher P. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Amanda. Christopher P. contends that the termination questionnaire he completed before the hearing and the colloquy that occurred at the hearing do not establish that he gave informed and voluntary consent to terminate his parental rights, which WIS. STAT. § 48.41(2) requires. Christopher P. contends that for this reason, and because the court did not consider the dispositional standards and factors in WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3), the termination order must be vacated. We disagree. We conclude that the trial court correctly found that Christopher P.'s consent was informed and voluntary. Therefore, we affirm the order to terminate his parental rights. However, the record does not show that the trial court considered the dispositional factors in § 48.426(3). Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further findings and conclusions as to these factors.

PER CURIAM. This is a medical malpractice action. Dick Marquardt and his wife Jean Marquardt appeal a judgment entered after a jury verdict in favor of Dr. Jay Schindler, Schindler's insurer, and two health care entities. Marquardt argues the court should have instructed the jury on res ipsa loquitur and should have given an informed consent special verdict question he requested. Marquardt also requests a new trial in the interest of justice, for the same reasons. We reject his arguments and affirm the judgment.

ANDERSON, P.J. Frederick A. Krahn appeals pro se from an order denying his motion to vacate a conviction and dismiss the underlying complaint in municipal court regarding a parking citation he received for parking in a city lot without a permit. Krahn argues that the requirement of a parking permit is unconstitutional as it creates an obstacle to a person's constitutional right to access and enjoy public waters. We hold that Krahn failed to adequately develop any legal arguments and, therefore, we affirm the judgment.

VERGERONT, J. This appeal arises from two separate actions to foreclose mortgages on the same property: the first initiated by the first mortgagee and the second initiated by the second mortgagee, JP Morgan Chase Bank, who had been joined in the first action but had not participated. JP Morgan appeals the circuit court order that confirmed a sheriff's sale in the first action to Hare Investments, LLC, and vacated an order confirming a sheriff's sale in the second action.

PER CURIAM. Four Star Properties, Inc. appeals from judgments dismissing its action against Mark and Paula Woychik to remove clouds on title to real estate, and granting the Woychiks' counterclaim for damages based on Four Star's misrepresentations and construction delays caused by Four Star's failure to complete a certified survey. The Woychiks cross-appeal the judgment awarding them one-fourth of their attorney fees, and have filed a motion to be awarded the attorney fees incurred in this appeal and cross-appeal. Except for the award of one-fourth of the Woychiks' attorney fees, we affirm the judgments. We reverse the judgment for attorney fees and remand the matter for the court to reconsider the percentage of attorney fees. We also direct the court to include in the judgment all of the reasonable attorney fees the Woychiks incurred as a result of this appeal and cross-appeal.

DYKMAN, J. Thomas and Denise Barker, who own undeveloped property near Lake Camelot, appeal from the trial court's denial of their summary judgment motion and award of summary judgment in favor of the Lake Camelot Property Owners Association (the Association). The Barkers argue that the Association is not entitled to dues, fees, and fines totaling $2,205.30 that the Association has assessed against them. They further argue that by placing maintenance liens on the Barkers' property, the Association slandered their title contrary to WIS. STAT. § 706.13 (2005-06). They contend that the restrictive covenants providing for these payments and requiring their membership in the Association expired July 1, 1999.

ANDERSON, P.J. Property valuations of eighteen beach-front properties along Lake Michigan in Sheboygan county are the subject of this appeal. The eighteen property owners claim that the circuit court erred in upholding the Board of Review of the Town of Wilson's valuations of their properties. The owners claim the assessments made for the properties are improper and cannot stand and that we should remand this matter to the Board.