PER CURIAM. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) has appealed a referee's report finding Attorney Jeffrey L. Elverman violated former SCR 20:8.4(f) by failing to report co-trustee fees he received as income on his state and federal tax returns for the years 1999 to 2003, thereby violating a supreme court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers, In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Owens, 172 Wis. 2d 54, 56-57, 492 N.W.2d 157 (1992), and recommending a public reprimand for that misconduct.

PER CURIAM. We review the stipulation filed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Richard A. Engelbrecht concerning misconduct charged in a six-count disciplinary complaint. The misconduct involves Attorney Engelbrecht's lack of diligence, misrepresentation and other violations. The parties have stipulated that the appropriate discipline is a two-year suspension of Attorney Engelbrecht's license to practice law in Wisconsin, together with restitution of $1,000.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The petitioner, Acuity, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision affirming orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County that denied Acuity's motions for summary judgment and reconsideration and that awarded G. Vaughn Stone and Christine Stone $500,000 pursuant to the parties' stipulation. Acuity contends that the court of appeals erred in its conclusions (1) that Acuity violated Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4m)(2005-06) by failing to provide the Stones with notice of the availability of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, and (2) that as a remedy, the Stones are entitled to have their umbrella insurance policy reformed to provide retroactive UIM coverage. It further asserts that the circuit court erred in its determination that the policy was contextually ambiguous.

PER CURIAM. Mednikow Properties, Inc. (Mednikow), appeals a judgment and an order of the circuit court holding that Isadore Mednikow (Isadore) was not unduly influenced by representatives of L.P. Mooradian Company, that Mooradian was entitled to money damages for breach of contract, and that Mooradian should be permitted to purchase certain property for its assessed value. Mednikow also appeals both a partial summary judgment determining Isadore was the primary shareholder of Mednikow as well as an order denying its motion for consideration.

PER CURIAM. A jury found Demetrius D. Anderson guilty of having been a felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of WIS. STAT. § 941.29(2)(a) (2003-04) and carrying a concealed weapon, a violation of § 941.23 (2003-04). Anderson contends on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdicts. We disagree and affirm the judgment of conviction.

HOOVER, P.J. Joshua O'Grady appeals a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury's verdict, convicting him of one count of manufacturing or delivery of THC, as well as an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. O'Grady argues the trial court made erroneous evidentiary determinations, he is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice, and newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial. We conclude his evidentiary complaints are waived, and this case is not one of the exceptional cases compelling us to exercise our discretionary reversal power. However, we conclude the trial court applied the wrong standard in assessing the newly discovered evidence and, accordingly, we reverse in part the order denying postconviction relief and remand with directions for the court to apply the correct standard.

CURLEY, P.J. Tamara Concha Limon appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after she pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver cocaine as party to a crime, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 961.16(2)(b)1., 961.41(1m)(cm)1r., and 939.05 (2003-04). Limon pled guilty after the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of her purse.

PER CURIAM. Thomas Russell appeals a judgment of conviction for burglary, false imprisonment, and first-degree sexual assault, along with an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Russell asserts multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We reject his arguments and affirm.

WEDEMEYER, J. Chip Branch appeals pro se from an order denying his November 30, 2004 postconviction WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2003-04) motion. Essentially, Branch raises two points of error. First, he claims his postconviction counsel provided him with ineffective assistance during his direct appeal for failing to address numerous deficiencies of his trial counsel. Second, he argues that the trial court judge should have recused himself from hearing his case because he demonstrated bias against Branch. Because his trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance and the rulings of the trial court cited by Branch fail to demonstrate the degree of favoritism or antagonism required to show bias, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Ronald Nipple appeals a judgment convicting him of repeated sexual assault of the same child. He also appeals an order denying his postconviction motion. Nipple contends that he is entitled to plea withdrawal or resentencing based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, erroneous exercise of sentencing discretion, and the interest of justice. We reject each of his arguments and affirm for the reasons discussed below.

WEDEMEYER, J. Ray Shawn Cherry appeals from a judgment entered after he pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine), contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 961.16(2)(b)1 and 961.41(1)(cm)1g. (2005-06). He also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion. Cherry raises only one issue in this appeal: whether the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it imposed the $250 DNA surcharge. Because the trial court failed to properly exercise its discretion before ordering the $250 DNA surcharge, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BRUNNER, J. Tim Bradwell appeals a judgment awarding damages to John Snowbank. Bradwell argues the Wisconsin Consumer Credit Act did not apply to the transaction with Snowbank. He also argues that if the Act did apply he did not violate it, and therefore Snowbank was not entitled to damages. We disagree and affirm.

BRUNNER, J. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, d/b/a WE Energies (WEPCO), appeals a summary judgment dismissing its claims against Outagamie County. Those claims revolved around WEPCO's private easement rights along a county highway and the costs of relocating its utility lines to accommodate a highway expansion. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Thomas Weaver appeals a child abuse injunction ordering him to avoid contact with his son, Gaige S. He argues the evidence at the hearing did not show reasonable grounds to believe he had abused Gaige. He also challenges the court's fact findings. We conclude the evidence did not support a finding that Weaver abused his son during the incident in question. We therefore reverse and remand with directions to vacate the injunction.

PER CURIAM. Marvin E. Bellinger appeals pro se from a circuit court order that denied both his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and his motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the State from imprisoning him. The circuit court concluded that: (1) Bellinger could not challenge the decision binding him over for trial by a petition for writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Bellinger failed to make the necessary showing to secure a temporary restraining order. We affirm.

HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J. Johnny Lacy Jr., an inmate at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (WSPF) in Boscobel, appeals pro se an order granting the motion of the defendants (collectively, Huibretgse) for summary judgment and dismissing his complaint. We affirm.

LUNDSTEN, J. Chibardun Telephone Cooperative and CTC Telcom (collectively, "Chibardun") appeal the circuit court's order dismissing their action against Wisconsin Bell. The circuit court concluded that it lost jurisdiction over the case under Browne v. Milwaukee Board of School Directors, 83 Wis. 2d 316, 265 N.W.2d 559, 267 N.W.2d 379 (1978), after the Public Service Commission issued a decision in a separate but closely related proceeding before the PSC. We conclude that Browne, where the circuit court deferred to an agency to decide a case, does not address the situation here, where the circuit court never deferred to the PSC but only stayed the case to see what the PSC would decide in the closely related proceeding. We therefore reverse the circuit court's order and remand for further proceedings.

KESSLER, J. Mack S., with the assistance of his father, appeals from dispositional orders after finding him delinquent based on misdemeanor battery in violation of WIS. STAT. § 940.19(1) (2001-02) and felony battery to an individual over the age of sixty-two, as a party to a crime, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 940.19(6)(a) and § 939.05 (2001-02), which incidents occurred when Mack S. was thirteen years old. Mack S. also appeals the denial of his post-disposition motion and pro se motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Mack S. presents the following issues. First, that WIS. STAT. § 938.23(1m)(a)'s (2001-02 eff. May 25, 2002) requirement that no child under the age of fifteen, while held in a secure detention facility, can waive his or her right to counsel and "have the resulting self incriminating custodial statement used against him [or her] at trial," means that Mack S.'s statements should have been suppressed. Second, the trial court violated Mack S.'s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it forced Mack S. to be represented by an attorney "he did not voluntarily accept" and who "frustrated a fair presentation of the case" to the extent that counsel's assistance was ineffective. Third, it was a breach of prosecutorial discretion to not refer the battery case to the city attorney's office for prosecution and that this decision was retaliation against Mack S. and his father for filing a federal lawsuit against the district attorney's office. Fourth, the WIS. STAT. § 940.19(6)(a) rebuttable presumption of conduct creating a substantial risk of great bodily harm for victims sixty-two years old or older is unconstitutional because it violates the Fifth and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Fifth, a pro se defendant has a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment "right to all reasonable tools necessary to prepare and present his defense" and that WIS. STAT. § 757.30 "permits a pro bono paralegal to practice law."

BROWN, J. The manufacturer of a "lemon" vehicle has thirty days to fulfill a consumer's request for replacement or refund under Wisconsin's Lemon Law. The state's courts have consistently refused to extend or ignore this deadline when the manufacturer and consumer could not reach agreement on refund details, or to allow a manufacturer to impose its own conditions on the consumer's refund. Our position has been that the Lemon Law lays out the consumer's obligations, and that once those are met, it is the manufacturer's responsibility to make the refund or replacement happen within thirty days. See Herzberg v. Ford Motor Co., 2001 WI App 65, ¶17, 242 Wis. 2d 316, 626 N.W.2d 67. If the manufacturer does not do so, the consumer will be entitled to the harsh statutory remedies, including double damages. As we said in Chariton v. Saturn Corporation, 2000 WI App 148, ¶5, 238 Wis. 2d 27, 615 N.W.2d 209, "[t]here are no excuses."

WEDEMEYER, J. Michael L. appeals from an order for involuntary medication and treatment. Michael claims that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the issuance of the order. Because the facts and circumstances of this case support the trial court's decision to enter the order, this court affirms.

SNYDER, J. Kari L. Hoehner appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), as a second offense. Hoehner pled guilty following the court's denial of her motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to suppress evidence. She contends that the court erred when it held that the officer had probable cause to arrest, specifically because the court erroneously gave weight to the officer's testimony regarding field sobriety tests and improperly took judicial notice of procedures used in field sobriety tests. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

LUNDSTEN, J. In this small claims action arising out of a residential real estate sale, Robert and Darlene Davis appeal the circuit court's judgment awarding damages to Latanya Richardson and Bryan Brabender (collectively, "Brabender") on Brabender's claims against the Davises for misrepresentation and false advertising. We affirm the judgment.

WEDEMEYER, J. Elias Zarate appeals from the judgment of the circuit court granting the summary judgment motion of defendant Continental Casualty Company. Zarate claims that Continental is a proper party to this case under Wisconsin's direct action statutes, WIS. STATS. §§ 803.04(2) and 632.24 (2005-06), and that Continental's insured was doing business in Wisconsin, which defeats the limitation on the direct action statutes set forth in WIS. STAT. § 631.01(1)(b). Because Continental's insured does less than one-half of one percent of its entire business operation in Wisconsin, which is "incidental or subordinate" to the main business operation, the limitation under § 631.01(1)(b) applies and a direct action is not proper. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment for defendant Continental.