LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J. This is a review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion affirming a circuit court decision for Walworth County by the Honorable Michael S. Gibbs that awarded maintenance from Rose Steinmann (Rose) to Tony Steinmann (Tony) and divided the Steinmanns' property in a divorce proceeding. Rose challenges the circuit court's property division, which she argues included a flawed "double-counting" of assets; improper application of transmutation rather than tracing principles; and an erroneous failure to allocate debts related to unpaid taxes on assets from a lawsuit settlement, rather than a proper application of tracing principles. She also challenges the court's maintenance award.

FINE, J. Ronald D. Luttrell appeals, pursuant to our leave, the circuit court's non-final order denying his motion for a competency evaluation under WIS. STAT. § 971.14. We affirm.

NEUBAUER, J. Thomas, Daniel and Patrick Steffen, d/b/a Steffen Brother's Partnership, sought a declaration of their rights to cropland they own and for years have leased to Dan Dumke, d/b/a D & D Partnership. Steffen Brother's appeals the order declaring valid a written two-year lease option and ordering the parties to negotiate a fair per-acre rental price. Because the lease option failed to include an essential term, we conclude that the provision is unenforceable. We reverse the trial court's order.

PER CURIAM. Nicholas J. Black appeals pro se from the circuit court's denial of his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005-06) postconviction motion. Black argues on appeal that the circuit court erred when it concluded his postconviction motion was procedurally barred under State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 185, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994) (postconviction claims that could have been raised in prior postconviction or appellate proceedings are barred absent a sufficient reason for failing to raise the claims in the earlier proceedings). We conclude that the circuit court appropriately determined that Black's postconviction motion was procedurally barred. We also conclude that Black's claims in his postconviction motion are unsupported by the record. We therefore affirm the circuit court's order.

PER CURIAM. Belinda Johnson appeals a judgment of conviction for two counts of misappropriation of personal identifying information or personal identification documents ("identity theft"), contrary to WIS. STAT. § 943.201(2) (2001-02), and one count of forgery, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 943.38(1)(a), and from a postconviction order denying her motion for modification of her twenty-year sentence. She contends the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion by giving too much weight to negative factors, relying on "immaterial speculation," and meting out a sentence so disparate from those given her co-actors as to shock the public conscience. We disagree and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Raheim R. Cason appeals pro se from the circuit court order that denied his motion for postconviction relief under WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005-06). Cason claimed that his trial and postconviction counsel were ineffective. The circuit court denied his motion without a hearing, and we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Dennis Reimer appeals from judgments of conviction of fleeing an officer and three counts of bail jumping. He also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion. He argues the circuit court judge interfered with his cross-examination of a witness and demonstrated bias by commenting on credibility during closing arguments. He further claims he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel did not object to the judge's indications of bias and effectively conceded guilt on the fleeing charge during closing argument. We reject the claims of error and affirm the judgments and order.

PER CURIAM. Joel Bosman appeals a judgment of conviction for eight counts of theft as party to the crime, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 943.20(1)(b) and 939.05. He also appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief without a hearing. Bosman contends the court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury as to the burden of proof on the value of the thefts. He also contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions and for failing to present certain witnesses.

PER CURIAM. Dennis Pearson appeals a judgment convicting him of repeatedly sexually assaulting two stepdaughters and an order denying his motion for a new trial. He argues: (1) the court should have declared a mistrial and his counsel was ineffective for not requesting a mistrial after a prospective juror indicated she was the jail nurse and had treated Pearson; (2) the court denied Pearson his right to be present when the court responded to the jury's requests to see some exhibits; (3) Pearson's trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to sending a doctor's cover letter into the jury room along with the medical reports when the letter vouched for the accusers' credibility; and (4) a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice because the real controversy was not fully tried. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

CURLEY, P.J. Jesse J. Franklin, Jr., appeals from a judgment of conviction and an order denying his postconviction motion. A jury found Franklin guilty of one count of possession with intent to deliver tetrahydrocannabinols (THC), contrary to WIS. STAT. § 961.41(1m)(h)2. (eff. Feb. 1, 2003); one count of possession with intent to deliver cocaine, contrary to § 961.41(1m)(cm)3. (eff. Feb. 1, 2003); and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 941.29(2)(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 2003).

PER CURIAM. Robert Magee appeals a judgment, entered upon a jury's verdict, convicting him of first-degree sexual assault of a child, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1). Magee also appeals the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Magee argues he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erroneously allowed a videotaped interview of the victim to be viewed in the jury room during deliberations. Although Magee concedes he waived this issue by failing to object at trial, Magee nevertheless urges this court to address his argument directly. We decline to do so. Alternatively, Magee seeks a new trial in the interest of justice or on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We reject Magee's arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

KESSLER, J. David A. Hansen appeals from a judgment of conviction resulting from Hansen's guilty plea after the trial court denied his motion to suppress for failure of the police officer to have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Byron Lee appeals from judgments of conviction of third-degree sexual assault and intimidation of a victim, and from an order denying his postconviction motion. He argues that the judge who took his no contest plea and was assigned to preside at sentencing erroneously recused himself. He also claims that the sentences imposed are unduly harsh and therefore an erroneous exercise of discretion. We conclude that no basis exists for resentencing and affirm the judgments and order.

PER CURIAM. Jose A. Baez appeals from a judgment of conviction and from an order denying his postconviction motion. The only issue is whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. James Armbrust appeals an order denying a motion for relief from a default judgment. The issue is whether his attorney's untimely filing of the answer should be imputed to Armbrust. Under the facts of this case, we conclude Armbrust was blameless and default judgment was inappropriate. We therefore reverse and remand.

BROWN, C.J. This case is about whether a widow, who was left out of an IRA and missed the one-year deadline to make a claim alleging an improper gift under the Marital Property Act, can nevertheless breathe life into her claim by asserting it as part of the probate of her late husband's will. She raises numerous arguments that she can do it this way, but we shoot them all down for the simple reason that she is comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. A claim of a marital property interest in an asset subject to nonprobate transfer is a completely different species from a challenge to a will's validity. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of her claim.

CURLEY, P.J. Dale R. Jacobson appeals the post-judgment contempt order requiring him to pay his former wife, Lori Jacobson, p/k/a Lori Gonion, $875 per month for 120 months to satisfy a $50,000 loan from his former wife, together with accrued interest on that amount. The $50,000 loan was memorialized in the marital settlement agreement and in a signed promissory note. Neither the agreement nor the note, however, contain repayment terms or a date by which the debt had to be paid. Jacobson argues that the trial court misconstrued the language in the marital settlement agreement and related promissory note "when it created a currently due, noncontingent obligation ." Additionally, Jacobson argues that the trial court erred in finding him in contempt for failing to make payments on the loan that had no due date and that was rewritten to add terms concerning repayment as was done by the family court commissioner. Because the trial court failed to conduct a de novo hearing as required, pursuant to WIS. STAT. §§ 767.17 and 757.69(8) (2005-06), we reverse the order of the trial court and we remand this matter to the trial court with the directive that a new hearing be conducted at which both parties testify and be allowed to present their recollections as to the repayment terms, the calculation of the interest due, and any legal defenses to the payment of the loan.

HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J. In this consolidated appeal, Phillip J.E. appeals termination of parental rights (TPR) orders under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(10) to his three children, Daniel J.E, Michelle L.E. and Sera M.E. The grounds for the TPR orders were established, in part, by prior adjudications that his children were in need of protection or services (CHIPS) under WIS. STAT. § 48.13(10). Phillip contends that the Waupaca County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) should be estopped from obtaining terminations under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(10) because it breached a plea agreement with him regarding the CHIPS adjudications by initiating TPR proceedings. Phillip also contends that application of § 48.415(10) in this case violates his right to substantive due process. We disagree and therefore affirm.

WEDEMEYER, J. The Journal Sentinel, Inc. and Zurich American Insurance Company appeal from an order of the circuit court affirming an order of the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), which ruled that there was credible and substantial evidence to affirm the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) finding that Michael J. Wagner's knees and hip injuries were work-related and therefore compensable under Wisconsin's worker's compensation laws. The Journal Sentinel asserts that because the physicians' opinions were based on an inaccurate fact as to the number of steps Wagner had to use each shift he worked, there is no credible evidence to support the findings that Wagner's injuries were work-related, that we must find the treating physicians' opinions in that regard to be incredible and that LIRC therefore exceeded its power in affirming the ALJ's determination. Because LIRC did not exceed its power and because there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to uphold the findings of the ALJ, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

PETERSON, J. This action arises out of Michael and Marcia Wilson's purchase of a herd of dairy cattle from Robert Tuxen. The Wilsons allege the cattle were infected with Johne's disease, an infectious, ultimately fatal disease they claim caused the demise of their farm. The circuit court granted Tuxen summary judgment, dismissing the suit in its entirety.

PER CURIAM. Sandra and Gary Luedtke appeal a judgment, entered on a jury verdict, dismissing their medical malpractice claims against Dr. Ghazwan Katmeh and related health care entities and insurers. They argue the court erred in excluding evidence of complaints against Katmeh by other patients and a resulting Medical Examining Board investigation. We conclude the court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the evidence and affirm the judgment.

PER CURIAM. Kathy Genrich and the Estate of Robert Genrich (collectively "Genrich") appeal from an order granting summary judgment dismissal of Genrich's medical malpractice claims against OHIC Insurance Company, Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund, Meriter Hospital, Inc., Margaret Bjelde, R.N., Shelly White, O.R.T., Kimberly A. Brown, O.R.T., David Melnick, M.D., Brenda Satchie, M.D., University of Wisconsin Hospital & Clinics Authority and Dawn M. Shaw, O.R.T. Genrich argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing her claims as time-barred. Alternatively, Genrich contends the circuit court erred by not applying equitable estoppel to preclude OHIC and its insureds from asserting a statute of limitations defense. We reject Genrich's arguments and affirm the judgment.

BRIDGE, J. The State appeals from the circuit court's order vacating Shawn D. Bowman's judgment of conviction for operating while intoxicated in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) (second offense) and dismissing the charge against him. The State argues that the circuit court lacked authority to sua sponte do so. We agree, reverse the order, and remand the cause with directions to reinstate the conviction.

PER CURIAM. Gale Schaffer appeals a partial summary judgment dismissing his emotional distress claim against Mindy Aubry's insurer, Progressive Northern Insurance Company. Schaffer contends the circuit court applied the wrong standard in determining his claim's viability. We agree. We reverse the judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.

PER CURIAM. Wendy and Phillip Crary appeal the circuit court's order for summary judgment in favor of PIC Wisconsin and Beaver Dam Community Hospitals, Inc. (collectively, "BDCH"). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

PER CURIAM. Dennis Desbrow, Michael Lynch, and Mary Ann Lynch (the Neighbors) appeal an order of the circuit court affirming the Langlade County Board of Adjustment's decision granting Raymond and Dorothy Porter a variance from the minimum lot width requirement. They argue the Board proceeded on an incorrect theory of the law, and the evidence did not support the Board's decision. We disagree and affirm the order.

HOOVER, P.J. John Bettendorf appeals a circuit court judgment entered following remittitur from this court, arguing the circuit court erred in refusing to hear additional arguments after the case was returned. Because we conclude the court appropriately applied our decision, we affirm.

PETERSON, J. Gilbert Rasmussen appeals an order finding his refusal to submit to a breath test improper and revoking his driving privileges for one year. He argues his refusal was not improper because the arresting officer lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to detain him for field sobriety tests and, without those tests, there was no probable cause for arrest. We conclude the officer had reasonable suspicion and affirm the order.

PETERSON, J. This is our second opinion in this case involving David Schauer's claims against the defendants, including the Diocese of Green Bay (collectively, the Diocese). In our first opinion, we concluded the statute of limitations on Schauer's claims ran out in 2001, two years before he filed this suit. See Schauer v. Diocese of Green Bay, 2004 WI App 180, ¶¶7, 26, 276 Wis. 2d 141, 687 N.W.2d 766 (Schauer I). However, we remanded the case for a circuit court determination on whether the Diocese was equitably estopped from asserting the statute. On remand, the circuit court, after submitting certain factual disputes to a jury, concluded the Diocese was not equitably estopped from asserting the statute and dismissed Schauer's claims.

PETERSON, J. Henry and Lisa Nault appeal a summary judgment holding their West Bend Mutual Insurance Company umbrella policy does not provide excess underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. They argue the policy is contextually ambiguous. They also contend the court should have held there was coverage because West Bend failed to give proper notice of the availability of excess UIM coverage in violation of WIS. STAT. § 632.32(4m).

LUNDSTEN J. The question before us is whether WIS. STAT. § 66.0217(11)(c) bars a town from contesting in court a particular type of annexation, namely, a "direct annexation by unanimous approval" under § 66.0217(2). The Village of Merrimac annexed property located in the Town of Merrimac under § 66.0217(2), and the Town brought suit. We agree with the circuit court that § 66.0217(11)(c) bars the Town's suit and that the Town may not obtain review of the annexation by the common law writ of certiorari. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court.