PER CURIAM. We review the findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations of the referee, Curry First, concluding that Attorney Steven D. Robinson engaged in unprofessional conduct in the course of his practice of law. Referee First recommended a public reprimand and imposition of the costs of this proceeding. Neither party has appealed from the referee's report and recommendation. We approve the findings, conclusions and recommendations as to the appropriate discipline for Attorney Robinson's misconduct.

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J. Robert Matteson, Nancy Matteson, and Matteson Communications (collectively, Robert) seek review of a published court of appeals opinion that affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded a decision of the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court, the Honorable Robert J. Wirtz presiding, related to the dissolution of a business partnership.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2005-06). Andrea L.O. appeals a circuit court order terminating her parental rights to her son Lyle E., Jr. (Junior) on the ground that he was in continuing need of protection or services.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, reversing in part and remanding for further proceedings a judgment of the Circuit Court for Outagamie County, Judge Dee R. Dyer, presiding.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Muller v. Society Ins., 2007 WI App 44, 300 Wis. 2d 463, 730 N.W.2d 668, reversing a judgment of the circuit court for Polk County, Robert H. Rasmussen, Judge.

PER CURIAM. The court is called upon to determine whether a judge's conduct in presiding at 11 cases in which the judge's spouse was a director of one of the parties constitutes misconduct under SCR 60.04(4)(e)1. of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Wis. Stat. § 757.81(4)(a).

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The petitioners, Anthony and Andrea Migliaccio, seek review of an unpublished court of appeals decision reversing a circuit court order that had granted summary judgment in favor of the Migliaccios and dismissed the Wis. Stat. § 100.18 statutory misrepresentation claim of Chad Novell, the respondent. They contend that the court of appeals erred when it concluded that reasonable reliance is not an element of the statutory misrepresentation claim.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, reversing a summary judgment issued by the Dane County Circuit Court, Angela B. Bartell, Judge. The circuit court dismissed a declaratory judgment action filed by plaintiff Walter Olson (Olson).

PER CURIAM. Myron Crane appeals an order granting NCO Portfolio Management, Inc.'s motion for relief from an order awarding attorney fees. Crane argues the circuit court erred by vacating the attorney fee award when the underlying judgment forming the basis for that award remains in effect. We agree and, therefore, reverse the order vacating the attorney fee award.

VERGERONT, J. The issue on this appeal is whether the circuit court properly dismissed a criminal charge added in the information because the prosecutor successfully objected at the preliminary hearing to questions that were relevant to that crime but not to the crime charged in the complaint. The complaint charged Elizabeth White with delivery of an amount of controlled substance between one and five grams in violation of WIS. STAT. § 961.41(1)(cm)1r. (2005-06), and the information added a charge of maintaining a drug house in violation of WIS. STAT. § 961.42(1). The circuit court concluded that, although the two charges might be transactionally related, it was unfair to permit the addition of the drug-house charge after the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing had successfully objected to questions relevant to that charge. The State appeals.

BRIDGE, J. This case involves the application of Wisconsin's identity theft statute to a person who misappropriates the identity of a public official. The circuit court ruled that the identity theft statute, WIS. STAT. § 943.201(2)(c) (2005-06), which in part prohibits the unauthorized use of a person's identity for the purpose of harming an individual's reputation, is unconstitutional as applied in the present case. The court reasoned that because the person whose identity Christopher Baron misappropriated was a public official, application of the identity theft statute violated Baron's First Amendment right to defame a public official with true information. We conclude that the identity theft statute does not criminalize the act of defaming a public official, and therefore does not violate Baron's First Amendment rights. Accordingly, we reverse.

NEUBAUER, J. Christopher Hoppe seeks to withdraw his guilty pleas to twelve counts of possession of child pornography. He appeals from the judgment convicting him and from the order denying his postconviction effort to withdraw his pleas. He contends that the plea colloquy fell too far short of required standards and that, due to being medicated and not reading the plea questionnaire/waiver of rights form ("plea questionnaire"), he did not comprehend the rights he was waiving or the penalties he faced.

WEDEMEYER, J. Kendrick Jackson appeals from a judgment of conviction on two counts of first-degree sexual assault while armed, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 940.225(1)(b) (2005-06) and two counts of kidnapping/seize or confine without consent, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 940.31(1)(b). He also appeals from orders denying his motion for post conviction relief.

PER CURIAM. Kirby T. Murrell appeals from a circuit court order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005­06) postconviction motion and from an order denying his motion for reconsideration. We conclude that the circuit court did not err when it held that Murrell's motion was procedurally barred pursuant to State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 181-82, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994) (postconviction claims that could have been raised in prior postconviction or appellate proceedings are barred absent a sufficient reason for failing to raise the claims in the earlier proceedings), and State v. Tillman, 2005 WI App 71, ¶19, 281 Wis. 2d 157, 696 N.W.2d 574 (no-merit procedure precludes successive postconviction motion raising same or other issues absent the defendant demonstrating a sufficient reason for failing to raise those issues through counsel or in a no-merit response). We therefore affirm the circuit court's orders.

PER CURIAM. Dennis Reimer appeals from a judgment of conviction of first-degree reckless injury. He argues that plain error occurred when the prosecutor misused evidence of other bad acts during closing argument, that the trial court erred in rejecting evidence supporting his theory of an alternative perpetrator of the crime, and that he was entitled to an in camera inspection of the mental health records of the infant victim's mother. We reject his claims and affirm the judgment.

PER CURIAM. Michael T. Shilbauer appeals from a judgment of conviction for criminal trespass, operating a vehicle without the owner's consent, fleeing from an officer, and bail-jumping, and from a postconviction order summarily denying his motion for a redetermination of his eligibility for the Challenge Incarceration and Earned Release Programs (collectively referred to as "Programs"). The issue is whether the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in merely declaring that Shilbauer was ineligible for those Programs at the conclusion of its sentencing remarks. We conclude that it is unnecessary for the trial court to restate its reasons for determining a defendant's ineligibility for the Programs when its overall sentencing rationale also justifies its ineligibility determinations. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Carl Anthony Bookout appeals from a judgment of conviction and an order denying his postconviction motion. Bookout claims that he was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information. We reject his contentions and affirm.

SNYDER, J. Michael D. Peters appeals from a judgment of conviction for obstructing an officer, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 946.41(1). Peters first contends that the circuit erred when it held that Peters was the subject of a legal investigatory traffic stop. He asserts that the officer's decision to stop him was based merely on a hunch and that the officer in fact provoked the driving behavior later characterized as suspicious. Peters also argues that his arrest for obstruction was not supported by probable cause. He asserts that the court should have granted his motions to suppress evidence obtained subsequent to the stop or, alternatively, subsequent to the arrest. Peters also argues that the circuit court failed to properly instruct the jury on the charge of obstruction. We agree with Peters that the evidence should have been suppressed because the investigative stop was unlawful and the arrest was not supported by probable cause. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter with directions.

ANDERSON, P.J. Lolita V. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights (TPR) to Richard C. III (Ricky). Lolita also appeals from an order denying her postdisposition motion for a new trial based on her allegations that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel because her counsel failed to object to improper evidence.

PER CURIAM. Kevin Mahner appeals a summary judgment in favor of New Holland North America, Inc. The key question in this appeal is what rights Mahner has against New Holland under his settlement with the defendant in this case, Rew Motors, Inc. We conclude Mahner acquired only Rew Motors' contribution and indemnification rights, not the right to assert his products liability claim directly against New Holland. We affirm the judgment.

PER CURIAM. Johnnie L. Burns appeals pro se from the circuit court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Burns, who was convicted in 1989 of several armed robberies and other crimes, challenged as impermissibly suggestive his identification by victims at a police "showup." The circuit court denied the petition because it concluded that the record was insufficient to support Burns' claims. We affirm the circuit court's decision, but we reach that result on different grounds than those employed by the circuit court. See State v. Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 124, 382 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1985). We conclude that to the extent Burns litigated the propriety of the show-up in prior postconviction proceedings, he was procedurally barred from re-litigating the issue. More importantly, we conclude that the supreme court's opinion in State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, on which Burns relies, is not retroactively applicable to this matter.

VERGERONT, J. This is a small claims action in which Jeff Voigt, an inmate at Waupun Correctional Institution, seeks to recover damages from five state officers and employees for the severing of his television cord in his cell by another inmate. The circuit court concluded the complaint failed to state a claim for relief and ordered it dismissed. Voigt appeals, contending that the circuit court failed to give a liberal construction to his complaint and erred in concluding that he could have amended his complaint to cure the deficiencies under WIS. STAT. ch. 799, which governs small claims actions. For the reasons we explain below, we reject Voigt's arguments and affirm the order of dismissal and the order denying Voigt's motion for reconsideration.

PER CURIAM. West Bend Mutual Insurance Company appeals from an order dismissing its third-party complaint against Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London and determining that Lloyd's warehouseman's insurance policy does not provide coverage for the potential liability of Valley Bakers Cooperative Association for spoiled celery that Valley Bakers was keeping in frozen storage. The issue is whether storage space leased by Valley Bakers was a "newly acquired" location within the meaning of Lloyd's policy. We agree with the circuit court that a newly acquired location covered under the policy is one that has ownership or control associated with it. We affirm the order dismissing Lloyd's from the action.

BRUNNER, J. Jon Ford appeals a judgment of conviction for operating while intoxicated--first offense and operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration--first offense. He argues the conviction should be reversed because (1) the real controversy has not been fully tried and (2) there has been a miscarriage of justice. We disagree and affirm.

ANDERSON, P.J. We do not reach the substantive issue raised by Stephanie A. James because her no contest plea to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), first offense, waives her challenge that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in setting aside the judgment of dismissal. Therefore, we affirm her conviction for OWI.

BROWN, C.J. Brittany L. Roe appeals the trial court's order finding that she improperly refused to take a breathalyzer test in violation of this state's implied consent law. She alleges that there was no probable cause to arrest her and that testimony by the officer that he read Roe the implied consent form is insufficient to show that she was advised of her rights under WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4). This court holds that there was probable cause to arrest and that the testimony about the officer having read her the implied consent form was sufficient. We affirm.

HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J. Franklin F. Cook appeals a circuit court order affirming a hearing examiner's decision denying him a driveway construction permit and a special permit to exceed the maximum allowed driveway length. We conclude that Cook fails to meet his burden to prove that the ordinance's provision limiting the length of driveways to 400 feet is not a valid exercise of the Town's police power under WIS. STAT. § 61.34. We further conclude that this provision and another provision permitting the Town to grant a special permit to exceed the maximum allowed driveway length are not zoning restrictions. Finally, we conclude that the Town's application of the relevant provisions of the ordinance to Cook was not arbitrary and represented its judgment rather than its will. We therefore affirm.

VERGERONT, J. This is a small claims action in which Kuchembecker seeks damages from Doug Tesar resulting from an automobile accident. The circuit court determined that Tesar was negligent and awarded $4,695 in compensatory damages, the amount requested by Kuchembecker. Tesar appeals, contending that the circuit court's failure to attribute any negligence to Kuchembecker was clearly erroneous and its resulting failure to reduce the damages proportionately, as required by WIS. STAT. § 895.045(1), constitutes an error of law. We reject these contentions and affirm the circuit court's judgment.

PER CURIAM. Mary Hauser sued Mark Bosman individually in connection with a home inspection. Bosman moved to dismiss, contending if Hauser had any claims for failures in the inspection, whether in contract or tort, it was against Home Inspection Associates, LLC ("the LLC"), of which he is a member. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that it was clearly revealed at all times to Hauser that the LLC would be doing the inspection. We disagree. Whether Hauser contracted with Bosman or the LLC presents a question of fact necessitating reversal. Moreover, although an individual is personally responsible for his or her own tortious conduct, we remand for a determination of whether a viable tort claim may be presented for a negligent home inspection under the facts of this case.