PER CURIAM. We review a referee's report recommending that Hazel J. Washington's license to practice law in Wisconsin be reinstated. No party has appealed from that report and recommendation. Therefore, the court's review proceeds under SCR 22.33(3).

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. The defendant, David G. Straszkowski, seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals order summarily affirming a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for Clark County, Jon M. Counsell, Judge. Based upon the defendant's plea of guilty, the circuit court convicted the defendant of second-degree sexual assault of a child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (2003-04). The circuit court denied the defendant's post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. Petitioner, Diana G. Sanders (Sanders), seeks review of an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals, which dismissed Sanders' appeal as having been untimely filed. The orders involved were granted in probate proceedings in the Circuit Court for Waupaca County with Judge Philip M. Kirk, presiding. The Respondent is the Estate of David R. Sanders (the Estate), and Ivan Gruetzmacher is the personal representative of the Estate.

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. A lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon (hereinafter "District Court of Oregon") that resulted in a judgment for $958,253.40 entered against two of the respondents, Kishan Bagadia and UNIK Associates (collectively, "UNIK"), and in favor of the two other respondents, Symantec Corporation and Quarterdeck Corporation (collectively, "Symantec"), precipitated the present action filed by UNIK's insurer, Acuity Mutual Insurance Company ("Acuity"), in the Waukesha County Circuit Court. Acuity sought a declaration that its insurance policy with UNIK does not cover the damages entered by the District Court of Oregon for an "advertising injury" Symantec alleges that it incurred as a result of UNIK's infringement of Symantec's copyrights and trademarks. Alternatively, in the event the circuit court ultimately held that Acuity's policy does cover the damages, Acuity sought a declaration that the amount it owes UNIK is set off by the amount Symantec has allegedly recovered from another insurer.

PER CURIAM. Pending before the court is a petition for review filed by Steven Nytsch. We decline to review this matter. However, we deviate from our usual practice of denying the petition for review by written order. Rather, we grant the petition for the sole purpose of remanding the matter to the court of appeals with directions to vacate certain language contained in footnote 6 of the court of appeals' decision.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The Honorable Marshall B. Murray seeks review of a published court of appeals decision granting a writ of mandamus. The writ directed him upon remand to permit the complainant, Adrian Hipp, to have subpoenas issued for those persons he listed as witnesses for a John Doe hearing. The court of appeals concluded that clerks of court may issue subpoenas for John Doe hearings.

PER CURIAM. Andrew Robinson appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him, and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue and when it rejected his challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and that he was denied his right to confront a witness against him under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Because we conclude that the trial court did not err, his trial counsel was not ineffective, and he does not have a right to confront a witness at a preliminary hearing, we affirm.

BRIDGE, J. Jason McClaren is charged with aggravated battery, attempted first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree reckless injury. The State has conceded that a factual basis exists for him to raise a claim of perfect self-defense. He appeals the circuit court's pretrial order requiring him to disclose, prior to trial, a summary of the evidence he intends to offer in furtherance of his defense regarding what he believed to be the violent character of the victim. In particular, the order requires disclosure of a summary of all specific instances of the victim's violent conduct of which McClaren is aware and intends to introduce at trial, including witnesses to the conduct and the relevant dates and locations of the conduct. We conclude that under the rule articulated in State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 478, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967), the circuit court's order exceeds its authority under WIS. STAT. § 971.23(2m) (2005-06) governing pretrial discovery in criminal matters. We also conclude that the court's general authority under WIS. STAT. § 906.11 to exercise control over the mode and order of presenting evidence cannot be read to permit it to require pretrial discovery that it would otherwise not be permitted to require under § 971.23(2m) and the rule in Miller. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's order.

PER CURIAM. Cheryl Sellers-Bruring appeals from a judgment convicting her of theft, as a party to a crime, criminal damage to property with a value over $2500, as a party to a crime, and transfer of encumbered property with intent to defraud. She argues that there was insufficient evidence to support two of the convictions. We affirm.

CURLEY, P.J. Brian A. Presberry appeals the judgment convicting him of five counts of armed robbery, as a party to the crime, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 943.32(1)(b) and (2), and 939.05 (2003-04). He also appeals from the order denying his postconviction motion. He argues that his convictions should be reversed because his attorney was ineffective for failing to conduct an investigation and for failing to subpoena alibi witnesses. He also contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him. Finally, he claims that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it sentenced him on each count to two and one-half years of initial confinement, to be followed by four years of extended supervision, to be served consecutively. Because Presberry's attorney was not ineffective, the evidence was sufficient, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion at sentencing, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Ricky D. Mitchell appeals from a judgment of conviction and from orders denying his postconviction motion and motion to reconsider. Mitchell contends that his trial attorney was ineffective at sentencing. We disagree and affirm.

PER CURIAM. After a trial to the court, Marlin A. Dixon was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide for his involvement in the beating death of Charlie Young, Jr. The circuit court imposed a forty-year prison sentence on Dixon. Dixon was a fourteen-year-old juvenile at the time of the crime, and he was initially incarcerated at the Ethan Allen School, a juvenile facility. When he turned sixteen, the Department of Corrections (DOC) transferred him to an adult institution where he was sexually assaulted by his cellmate. Dixon sought sentence modification, arguing that his premature transfer to an adult institution and subsequent rape constituted a new factor warranting sentence modification. The circuit court rejected Dixon's motion, and Dixon appeals. We reject Dixon's arguments and affirm the judgment of conviction and postconviction order.

PER CURIAM. Peter Seymour appeals a judgment, entered upon a jury's verdict, convicting him of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Seymour also appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Seymour seeks a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel or, alternatively, in the interest of justice. We reject Seymour's arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Edward M. Maresh pled guilty to one count each of felony bail jumping and maintaining a drug-trafficking place. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and the order denying his postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Maresh also seeks resentencing on grounds the trial court failed to state on the record the basis for the sentence and relied on inaccurate information. Maresh has not shown manifest injustice: his counsel's performance was not prejudicial, his pleas were knowingly and intelligently entered and he has waived direct review of whether the State breached the plea agreement. In addition, the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in sentencing Maresh. We affirm.

KESSLER, J. Willie D. Griffin appeals from an order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas after sentencing based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Griffin argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion without granting him a Machner hearing. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Aaron Jones appeals from judgments convicting him of attempted armed robbery and misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and from an order denying his postconviction motion to withdraw his plea and for resentencing. He argues that his plea was not knowingly entered and lacked a factual basis because of confusion regarding the date and place of the crime and that he is entitled to resentencing because dismissed counts were used as "read-ins" at sentencing. We affirm that portion of the order denying the motion for plea withdrawal and reverse the judgment of conviction and that part of the order denying resentencing. We remand for resentencing before a different judge.

PER CURIAM. Anthony Lamont Jones appeals from a judgment of conviction and from an order denying his second postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Jones contends that his pleas were not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and therefore they constitute a manifest injustice. We disagree and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Omar Carrasquillo, a/k/a Ernesto Rivera, appeals pro se from an order denying his postconviction motion brought pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005-06). The circuit court denied the motion as conclusory and unsupported. We affirm, but on the alternative ground that the claim is procedurally barred.

PER CURIAM. Sharod Antwon Doll appeals from a judgment entered after he pled guilty to one count of delivery of a controlled substance, cocaine (one gram or less), contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 961.16(2)(b)1. and 961.41(1)(cm)1g. (2005-06).(1) He also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion seeking sentence modification and an order denying his motion seeking reconsideration of the denial of his sentence modification motion. Because the trial court did not erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion, we affirm.

WEDEMEYER, J. Cory Mendrell Welch appeals from judgments and an order following two trials in which a jury found him guilty on all four counts in the first trial and eight of the twelve counts in the second trial. Welch claims in this appeal that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it: (1) granted the State's motion to sever the sixteen-charged counts into two separate trials; and (2) allowed other-acts evidence to be admitted at both trials. Because the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in rendering the severance or evidentiary rulings, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Nancy Ezell appeals, pro se, from an order denying her postconviction motion to cure allegedly excessive sentences. See WIS. STAT. § 973.13 (2005-06). The circuit court concluded that Ezell was not entitled to relief, and we affirm.

KESSLER, J. Jolanda Naqellari appeals from a judgment wherein she was awarded $220.55 less than she requested for repair of her vehicle following an accident in which the circuit court found the driver of the other vehicle involved one hundred percent liable for the damage. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. S.D. appeals a circuit court's award of punitive damages against Jacob Eisold. S.D. contends the court erred when concluding it could not consider Eisold's future earning capacity when awarding punitive damages. We agree and reverse the portion of the judgment awarding punitive damages and remand for the court to reconsider the issue in light of this decision.

PETERSON, J. Vincent Biskupic is a former Outagamie County District Attorney and an unsuccessful candidate for Wisconsin Attorney General. He claims he was defamed by a newspaper article published by the Shawano Leader in August 2004. The article incorrectly stated Biskupic had been involved in bribery and graft.

PER CURIAM. Ruby Luedtke appeals orders resolving a dispute over the estate of her son, Kurt Luedtke, who died intestate. The issue is whether Kurt's interest in a farm, received by deed from Ruby just before Kurt's death, belongs to the estate, or reverts to Ruby. We affirm the trial court's determination that the disputed property belongs to the estate.

PER CURIAM. Mark Freitag challenges the property division in the judgment divorcing him from Evelyn Freitag. He also appeals from an order denying reconsideration. Mark argues that the circuit court erroneously valued the marital home, failed to restore his inherited property to him, erroneously awarded Evelyn's pension to her as her separate property, and erroneously included Evelyn's student loan debt as marital debt. Because the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in dividing the parties' property and debts, we affirm the judgment and the order.

ANDERSON, P.J. PRN Associates LLC and PGN Associates LLC (hereinafter collectively, Prism) appeal from an order dismissing a petition for review filed pursuant to WIS. STAT. §§ 227.52-53 (2005-06) and an order denying reconsideration of that dismissal. We agree with the circuit court that Prism's claims are moot and, therefore, affirm the orders.

BROWN, C.J. This case arises from an automobile accident in Oconomowoc in which Richard Torres was killed. Torres lived and worked in Texas and had traveled to Wisconsin, along with a coworker, for a seminar related to his job. At the time of the accident, the coworker was driving the car and Torres was the passenger. Torres' estate, his minor daughter, and his mother sued the coworker and his insurers for negligence, but the trial court dismissed the claims on the grounds that Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act provides Torres' exclusive remedy for his coworker's negligence in the accident. On appeal, Plaintiffs renew their argument that the accident does not fall under worker's compensation because neither Torres nor his employer was subject to the Wisconsin Act. We conclude, as the circuit court did, that where an out-of-state employer sends an out-of-state employee to Wisconsin and the employee is injured or killed in Wisconsin in the course of employment, Wisconsin's Act is applicable. Therefore Torres' co-employee has no liability for Torres' death and his insurers were properly dismissed from the case. See WIS. STAT. § 102.03(2) (2005-06). This conclusion moots the rest of the issues in the case; we therefore affirm.

CURLEY, P.J. Gary M. Lohman appeals the judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (second offense), contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 346.63(1)(a) and 346.65(2) (2005-06). He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained by the police after the police stopped his car as a result of a citizen 9-1-1 call. Because the 9-1-1 call from a citizen who identified himself and told the police he thought Lohman was drunk gave the police reasonable suspicion to stop Lohman, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. Consequently, this court affirms the judgment of conviction.

SNYDER, J. Jacob Jeffrey Van Ruden appeals from an order finding his refusal to submit to a chemical test requested pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 343.305 unreasonable. Van Ruden contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that the arresting officer had complied with the implied consent law. On appeal, Van Ruden argues that the Department of Transportation violated the separation of powers doctrine by amending the Informing the Accused form to include language not authorized by § 343.305(4). Because Van Ruden did not make a separation of powers argument before the circuit court, that argument is waived. Further, we disagree that the arresting officer failed to comply with the informed consent law and we affirm the order of the circuit court.

BROWN, C.J. Christopher M. Ritchey appeals his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated--3rd offense. The police officer's discovery of this offense arose out of an initial stop for driving without headlights on. Ritchey claimed at his motion to dismiss/motion to suppress hearing, and again by his postconviction motion, that he had his headlights on and so there was no reasonable suspicion to stop him. But the judge who presided over the pretrial motion, Judge James Carlson, found the police officer more credible. And that is what this appeal is about: a credibility determination. We will not reverse a credibility determination of the trial court unless it is clearly erroneous, and that is not the case here. We affirm.

FINE, J. The Milwaukee Police Association and Philip Sliwinski appeal the judgment quashing their petition for a writ of mandamus that sought an order reinstating Sliwinski to his position as a City of Milwaukee police officer. We reverse because Sliwinski is entitled to his pay and benefits under WIS. STAT. § 62.50(18), but not, as we explain below, reinstatement.

ANDERSON, P.J. The Trimble Irrevocable Trust (c/o Gene Trimble) appeals from an order granting summary judgment to Thomas and Josephine Camacho, holding that they gained title to a small strip of land through adverse possession. We reject Trimble's procedural and substantive challenges and affirm.

BROWN, J. This appeal concerns a real property agreement entered into in 1967. This agreement gave a right of first refusal on one property to owners of adjoining properties and stated that this right belonged to these property owners and their "heirs, successors and assigns." The key issue in this case is whether this right of first refusal could be transferred to just anybody or whether it could only be transferred along with one of the adjoining properties. The appellant, Robert L. Altnau, claims that he holds the right of first refusal, having received it by "assignment" from one of the owners of the adjoining properties. He asserts that the word "assigns" in the 1967 agreement therefore includes him. But the circuit court held, and we agree, that the law is as follows: in the absence of clear language stating otherwise, the right runs with the land, unless it would be more useful to the original grantee than to one who later owned the land. Contrary to Altnau's argument, the use of the word "assigns" in the agreement does not constitute such a clear statement; and he has given no reason to think that the right is more valuable to him than to the owners of the adjoining property. We therefore affirm the trial court and hold that the right of first refusal runs with the land.

PER CURIAM. The appellants, landowners in the Town of Rome, appeal from a judgment of the circuit court declaring invalid the nonconforming use permits they received from the Town's Zoning Board of Appeals. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse.

NEUBAUER, J. J&K Aligning, Inc., d/b/a Summerfield Aligning Service, appeals from a WIS. STAT. ch. 799 small claims judgment in favor of Jennifer Pacocha in the amount of $207.90. The judgment resulted from a dispute between the parties as to the amount owed by Pacocha to Summerfield for vehicle repairs. Summerfield argues that the trial court erred in ordering it to reimburse Pacocha for amounts paid for vehicle repairs. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J. Lavonne R. O'Malley appeals pro se a judgment against her for failure to stop at a stop sign as a bicyclist, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.46(1) (2005-06). We affirm.