PER CURIAM. We review the report of the referee, John Murphy, recommending the court suspend Attorney Terrence Woods' license to practice law for a period of ninety (90) days for professional misconduct committed in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding and a divorce proceeding. No appeal has been filed.

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J. This is a review of a published court of appeals opinion affirming the circuit court's determination that a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy issued by American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American Family) to Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc. (WSGI) covered damages awarded to Robert Stuart and Lin Farquhar-Stuart (the Stuarts) in a lawsuit resulting from the misrepresentations, as well as design and construction defects, related to a home remodeling project WSGI performed for the Stuarts.

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. The State seeks review of a published court of appeals decision reversing an order and judgment of the Circuit Court for Racine County, Dennis J. Barry, Judge. The circuit court denied defendant Dwight M. Sanders' motions to suppress both physical evidence and statements that law enforcement officers obtained following a warrantless entry into the defendant's home and two subsequent warrantless searches of the defendant's bedroom. The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver as a second offense and as a habitual offender contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)1r., 961.48, and 939.62 (2005-06).

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. We review a decision by the court of appeals affirming an order of the circuit court that dismissed one count of attempted third-degree sexual assault, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3) (2005-06) and Wis. Stat. § 939.32, against Nicholas Grunke, Alexander Grunke and Dustin Radke. The issue presented is whether § 940.225 criminalizes sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a victim already dead at the time of the sexual activity when the accused did not cause the death of the victim. We conclude that it does. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. This case comes before us by certification from the court of appeals. Ramon Arias (Arias) was charged with one count of carrying a concealed weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 941.23 and 939.51(3)(a) (2005-06); one count of possession of a switchblade knife, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 941.24 and 939.51(3)(a); and one count of possession with intent to deliver no more than five grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)1r, 939.50(3)(f) and 961.49(2)(f).

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. We review a decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's sua sponte vacation of a default judgment against defendant Carlos Rutherford and the circuit court's sua sponte grant of judgment in Rutherford's favor. We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in vacating the default judgment because Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) (2005-06) permits a court to grant relief from a judgment or an order. However, we also conclude that the circuit court did err when it sua sponte granted summary judgment in Rutherford's favor because it failed to give the prior notice required by Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). Accordingly, we affirm in part; reverse in part and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This is a review of a published court of appeals' decision, which reversed the decision of the Dane County Circuit Court, Steven D. Ebert, Judge. In the underlying dispute between Menasha Corporation (Menasha) and the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (DOR), the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission (Commission) concluded that the "R/3 System," which Menasha purchased from SAP, was a custom computer program under Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.71(1)(e) (Sept. 2006), and thus, the R/3 System was exempt from sales and use tax. See Wis. Stat. § 77.51(20) (2003-04). The DOR appealed that decision to the Dane County Circuit Court. The circuit court reversed the Commission's decision and concluded that the R/3 System was a non-custom software program and thus was taxable as tangible property. Menasha then appealed that decision to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's decision and therefore affirmed the Commission's initial decision that the R/3 System was custom and thus exempt from sales and use tax. We affirm the court of appeals' decision.

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J. This is a review of a published court of appeals opinion reversing and remanding a non-final order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable Clare L. Fiorenza presiding. The circuit court issued an order directing the Whitnall School District (the District) to provide answers to interrogatories from Barbara Sands (Sands) regarding a discussion about her employment during a closed session of the Whitnall School Board (the Board).

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. Preserving an open government and promoting economic development represent two defining principles which we value as a people and strive to accomplish as a state. This case represents the intersection of these two principles.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed an order of the Kenosha County Circuit Court, Wilbur W. Warren III, Judge.

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J. Walgreen Co. (Walgreens) seeks review of a published court of appeals opinion affirming a judgment of the Dane County Circuit Court, the Honorable Diane M. Nicks presiding. The judgment adopted assessments of two Walgreens stores located in Madison, Wisconsin, conducted by the City of Madison (City) for tax purposes. Walgreens challenged the assessments and sought a refund of taxes paid on the properties for 2003 and 2004, but the Madison Board of Review rejected its challenges. Walgreens filed a Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d)(2005-06) action, and the circuit court and court of appeals both upheld the City's assessments.

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J. This is a review of a published court of appeals opinion affirming a judgment of the Dane County circuit court, Judge David T. Flanagan, III, presiding. The County of Dane (County) challenges a judgment ordering the County to pay the Town of Madison (Town) $75,000 toward the cost of constructing a bridge, along with costs and fees.

PER CURIAM. Carl E. Rucker and the Rucker Detective Agency (collectively referred to as "Rucker and his agency") appeal from the circuit court's order affirming the order of the Department of Regulation & Licensing ("Department") imposing a suspension and costs on Carl E. Rucker ("Rucker"), and reprimanding and limiting the license of the Rucker Detective Agency ("Detective Agency") for unprofessional conduct. Rucker and his agency raise ten issues on appeal of which only four were even arguably preserved. We conclude that Rucker and his agency have waived their right to review six of the issues they now raise for failing to raise those issues in their circuit court petition, and that they have failed to adequately raise and brief one of the claims that they had arguably preserved, namely that the circuit court "erred [by] upholding the department's actions in this case." Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Gregory J. Nelson appeals from a judgment convicting him of first-degree intentional homicide by use of a dangerous weapon, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§940.01(1)(a) and 939.63(1)(b) (2005-06). His trial theory was self-defense. Nelson contends the trial court should have admitted a recorded conversation between him and his brother referring to the victim having a weapon, and should have allowed him to counter testimony about the victim's peaceful nature with evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim. He also contends that the evidence did not support giving the provocation instruction and was insufficient to support the guilty verdict. Lastly, Nelson contends the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. We disagree and affirm.

PER CURIAM. A jury convicted Cortez P. Robinson of first-degree intentional homicide, armed robbery with use of force, and attempted first-degree intentional homicide, all as a party to the crimes. On appeal, Robinson argues that the circuit court erred when it admitted out-of-court statements made to a third party by his accomplice, Aldric Robinson. Because we conclude that the appellant failed to preserve on the record his specific objections to admission of the statements and the circuit court's ruling on his objection, he waived the right to challenge the ruling on appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.

FINE, J. Davon Terrell Smith appeals a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of second-degree intentional homicide while armed, see WIS. STAT. §§ 940.05(1), 939.63, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, see WIS. STAT. § 941.29(2). He also appeals an order denying his postconviction motion. Smith claims that: (1) his trial lawyer was ineffective; and (2) the trial court erroneously excluded evidence. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Gregg Kandutsch appeals an order denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of double jeopardy. Because we conclude the circuit court appropriately determined there was a manifest necessity for granting a mistrial in Kandutsch's first trial, we affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Juan Jose DeJesus-Torres pled guilty to and was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, as a party to a crime. He appeals pro se from circuit court orders denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005­06) postconviction motion and his reconsideration motion. In the § 974.06 motion, DeJesus-Torres argued that his plea was invalid because his lawyer had failed to explain the elements to him, that he had not understood the elements of the crime to which he was pleading, and that he therefore had not entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. The circuit court denied the motion largely because DeJesus-Torres had failed to ensure that a transcript of the plea hearing had been produced and included in the record. In deciding the reconsideration motion, the circuit court ordered the plea-hearing transcript, reviewed it, and concluded that the transcript showed that DeJesus-Torres had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea. On appeal, we conclude that the record demonstrates that DeJesus-Torres' claims are without merit. We therefore affirm the circuit court's orders.

PER CURIAM. Lawrence Griffin, Jr., appeals pro se from circuit court orders denying his motion for sentence credit and requests for reconsideration. The circuit court denied the motions because Griffin did not meet the criteria for sentence credit established in WIS. STAT. § 973.155(1)(a) (2005-06). Because Griffin failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to sentence credit, we affirm the circuit court's orders.

PER CURIAM. Raymond L. Miller appeals pro se from orders denying his motions for sentence credit and an order denying his motion for reconsideration. The circuit court concluded that the days Miller spent in custody serving a sentence following revocation of probation should not be credited against a later-imposed concurrent sentence. We agree and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Derek Kramer appeals an order affirming a prison disciplinary decision. A hearing officer found that Kramer's possession of white supremacist publications, recruiting materials and symbols violated WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DOC 303.20 (Group Resistance) and § DOC 303.47 (Possession of Contraband). Kramer argues that the finding was arbitrary and not supported by the evidence because he received the materials through the prison mail room or property room and they do not appear on the list of prohibited publications, and the materials relate to an external group, not an inmate group. He also argues that his First Amendment and Equal Protection rights were violated by prohibiting his possession of these documents. We reject these arguments and affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Alex Willson appeals an ex parte order. The ex parte order vacated an earlier order requiring Dawn Willson to return the parties' daughter Raquel to Alex. Alex argues, among other things, that the court erred in vacating the order without notice to him as required by WIS. STAT. § 801.14. We agree, reverse, and remand with directions to vacate the ex parte order.

PER CURIAM. Dale Bird appeals a post-divorce order that modified the physical placement schedule for the parties' children. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

LUNDSTEN, J. David E. appeals a CHIPS (child in need of protection or services) order pertaining to his daughter, Chyanne E.E. David's principal argument is that he was entitled to a fact-finding hearing despite Chyanne's mother's admission to allegations in the CHIPS petition. We agree with this argument, but reject other arguments that David makes. We reverse the order, and remand for further proceedings.

NEUBAUER, J. Walter L. Carrothers appeals from a judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), third offense. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the officer lacked probable cause to initiate a traffic stop. We reject Carrothers' argument. We conclude that the proper constitutional standard for evaluating the initial investigatory stop in this case is reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. We uphold the trial court's denial of Carrothers' motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment.