PER CURIAM. We review the recommendation of the referee, Dennis J. Flynn, that the license of Attorney Carlos A. Gamiño to practice law in this state be suspended for a period of 18 months due to his professional misconduct and that he should also be required to complete 24 continuing legal education (CLE) credits approved for ethics and pay the costs of this disciplinary proceeding.

PER CURIAM. This is a reciprocal discipline matter. On March 5, 2008, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a complaint and motion pursuant to SCR 22.22 requesting that this court revoke the license of Attorney Michael F. Swensen as reciprocal discipline identical to that imposed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. That court disbarred Attorney Swensen from the practice of law on November 15, 2007. The OLR's complaint notes that Attorney Swensen failed to notify the OLR of the Minnesota disciplinary action within 20 days of the effective date of that order in violation of SCR 22.22(1). The OLR first learned of Attorney Swensen's Minnesota disbarment on January 8, 2008, by letter from Attorney Swensen.

PER CURIAM. In this matter we review whether discipline reciprocal to that imposed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in December 2007 should be imposed against Attorney Eric L. Crandall.

PER CURIAM. On June 5, 2008, this court issued a decision reversing a court of appeals' decision, which, in turn, reversed a circuit court judgment requiring Attorney James R. Donohoo to pay costs and attorney fees for filing and maintaining a defamation lawsuit that was found to be frivolous. Donohoo v. Action Wisconsin Inc., 2008 WI 56, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 750 N.W.2d 739. The case was decided by a 4-3 vote, with Justice Bradley writing the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Crooks, and Justice Butler joined. Justice Roggensack authored a dissent, in which Justice Prosser and Justice Ziegler joined.

PER CURIAM. Judith Van Handel appeals an order denying her motion for attorney fees against the Department of Health and Family Services (the Department) under WIS. STAT. § 814.245 after prevailing on her claim that she was entitled to a hearing before the Department of Administration's Division of Hearings and Appeals (the Division). Van Handel contends the circuit court erred when determining that the Department had a reasonable basis in law and fact for its position. We affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. E. P. Wallace appeals from a judgment of conviction for first-degree reckless homicide and battery, and from a postconviction order denying sentence modification. The issues are whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict for the reckless homicide, and whether the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict against Wallace for (the lesser included offense of first-degree) reckless homicide, and that the trial court properly exercised its sentencing discretion when it imposed a thirty-year sentence on a dangerous drug dealer with a criminal record who perpetrated a homicide. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Edison Camacho appeals after a jury found him guilty of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. See WIS. STAT. § 941.29(2)(a) (2005­06). Camacho's postconviction motion was denied by the circuit court. The only issue on appeal is whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict. Because it was stipulated that Camacho had a felony conviction, and the Record contains ample evidence that Camacho possessed a firearm, we affirm the judgment of conviction and postconviction order.

PER CURIAM. Denell Jackson appeals from the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, and that the circuit court erred when it denied his postconviction motion without holding a hearing. Because we conclude that the circuit court did not err, we affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Eddie D. Cannon appeals, pro se, from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005-06) motion. He claims that the trial court erred in summarily denying his contention that postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance. Because Cannon's claims are procedurally barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Terez Cook appeals a judgment, entered upon a jury's verdicts, convicting him of armed robbery, armed burglary, battery, theft of moveable property, mistreatment of an animal resulting in death and three counts of false imprisonment, all counts as a repeater and as party to a crime. Cook argues the trial court erred by admitting: (1) Cook's statements to police; (2) DNA evidence; and (3) witness testimony regarding Cook's identification in a photo lineup. Cook also claims he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel and is otherwise entitled to a new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment.

PER CURIAM. Vernon Henrique Walker appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion for a new trial. The issue is whether the supreme court's decision in State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶33, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, applies retroactively to Walker's 1997 judgment from which he seeks collateral review. We conclude that Dubose does not meet either of the two exceptions that merit its retroactive application on collateral review. Therefore, we affirm.

HOOVER, P.J. Travis Dewitt appeals judgments of conviction, entered following his plea, finding him guilty of seven counts in four cases. He also appeals orders denying his motions to withdraw his pleas. Dewitt argues that his plea agreement was void as a matter of law because nine bail jumping charges were "legally unsupportable" and, consequently, the agreement was illusory. We reject Dewitt's arguments and affirm the judgments and orders.

PER CURIAM. Earl Miller, Jr. appeals from a judgment and an order entered after he pled no contest to one count of first-degree recklessly endangering safety, while armed, in violation of WIS. STAT. §§ 941.30(1) and 939.63(1)(b) (2005-06). He challenges only the restitution order, which required that he pay $7500. He asserts that under the facts and circumstances of this case, the restitution amount ordered is unreasonably high. Because the trial court erred in imposing the $7500 restitution amount, we reverse.

PER CURIAM. Dexter Sallis, also known as Derrick Sallis, appeals from an order denying his sentence modification motion as procedurally barred. The issue is whether the procedural bar of State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 181-82, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), applies to motions for sentence modification that raise new factors. We conclude that Escalona applies to sentence modification motions that raise issues that were or could have been litigated previously, such as those now raised by Sallis. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Walker B. Johnson appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion seeking to modify his sentence. He also appeals from an order denying his motion for reconsideration. Johnson claims two new factors exist that warrant the modification of his sentence. First, he claims that the sentencing court did not consider the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Sentencing pertaining to consecutive sentences. Second, he claims that his trial lawyer did not advise him accurately of party to a crime liability. Because Johnson failed to establish a new factor, and because his claim was procedurally barred under State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Eliseo Herrera pled guilty to one count of causing mental harm to a child. See WIS. STAT. § 948.04(1) (2005-06). The circuit court imposed a bifurcated sentence of five years and two months, comprised of twenty-six months of initial confinement and thirty-six months of extended supervision. Herrera filed a postconviction motion for sentence modification, arguing that the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion and that the sentence was harsh and excessive. The circuit court denied the motion. Herrera appeals, and we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Tyrone L. Tillery appeals from the order denying his motion to modify his sentence. He argues that this court's decision in State v. Mason, 2004 WI App 176, 276 Wis. 2d 434, 687 N.W.2d 526, constitutes a new factor that warrants modification of his sentence. Because we conclude that Tillery is not entitled to sentence modification, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Patrick Rannick appeals from an order denying his motion to modify his sentence on the ground that his ineligibility for mandatory parole is a new factor supporting a reduction in his sentence. We conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in determining that Rannick's parole ineligibility did not support a sentence reduction. We affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Avery D. Shelton appeals from an order denying his sentence modification motion. The issue is whether the presumptive mandatory release statute, WIS. STAT. § 302.11(1g) (created April 21, 1994), constitutes a new sentencing factor warranting sentence modification. We conclude that the trial court was aware of the current applicable law, namely the presumptive mandatory release statute, when it sentenced Shelton; thus, § 302.11(1g) is not a new factor. Additionally, we will not consider the presumptive mandatory release statute as a new factor because the trial court did not mention Shelton's parole eligibility or mandatory release date in its sentencing remarks. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Norris J. Batson appeals from a consolidated order summarily denying his sentence modification motion. The issue is whether Batson has made a sufficient showing of a new factor to warrant an evidentiary hearing to further explore the circumstances of that alleged new factor. We conclude that Batson has waived his objection to what he now claims were misstatements in the guilty plea questionnaire and waiver of rights forms he signed, and by the prosecutor and the trial court at the plea and sentencing hearing. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Follett Corporation appeals a summary judgment awarding sales commissions to Linette Brown in a wage claim action. Brown cross-appeals, arguing the court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing on her claim for double damages. Brown also contends the court erroneously failed to award her prejudgment interest. We reject Follett's argument that Brown was not entitled to commissions. We also reject Brown's claim that she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the double damages issue. However, we conclude Brown was entitled to prejudgment interest, and we therefore reverse and remand for the court to award prejudgment interest.

BROWN, C.J. This lawsuit concerns a now-closed landfill in Muskego. The plaintiffs are nearby landowners whose water is contaminated with a toxic chemical called vinyl chloride, which they allege came from the landfill. Their suit against Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc., the landfill's operator, is still pending in the circuit court, and is not before us in this appeal. Rather, this is the plaintiffs' appeal of the circuit court's summary judgment dismissing a group of defendants known as "the Generators." These are businesses that, at various times, generated waste that was dumped at the landfill. The trial court dismissed the Generators because it concluded that the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence linking the Generators' actions to the vinyl chloride in the plaintiffs' water. We affirm because we likewise conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide. A case founded only on hunches and speculation, rather than evidence, will not justify holding a trial. The plaintiffs also appeal certain evidentiary rulings and the dismissal of peripheral claims. We affirm on these issues as well for the reasons that follow.

WEDEMEYER, J. Ryan M. Lampe, Scott Campbell, and Allstate Insurance Co. (hereinafter "Allstate" when referring to all three appellants) appeal from an order granting Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co. and Employers Insurance Co. of Wausau's motion for summary judgment. The trial court ruled that the Wausau and Employers insurance policies for the Cudahy School District (District) did not provide coverage to volunteer wrestling coach, Campbell, for injuries Lampe sustained during a practice session Campbell was conducting in the wrestling room at Cudahy High School. Allstate asserts that the trial court erred in so ruling because the undisputed facts support a finding that Campbell satisfies the definition of a "volunteer worker," as that term is used in the policies at issue here. Because the undisputed facts give rise to competing inferences as to whether Campbell should be provided coverage as a "volunteer worker" under the insurance policies at issue, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

PETERSON, J. Paul Shefchek appeals a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense. Shefchek argues the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

VERGERONT, J. The State appeals the circuit court's order granting the motion of Catherine Schutz to suppress evidence. Schutz was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, third offense, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) and WIS. STAT. § 346.65(2)(am)3., and one count of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, third offense, in violation of § 346.63(1)(b) and § 346.65(2)(am)3. In her motion Schutz contended that the law enforcement officer who stopped her vehicle lacked reasonable suspicion that she was driving while under the influence of an intoxicant and thus the field sobriety tests were unlawful. The court agreed and granted her motion to suppress all evidence obtained during and after the field sobriety tests.

PER CURIAM. Ryan Kinnaman appeals from a judgment declaring Robert Richart and John Roberts to be the owners of a portion of an abandoned roadway by adverse possession. He argues that the circuit court's findings are not supported by the evidence and that he is entitled to certain presumptions afforded the true owner of property. We affirm the judgment.

SNYDER, J. Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. (Racine Harley) appeals from a summary judgment in favor of Harley-Davidson Motor Company, Inc. (Harley-Davidson). Racine Harley argues that the circuit court erred in two respects. First, it failed to recognize that another case between these two parties pending before the Division of Hearings and Appeals need not be resolved before this action could go forward. Second, Racine Harley asserts that when faced with Harley-Davidson's motion for summary judgment, the court disregarded the summary judgment methodology and improperly dismissed Racine's complaint for failure to state a cause of action. We agree that the matter was not properly resolved and we reverse the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.

SNYDER, J. The State appeals from an order granting Dean Brown's motion to suppress evidence seized in a traffic stop. The State argues that based solely on information provided by the citizen informant, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown's vehicle. We disagree and affirm the order of the circuit court.