PER CURIAM. We review a referee's report recommending that John F. Scanlan's license to practice law in Wisconsin be reinstated.

PER CURIAM. Fahmi Abdallah appeals from a default judgment against him, awarding damages, costs and attorney's fees to Marla Baker, formerly known as Lockridge, on her claims against him for statutory fraudulent representation on a commercial lease agreement. We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Abdallah's motions to extend the time to answer Baker's complaint and to reopen the default judgment entered against him, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's damage award. However, the trial court failed to find whether the attorney's fee award was reasonable. Therefore, we affirm the judgment with the exception of the award for attorney's fees and remand the matter for a determination of the reasonableness of the award for attorney's fees, and for an award of appellate attorney's fees pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 100.18(11)(b)2. (2005-06).

PER CURIAM. Burnett County, its Board of Supervisors, its Zoning Administration, and its insurance company (collectively, the County), appeal a judgment, entered upon a jury's verdict, awarding damages to Joseph and JoAnne Yourchuck and their business, Yourchuck Video, Inc. (collectively, Yourchuck). The County argues that various provisions of Wisconsin's governmental immunity statute, WIS. STAT. § 893.80, apply to bar Yourchuck's claim. The County also contends the court applied the wrong measure of damages. We conclude § 893.80 is preempted because Yourchuck's present claim arises under federal, not state, law. Further, we conclude the measure of damages was not improper. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and order.

SNYDER, J. Todd E. Peterson appeals from a judgment and an order arising from his criminal conviction for sexual assault of a child. He contends that the judgment of conviction should be reversed because he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the court's evidentiary ruling on other acts evidence was error. Peterson also argues that the court improperly removed Peterson's privately retained postconviction counsel over Peterson's objection. We agree. The circuit court erroneously removed Peterson's retained counsel and required Peterson to continue the Machner hearing with appointed counsel. We reverse the postconviction order and remand for further proceedings. In light of our remand for further postconviction proceedings, which will address Peterson's allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we do not reach the merits of Peterson's appeal from the judgment of conviction.

PER CURIAM. Antonio Owens appeals judgments convicting him of being a felon in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed weapon, obstructing an officer, and mistreatment of an animal. He also appeals the order denying his postconviction motion. The issues are whether he received effective assistance from his trial counsel, and whether he should receive a new trial in the interest of justice. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Nelson Garcia, Jr., appeals a judgment convicting him of one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child. He also appeals the order denying him postconviction relief. In his postconviction motion, Garcia alleged that he did not enter a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea to the charge, and that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. On appeal, he challenges the trial court's decision to deny those claims without a hearing. We conclude that a hearing on the postconviction motion is necessary, and we therefore reverse.

PER CURIAM. Calvin Eleby, Jr., appeals from an order summarily denying his motion for sentence modification. We conclude that Eleby's status on extended supervision, which renders him ineligible for certification as a teacher in the Illinois public school system which, he claims, would facilitate his payment of restitution, does not constitute a new factor warranting sentence modification. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. James Katrell Jones appeals from a corrected judgment of conviction for two counts of recklessly endangering safety and for attempting to deliver cocaine. The issues are whether the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion by failing to explain the reasons for the length of the confinement portion of its sentence, for departing from the parties' sentencing recommendations, for failing to address how the confinement term was the minimum amount of custody necessary to achieve the sentencing considerations ("minimum custody standard"), for declaring Jones ineligible for the Challenge Incarceration and Earned Release Programs because it determined that he did not have a substance abuse problem, and for denying his sentence modification motion. We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its sentencing discretion in all the challenged respects; the fact that it did so differently than Jones had hoped does not constitute a misuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm.

KESSLER, J. This is an appeal of a conviction for possession of a controlled substance contrary to WIS. STAT. § 961.41(3g)(c) (2005-06) based on a guilty plea entered after denial of a motion to suppress the seizure of cocaine which was found in Mr. Triggs' pocket after his admission to possession of drug paraphernalia during an investigative stop. Triggs argues that the police did not have a reasonable suspicion upon which to base the investigative stop, thus the subsequent search was invalid. We disagree and affirm.

SNYDER, J. The State appeals from an order granting Aaron E. Applewhite's motion to suppress evidence seized during a pat-down search. The circuit court held that the pat-down and removal of contraband were not justified and granted the motion to suppress. We conclude the pat-down and confiscation of contraband were proper; therefore, we reverse the order of the circuit court.

PER CURIAM. Ronald Lane appeals a judgment convicting him of one count of burglary, as a repeater and as a party to a crime, and an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they stopped him and that the circuit court erred in conducting a restitution hearing without him. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Steven Smith appeals a judgment convicting him of one count of second-degree recklessly endangering safety, one count of maintaining a drug trafficking place, one count of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver between 5 and 15 grams, and one count of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver between 15 and 40 grams. He also appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Robert Lins appeals a judgment convicting him of one count of second-degree sexual assault with use of force, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of misdemeanor battery. He also appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that he did not knowingly waive his right to counsel and that the circuit court erred in sentencing him based on disputed factual information without giving him an opportunity to rebut it. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.

NEUBAUER, J. Barry J. Smith, Sr., appeals from a circuit court order imposing a civil forfeiture for fishing without a valid fishing license contrary to WIS. STAT. § 29.024(1). Smith's citation was based on the fact that the annual license he purchased in July 2006 had expired in March 2007, the expiration date indicated on the face of the license. Smith requests this court to determine the meaning of "annual" to mean twelve months from the time of issue. Smith is essentially challenging the Department of Natural Resource's rule, promulgated under § 29.024, that all fishing licenses expire on March 31 regardless of the purchase date. Because Smith failed to follow the statutory method for review of the DNR's rule, we are without jurisdiction to review Smith's argument. Accordingly, we affirm the order.

HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J. Laura Young appeals a circuit court order dismissing her insurer, West Bend Mutual Insurance Company ("West Bend"), as a party to Young's negligence action. Young was injured while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle driven by her boyfriend, Jeffrey Ramczyk. Young averred that she had purchased the motorcycle for Ramczyk, but retained title to it for reasons explained later. The circuit court, construing the so-called "drive other car" exclusion to Young's policy, concluded that Young was the "owner" of the motorcycle within the meaning of the exclusion and therefore was not entitled to coverage under her underinsured motorist (UIM) policy. Because we conclude that a dispute of material fact exists concerning whether Young was the "owner" of the motorcycle within the meaning of the policy, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BRIDGE, J. Daniel A. Knueppel appeals judgments convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) and of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(b). He contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the arresting officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. We disagree and affirm the judgments.

VERGERONT, J. The issue on this appeal is whether the arresting officers violated Timothy Neitzel's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches when they unlocked a gas station restroom he occupied. The resolution of this issue turns on whether Neitzel has standing to assert this claim. We conclude Neitzel did not have standing because, at the time the officers unlocked the door, he did not have an expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.

VERGERONT, J. This is an appeal of a nonfinal order dismissing on summary judgment Joseph Henrikson's claim for punitive damages in this action alleging negligent driving by Nicolas Strapon. Henrikson contends the circuit court applied an incorrect legal standard regarding punitive damages and, when the correct standard is applied, there is evidence that entitles him to a jury trial on punitive damages. In particular, Henrikson asserts the following evidence shows that Strapon acted in intentional disregard of his rights: Strapon's consumption of alcohol; the circumstances of the accident, including the evidence that Strapon hit Henrikson while he was crossing the street in the crosswalk; and the undisputed evidence that Strapon fled the scene after hitting Henrikson.

PER CURIAM. Scott Kurzynski appeals a default judgment entered in favor of the Town of Rib Mountain. Kurzynski argues that an error in the summons effectively deprived him of the full statutory time to file an answer. We agree. Because the Town should not benefit from its own error, we reverse the judgment.