PER CURIAM. Adrian T. Hipp moves the court for modification or reconsideration of its decision dated June 20, 2008. State ex rel. Hipp v. Murray, 2008 WI 67, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 750 N.W.2d 873. Hipp's motion asks the court to remove the following sentence from ¶49 of the court's opinion:

VERGERONT, J. This appeal arises out of a dispute between Public Storage, Inc., a company that rents self-service storage units, and Zachary Luckett and his parents, who stored property in one of the units after Luckett signed a rental agreement. After Public Storage auctioned the stored property because of unpaid rent, Luckett and his parents, James and Quincle Cook, filed this action alleging violations of WIS. STAT. § 704.90 (2005-06), which governs self-service storage facilities, and other claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages. The court entered judgment on the verdict, and it ordered attorney's fees under § 704.90(12).

PER CURIAM. Roy James Jones, pro se, appeals from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.07 (2005-06) motion and from an order denying his motion for reconsideration. To the extent that Jones was challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment of conviction, the circuit court denied relief on the ground that Jones's claim was barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). The circuit court also denied Jones's request that the circuit court order postconviction deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing pursuant to § 974.07. Because the circuit court did not err in either respect, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Deangelo Stokes appeals a judgment convicting him of first-degree intentional homicide. He also appeals an order denying postconviction relief. Stokes was convicted after a jury trial. The issue is whether the trial court properly admitted into evidence the statement of an unavailable witness. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Dennis Denson appeals a judgment convicting him of one count of repeated sexual assault of the same child. He also appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Denson argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury was never instructed on an essential element of the charged offense. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Harry Krivoshein, III appeals an order denying his postconviction motion, without an evidentiary hearing, to withdraw his no contest pleas. Krivoshein argues the circuit court failed to advise him it was not bound by the State's sentencing recommendation. He contends this constitutes a prima facie showing the court accepted his plea without complying with WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) or other mandatory procedures, and that he is therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing on whether he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily under State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). We agree. We reverse the part of the order denying Krivoshein's motion to withdraw his no contest pleas without a hearing and remand to the circuit court for a hearing on the motion.

PER CURIAM. Clair Ellsworth Visgar appeals an order denying WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005-06) relief from a conviction for substantial battery as a habitual criminal. Visgar pled guilty and was sentenced in May 2004. His postconviction motion and supplemental motion alleged four grounds to withdraw his plea. The circuit court denied the motions, and we affirm.

BRIDGE, J. Jacob Jones was convicted of repeated acts of sexual assault of a child and sexual exploitation a child. Evidence admitted at trial was seized during a warrantless search of Jones's bedroom. Prior to trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which was denied. Jones challenges the ruling on appeal. He first contends that the search was a police search, not a probation search, and therefore required a warrant. He also contends that if the search was a probation search, it was not reasonable. In addition, he argues that the use of a locksmith to gain entry into his bedroom constituted a violation of WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DOC 328.21(3)(f) (Dec. 2006), which he asserts compels suppression of the evidence discovered during the search. We reject each of Jones's arguments and affirm.

FINE, J. William Agosto appeals the following judgments of conviction entered on his pleas of guilty in Milwaukee County circuit court case number 2005-CF-0638: second-degree sexual assault of a child, see WIS. STAT. § 948.02(2), and interference with child custody, see WIS. STAT. § 948.31(2). The judgments were dated March 1, 2006, and, as corrected, April 12, 2006, and April 25, 2006. We view Agosto's appeal as being from the April 25 final corrected judgment, which superseded the others. Agosto also appeals the circuit court's October 18, 2006, order denying his motion to relieve him of his obligation to reimburse his mother for the $50,000 bail that she posted for him but was forfeited when he did not appear for a court date. The only issue on this appeal is whether the circuit court could order Agosto to reimburse his mother.

LUNDSTEN, J. This is an equitable estoppel case presenting the question whether Independence Corrugated reasonably relied to its detriment on conduct by the City of Oak Creek. Specifically, Independence argues that it lost out on a significant state tax benefit because it relied both on an incorrect tax form provided by the City and on the City mayor's assurances that he was working to correct the problem and that Independence should be "optimistic." We agree with the City and the circuit court that, as a matter of law, Independence cannot show that its reliance on the City's conduct was reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's judgment dismissing Independence's claims against the City.

DYKMAN, J. Colleen O'Rourke appeals from an order granting an injunction against her which ordered O'Rourke to strictly comply with the physical placement schedule for her son while August Lubinski, her ex-husband, is in active duty in the military. The order also grants the petition of Lubinski's wife, Jenny Lubinski, for stepparent visitation, under the same schedule and in the same manner as Lubinski would exercise physical placement were he not called to active duty. O'Rourke contends that (1) Lubinski did not have standing to file his motion, and Jenny Lubinski did not have standing to file her petition, because O'Rourke had not yet interfered with the placement schedule or denied visitation; (2) the trial court erred by granting the motion and petition without holding an evidentiary hearing; and (3) the trial court's decision was an erroneous exercise of its discretion. We conclude that the trial court applied incorrect legal standards in granting the motion and the petition, and therefore erroneously exercised its discretion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to deny the motion and petition.

BRIDGE, J. In December 2005, Carter Rierson sought the dissolution of his marriage to Anuradha Rangaswamy. At the time, Carter was employed by and the president of Best Defense, Inc., a security business. Anuradha was employed as a school teacher. At the time he filed for divorce, Carter also requested a hearing for a temporary order establishing the parties' financial arrangements during the pendency of the action. In February 2006, the circuit court entered a temporary order. In the order, the court found that Carter had an annual income of $40,000, which is a monthly income of approximately $3,333.33, and that Anuradha had a monthly income of $3,345. The temporary order also provided, among other things, that Christopher was limited to drawing $3,333 per month from all businesses and that Carter was prohibited from "us[ing] business funds for personal use, including but not limited to gas, phone or satellite [television]."

PER CURIAM. Greg H. Page appeals from an order providing for sixteen years of maintenance to Crystal J. Page, Greg's former spouse. We disagree that the length and amount of the maintenance award represented an erroneous exercise of the trial court's discretion. We affirm.

PETERSON, J. Therese S. appeals orders terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Yasmine B., and denying her postdisposition motion. She contends her motion presented a prima facie case she did not knowingly and intelligently enter her no contest plea to the grounds portion of the petition. We agree, reverse the orders, and remand for the circuit court to determine whether the County can prove the plea was nonetheless entered knowingly and intelligently.

PER CURIAM. Diane M. Godson appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance Corporation (WPS) and independent insurance agent Dean Dornfeld. We agree with the circuit court that Godson received the coverage she contracted for under the first policy; that she knew the policies were nonrenewable and excluded preexisting conditions; and that Dornfeld's actions were nonnegligent as to the first policy and irrelevant as to the second. We affirm.

VERGERONT, J. Deborah Hertel appeals the judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, third offense, and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration of .08 or more, third offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) and (b). She contends the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained after what she contends was an unlawful entry into her home. We conclude the circuit court did not err and we affirm.

VERGERONT, J. Brent Beckwith appeals the judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) of .08 or more, second offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(b). He contends that the duration of his detention by the arresting officer was unreasonable and therefore a de facto arrest without probable cause; that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in deciding to adopt the findings and ruling on this issue made in the civil case, which was dismissed; and that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in deciding to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion to deny him a hearing on the issue in this action. For the reasons we explain below, we affirm.

HIGGINBOTHAM, P.J. This case arises from an ownership dispute over a .18 acre parcel of land that lies between Ellen and Mark Thorn's residential property and two residential lots that were once a part of Rod and Pam Olson's farm. The Olsons are the record titleholders to the disputed parcel; the Thorns claim ownership of the parcel by adverse possession. The Thorns brought this action to obtain a judgment declaring them the owners of the disputed parcel by adverse possession, and to recover damages from the Olsons for trespass and intentional interference with contract.

BROWN, C.J. Jason Lillis appeals a small claims judgment for $1942 plus costs. He contends that Little Hands Child Care never submitted supporting documents to prove the debt. He argues that WIS. STAT. §§ 802.01(2)(b) and 802.03(7) require not only that these documents be submitted as a prior condition to maintaining the action, but also that copies of these documents be provided to him and that neither were done. We have two responses. First, the two statutes he cites have no application to small claims procedure. Second, Little Hands did provide documentation showing the amount owed, albeit at trial. Whether that documentation proved what it was intended to prove was a decision for the small claims court to make. The small claims court found that Little Hands had met its burden of proof. We affirm.

VERGERONT, J. The issue on appeal in this probate action is the proper construction of WIS. STAT. § 854.14 (2003-04), which prevents a person who "unlawful[ly] and intentional[ly] kill[s]" another from benefiting under the decedent's will and other instruments. We agree with the circuit court that "unlawful and intentional killing" within the meaning of this statute does not include assisting another to commit suicide. We therefore affirm.