No decisions were released.

• Contracts/ Settlement Agreement/ Property
  
  Dyer v. Law
  Docket: 2007AP002444 10-01-08
  

  PER CURIAM. Arthur D. Dyer appeals from a circuit court order dismissing his claims against Paul Law on the grounds that the parties' previous settlement agreement released all claims. We agree and affirm.
• Contracts/ Summary Judgment/ Notice/ Right To Cure
  
  Gunderson, Inc. v. Aspirus Wausau Hospital
  Docket: 2007AP002623 10-01-08
  

  PER CURIAM. Gunderson, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the circuit court that granted summary judgment to Aspirus Wausau Hospital, Inc. Gunderson argues that the circuit court erred when it denied Gunderson's motion for summary judgment and granted Aspirus's motion. Because we conclude that there are factual disputes that should be resolved at trial and, consequently, summary judgment was not appropriate, we reverse that part of the judgment of the circuit court that granted summary judgment to Aspirus and affirm that portion of the judgment that denied Gunderson's motion for partial summary judgment. We remand the matter to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
• Criminal Law/ Evidence
  
  State v. Dodds
  Docket: 2007AP001579 09-30-08
  

  PER CURIAM. Brian Dodds was charged with misdemeanor counts of battery and disorderly conduct, with use of a dangerous weapon. In a separate case that was consolidated for trial, Dodds was charged with felony bail jumping and possession of a firearm by a felon. A jury found Dodds guilty on all counts. On appeal, Dodds contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's findings on the weapons-related charges. We disagree and affirm the judgments of conviction.
• Criminal Law/ Evidence/ Jurisdiction
  
  State v. Morgan
  Docket: 2007AP001768 09-30-08
  

  PER CURIAM. In separate criminal complaints, Tony R. Morgan was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and with possession of heroin with intent to deliver. The cases were tried in a single court trial, and the court found Morgan guilty of both charges. Morgan filed a notice of appeal only in the cocaine case. The only issue that Morgan raises on appeal, however, concerns a suppression motion filed in the heroin case. Because Morgan did not file a notice of appeal in the heroin case, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the suppression issue. Because Morgan does not raise any appellate argument pertinent to the cocaine case, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
• Criminal Law/ Harmless Error/ Juries/ Jury Instructions
  
  State v. Lee
  Docket: 2007AP001741 09-30-08
  

  PER CURIAM. Terence Anthony Lee appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him. He argues that the trial court committed reversible error during the jury's deliberations. Because we conclude that any error committed by the trial court was harmless, we affirm.
• Criminal Law/ Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel/ Evidence
  
  State v. Brown
  Docket: 2007AP001383 09-30-08
  

  CURLEY, P.J. John R. Brown appeals the judgment, entered following a jury trial, convicting him of armed robbery, use of force, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 943.32(2) (eff. Feb. 1, 2003). Brown also appeals the order denying his postconviction motion. Brown argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion challenging the "show-up" identification and in-court identifications. Because a motion to suppress, had it been filed, would have been unsuccessful under the then-current law, Brown's attorney was not ineffective for failing to file one. Also, Brown was not entitled to application of the new standard, enunciated in State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, which severely curtailed the admissibility of "show-up" identifications because it was not preserved on appeal. Consequently, we affirm.
• Criminal Law/ Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel/ Evidence/ New Trial
  
  State v . Kruger
  Docket: 2007AP002064 10-01-08
  Recommended for Publication
  

  NEUBAUER, J. Bryan J. Krueger appeals from his conviction of first-degree sexual assault of a child contrary to WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1), and an order denying his motion for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Krueger contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to testimony by a social worker offered in response to the State's request for her opinion on whether the child's testimony was a product of coaching or suggestion. The social worker testified that the child was not sophisticated enough to maintain a fabricated story, and therefore could not have consistently recounted the details of the alleged incident "unless it was something that she had experienced." Because the social worker effectively offered expert opinion testimony that the child was telling the truth, which is impermissible under State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984), we conclude that Krueger's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the testimony. We also conclude that Krueger was prejudiced by counsel's failure. We reverse the judgment of conviction and the order denying Krueger's motion for postconviction relief. We remand for a new trial.
• Criminal Law/ Jurors/ Jury Instruction
  
  State v. Oliver
  Docket: 2007AP002390 10-01-08
  

  PER CURIAM. A jury found Kelly J. Oliver, Jr., guilty of first-degree recklessly endangering safety by use of a dangerous weapon as a party to a crime (PTAC). He contends the evidence was insufficient to convict him, that the PTAC instruction was structurally flawed, requiring reversal, and that, because he is African-American, the striking of the only black juror was a violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). We disagree and affirm.
• Criminal Law/ Motor Vehicle Law/ OWI/ Pleas/ Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel/ Sentencing
  
  State v. Scolman
  Docket: 2007AP002682 10-02-08
  

  PER CURIAM. Joshua James Scolman appeals from judgments convicting him of numerous offenses arising out of a fatal drunk driving accident and his subsequent threats and firing of a gun. He also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion to withdraw his no contest pleas or for sentence modification. Scolman argues that he established a manifest injustice justifying plea withdrawal because he did not understand important legal principles relating to the plea agreement, and he faults his trial attorney and the trial court for failing to explain the law. He also argues that the prosecutor violated the plea agreement and that the facts do not support the consecutive sentences imposed. We conclude that Scolman's motion presented sufficient facts to justify a hearing on his alleged misunderstanding of the law and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we reverse on those issues and remand the matter for further proceedings. We affirm as to the remaining issues.
• Criminal Law/ New Trial/ Right To Confrontation/ Right To Defense/ Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
  
  State v. Brown
  Docket: 2007AP002324 09-30-08
  

  KESSLER, J. Michael Brown appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered after a jury trial, for being a felon in possession of a weapon, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 941.29(2)(a) (2005-06). He also appeals from an order partially denying his motion for postconviction relief. Brown argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he was denied his constitutional rights to confront a witness, to present a defense, and to have the effective assistance of counsel. He also argues that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice. We conclude that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to explore Brown's roommate's motivations to testify in a certain manner at trial, which denied Brown the constitutional right to confront a witness. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
• Criminal Law/ Repeat Offender/ Enhancer Penalty/ Procedure
  
  State v. Kashney
  Docket: 2007AP002687 10-01-08
  Recommended for Publication
  

  BROWN, C.J. In State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, ¶¶67-69, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 263, the supreme court stated that evidence of repeater status may not be submitted until "post-trial." Here, the evidence was submitted after the jury returned the guilty verdicts and had left the courtroom, but before the court had rendered judgment on the verdicts and concluded the trial. We rejected a no-merit appeal to clarify what the term "post-trial" means, in our view. Now, after full briefing on the subject, we are satisfied that the State may submit repeater evidence at any time following the jury verdict up until the actual sentencing. We therefore affirm because the State met its burden regarding repeater evidence.
• Criminal Law/ Sentencing/ Sentencing Modification/ Judicial Authority-Discretion
  
  State v. Washington
  Docket: 2007AP002334 09-30-08
  

  PER CURIAM. Alfonzo E. Washingon pled guilty to one count of felony murder (armed robbery), party to a crime. See WIS. STAT. §§ 940.03, 939.05 (2005-06). The circuit court imposed a bifurcated sentence of forty years, comprised of thirty years of initial confinement and ten years of extended supervision. The circuit court denied Washington's postconviction motion for sentence modification. On appeal, Washington renews the arguments made in his postconviction motion, namely, (1) the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion and the sentence was unduly long and excessive; (2) the circuit court erred when it did not explain why it did not adopt the sentencing recommendation made in the presentence investigation report; and (3) the circuit court denied him equal protection by imposing a harsher sentence on him than the sentence meted out to one of his co-actors. Because the record shows that the circuit court properly exercised its sentencing discretion, we affirm.
• Criminal Law/ Statutes/ Pleas/ Plea Withdrawal/ Statutory Construction-Interpretation
  
  State v. Olson
  Docket: 2008AP000587 10-02-08
  Recommended for Publication
  

  LUNDSTEN, J. Eric Olson entered a plea to a charge of using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime in violation of WIS. STAT. § 948.075. This crime requires proof "that the actor did an act, other than use a computerized communication system to communicate with the individual, to effect the actor's intent ." Section 948.075(3). The issue here is whether this "act" element is satisfied either by Olson's transmission of live video of himself shirtless from the top of the chest up during an on-line chat or by his prior sexual encounters with other individuals who he met chatting on-line. We conclude that neither Olson's video transmission nor his prior sexual encounters constitute the type of "act" contemplated by the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's judgment convicting Olson under the statute and the circuit court's order denying Olson's postconviction motion for plea withdrawal. We remand to the circuit court so that Olson may withdraw his plea.
• Criminal Law/ Vacate Sentencing/ Resentencing/ Waiver Of Issue
  
  State v. Mobley
  Docket: 2007AP001208 09-30-08
  

  PER CURIAM. Charles Lindale Mobley, pro se, appeals from an order denying his motion seeking to vacate a sentence. We conclude that the trial court did not commit error as claimed by Mobley and, even if it did, Mobley waived the error when he did not object at the time. Therefore, we affirm.
• Inmates/ Writ Of Habeas Corpus/ Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel/ Appeals/ Waiver Of Right To Counsel
  
  Roberts v. Thurmer
  Docket: 2007AP001465 09-30-08
  

  PER CURIAM. Andrew Roberts appeals pro se from a circuit court order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was filed under State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 522, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992) (to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must petition the appellate court that heard the appeal for a writ of habeas corpus). Roberts contends that his appellate counsel failed to properly advise him of his appellate rights and abandoned him without pursuing an appeal. The record establishes that: (1) counsel properly advised Roberts of his postconviction and appellate options; and (2) Roberts failed to inform counsel as to how he wished to proceed. We conclude that Roberts waived his appellate rights by that conduct. We therefore affirm the circuit court's order.
• Insurance/ Coverage/ Contracts/ Summary Judgment
  
  Lampe v. Allstate Insurance
  Docket: 2007AP002249E 09-30-08
  
• OWI/ Evidence/ Probable Cause/ Arrest/ Constitutional Law
  
  State v. Lange
  Docket: 2008AP000882 10-02-08
  

  DYKMAN, J. Mitchell Lange appeals from a judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). Lange argues that police did not have probable cause to arrest him for OWI after witnessing his erratic driving at bar time leading to a one-car crash. The State responds that those facts amount to probable cause to believe Lange had committed the offense of OWI. We conclude that the facts of this case do not establish probable cause to arrest Lange for OWI, and therefore reverse and remand with directions to grant Lange's motion to suppress.
• OWI/ Reasonable Suspicion/ Traffic Stops/ Evidence/ Constitutional Law
  
  City of Rhinelander v. Plautz
  Docket: 2008AP000666 09-30-08
  

  HOOVER, P.J. Mark Plautz appeals a judgment of conviction for operating while intoxicated, first offense. Plautz argues the circuit court erred when it found there was reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle and denied his motion to suppress. We disagree with Plautz and affirm the judgment.
• Prohibited Alcohol Concentration (PAC)/ Evidence/ Testing/ No Contest Plea/ Waiver Of Appeal
  
  City of Menasha v. Liebhauser
  Docket: 2007AP002874 10-01-08
  

  SNYDER, J. James G. Liebhauser appeals from a judgment that followed his no contest plea to driving with a prohibited blood alcohol content, first offense. Liebhauser contends that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained following his arrest. He argues that the forced blood draw was performed in an unreasonable manner, that he reasonably objected to the blood draw, and that the gravity of the offense did not justify the forced blood draw. We affirm the judgment.
• Property/ Easements/ Procedure/ Default Judgments/ Judicial Authority-Discretion
  
  Malek v. Prooyen
  Docket: 2008AP001093 09-30-08
  

  PER CURIAM. Patrick Mahoney appeals an order denying his motions to enlarge time to answer a complaint under WIS. STAT. § 801.15(2)(a) and for relief from a default judgment under WIS. STAT. § 806.07. He also appeals a judgment that "confirmed" the default judgment. He contends the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to explain its reasoning for denying his § 806.07 motion. We agree and reverse the portion of the order denying his § 806.07 motion, as well as the judgment "confirming" the default judgment. On remand, we direct the court to demonstrate, on the record, its reasoning for granting or denying Mahoney's § 806.07 motion.
• Torts/ Negligence/ Safe Place Statute/ Statutory Duty
  
  Rohde v. Acuity
  Docket: 2008AP000997 09-30-08
  

  PER CURIAM. Robert Rohde appeals a judgment and an order dismissing his safe place and negligence claims against The Selmer Company and its insurer. The circuit court concluded that Selmer, the general contractor, was not liable to Rohde, an employee of a subcontractor, because Selmer neither retained the requisite control under the safe place statute nor committed an affirmative act of negligence. We agree with the circuit court and affirm.
• Torts/ Negligence/ Verdicts/ New Trial/ Evidence/ Jury Instructions/ Judicial Authority-Discretion
  
  Chobanian v. Meriter Hospital, Inc.
  Docket: 2007AP001278 10-02-08
  

  DYKMAN, J. Elizabeth Chobanian appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in her negligence action against Meriter Hospital, Dr. Catherine James, and Dr. JoDee Brandon following the birth of her son at Meriter Hospital. Chobanian argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying Chobanian's motion for a new trial because the jury findings were contrary to the evidence; (2) denying her motion for a new trial in the interest of justice because the real controversy was not fully tried when the trial court bifurcated Chobanian's direct liability claim against Meriter for negligently monitoring the competence of its nurses from her vicarious liability claim against Meriter for the negligence of its nurses; (3) excluding testimony regarding Meriter's policies and procedures because it was relevant to the issue of causal negligence; (4) submitting an instruction and verdict question on Chobanian's contributory negligence because it was not supported by the evidence; (5) refusing to allow cross-examination of Dr. James on causation because Dr. James was an expert witness and did not have a privilege to refuse to testify on that topic; and (6) refusing to allow the jury to hear evidence relevant to spoliation based on destroyed original copies and late entries and alterations in the medical records.