In April 2024, the Supreme Court decided Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,¹ and in so doing, reduced the magnitude of harm some courts (including courts in the Seventh Circuit) previously required to establish an “adverse action” in Title VII discrimination claims.

Muldrow resolved “a Circuit split over whether an employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must meet a heightened threshold of harm – be it dubbed significant, serious, or something similar.”²

About Muldrow

The underlying facts of the case are as follows: City of St. Louis Police Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow brought a Title VII lawsuit against the city, alleging it forcibly transferred her to a different position because of her gender.

Importantly, the transfer did not result in any changes to Muldrow’s rank, and it did not cause her to lose pay. Her responsibilities, perks, and schedule changed, however. Among such changes, the transfer resulted in less prestigious work, lost access to a take-home vehicle, and a less predictable schedule that involved some weekend work.

Initially, Muldrow’s case met the same fate as many Title VII plaintiffs alleging only noneconomic harm: The district court granted the City summary judgment on Muldrow’s claims and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. In its decision, the Eighth Circuit held that Muldrow failed to show her transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage,” and emphasized that her transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits,” but had caused “only minor changes in working conditions.”³

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Muldrow’s appeal. Analyzing the language of Title VII, the Court wrote, “To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.”⁴

What Muldrow need not show, the Court clarified, is that the harm incurred was “significant” or otherwise exceeded some heightened bar. “‘Discriminate against’ means treat worse, here based on sex.”⁵

Vacating the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the Court concluded that to make out a discrimination claim under the plain language of Title VII, a litigant need only “show that the [employer’s action] brought about some ‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or condition.” The Court held the “material” or “significant” adverse action the Eighth Circuit (and others) demanded, was not required.⁶

What follows examines Muldrow’s impact on Title VII cases in the Seventh Circuit in the (roughly) one year since it was decided, including those instances where courts have declined to extend Muldrow’sholding.

Citing Muldrow for Sufficient Evidence of 'Harm'

Multiple courts considering Title VII cases featuring only (or primarily) noneconomic injuries have cited Muldrow in finding sufficient evidence of “harm.”

• Among such decisions, Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., examined whether the plaintiff’s allegations of training delays, vacation request denials, and an unwanted shift transfer that made caring for a young child more difficult, constituted an adverse action for purposes of Title VII.⁷
  
  Reversing the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, the Seventh Circuit found that each of the three harms the plaintiff alleged entailed "some harm,” as required by Muldrow. The Court noted that Muldrow was issued after the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, and further observed that the cases the district court cited in support of dismissing the complaint had been “overtaken by [Muldrow].”⁸

• In Yousef Ismail v. DeJoy,a district court found that a plaintiff who was publicly escorted from work by the police and placed on emergency placement status without pay sufficiently plead an “adverse action.”⁹

• The district court in Moorehead v. KRG MS Oak Brook, LLC, held the plaintiff’s alleged denials of “coveted” and “lucrative” banquet assignments was sufficiently disadvantageous to demonstrate an adverse action.¹⁰

• In Johnson v. Nestlé USA, the employer denied plaintiff’s admission into its training program on a non-probationary basis and instead offered him a 60-day extension of his probationary period. The employee rejected the offer. The question before the court was whether, notwithstanding the employee’s rejection of the employer’s probation extension offer, the employee suffered an adverse action just the same. The court concluded he had, and noted that the Seventh Circuit has “suggested that placing an employee on probation, in some cases, may constitute a materially adverse employment action.”¹¹ The Court added that “[i]f anything, probation is more likely to suffice under the lenient standard from Muldrow.”

• In Chesnut v. Chicago Public Schools, a district court ruled that a last-minutesubstitute teaching assignment that resulted in the denial of additional pay was sufficient to survive employer’s motion to dismiss.¹²

Cases Declining Muldrow

Notwithstanding such decisions, it remains true that “not every workplace slight is actionable.”¹³ Multiple courts in the Seventh Circuit have declined to extend Muldrow’s relaxed burden to the facts before them. Among these decisions are as follows:

• The question before the district court in Brody v. Costco Wholesale Corp. was whether offering an employee a night shift position instead of the day shift position was an adverse action. Finding the plaintiff failed to put forth evidence that there was any material difference between the night shift he was offered and the day shift he preferred, the court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment.¹⁴

• In Phillips v. Baxter, the plaintiff argued that his unwanted transfer from one office to another amounted to an adverse action under Title VII.¹⁵ In this instance, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision granting summary judgment, holding that because the reassignment did not “not change his position, job duties, salary, or benefits, and the new office was even in the same building,” it did not leave him “worse off” as required by Muldrow.¹⁶

• Observing that Muldrow’s relaxed standard was explicitly limited to Title VII discrimination claims,¹⁷ the district court in Strickland v. Dart, declined to apply Muldrow to a first amendment retaliation case.¹⁸

• Similarly, the district court in Miller v. O'Malley, refused to apply Muldrow to a Title IX retaliation claim.¹⁹

Conclusion: Not Just Material or Significant Harm

While Muldrow may not have opened the courthouse doors to every workplace inconvenience or slight, there can be little question that the Court’s decision provides new opportunities for Title VII plaintiffs alleging only noneconomic harms, including lateral job transfers, training denials or delays, less prestigious or appealing job assignments, and other harms previously thought to be potentially inactionable.

This article was originally published on the State Bar of Wisconsin’s Labor & Employment Law Section Blog. Visit the State Bar sections or the Labor & Employment Law Section webpages to learn more about the benefits of section membership.

Endnotes

¹ Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 144 S. Ct. 967 (2024).

² Id. at 353.

³ Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 30 F. 4th 680, 688-89 (8th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).

⁴ Muldrow, 601 U.S. 346 at 354-55.

⁵ Id. at 347.

⁶ Id. at 347, 354.

⁷ Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335 (7th Cir. 2024).

⁸ Id. at 1335 and 1336.

⁹ Yousef Ismail v. DeJoy, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18687 (N.D. Ill. 2025) (granting summary judgment on other grounds).

¹⁰ Moorehead v. KRG MS Oak Brook, LLC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177210 (N.D. Ill. 2024).

¹¹ Johnson v. Nestlé USA, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175587 at *12 (N.D. Ill. 2024), citing Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 n.31 (7th Cir. 2012).

¹² Chesnut v. Chicago Public Schools, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215072 (N.D. Ill 2024).

¹³ Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996) (“mere unhappiness and inconvenience are not actionable under Title VII.”).

¹⁴ Brody v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12663 (W.D. Wis 2025).

¹⁵ Phillips v. Baxter, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10078, (7th Cir 2024).

¹⁶ The Phillips court also rejected the following as insufficient to demonstrate an adverse action: Changes to the employee’s job duties where all changes were within the scope of his role; an inability to make long-distance phone calls or access some computer applications; and, a pre-disciplinary meeting that while scheduled, never occurred. Id. at *9.

¹⁷ The Supreme Court explicitly limited its holding in Muldrow to discrimination claims, and clarified that its holding did not apply to retaliation claims. Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 357 ("Title VII's separate anti-retaliation provision ... applies only when the retaliatory action is 'materially adverse,' meaning that it causes 'significant' harm. The City thinks we should import the same standard into the anti-discrimination provision at issue. But that would create a mismatch. White adopted the [heightened] standard for reasons peculiar to the retaliation context ... [and inapplicable] to the discrimination bar.” Id., citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).

¹⁸ Strickland v. Dart, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228996 (N.D. Ill., 2024).

¹⁹ Miller v. O'Malley, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168746 (N.D. Ill. 2024).