Family exclusion provision does not prevent ex-wife from obtaining
wrongful death damages
The mother of a child who drowned sued her ex-husband's
insurance company in a wrongful death action, alleging the
ex-husband's wife was negligent. The appeals court ruled
in favor of the insurance company, barring coverage for
any wrongful death recovery, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court
recently reversed.
By Joe Forward, Legal Writer,
State Bar of Wisconsin
May 9, 2011
– The divorced parents of a child who died have a right to bring
separate actions for wrongful death, but a judgment in favor of one
parent does not entitle the other to any ownership of the recovery, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court recently ruled.
This ruling, in Day
v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 2011 WI 24 (April 29, 2011), was
essential in determining whether a “family exclusion”
provision in a homeowner’s insurance policy would prevent Wendy
Day (Wendy) from recovering wrongful death damages for the death of her
daughter because Wendy’s ex-husband, Clinton, was an insured under
the policy.
In 2006, eight-year-old Emma Day drowned while taking a bath at the
home of her father, Clinton, and stepmother, Holly Day. Clinton’s
ex-wife, Wendy, filed suit alleging that Holly left Emma, prone to
epileptic seizures, unattended in the bathtub and was therefore
negligent.
Holly and Clinton’s homeowner’s insurance policy with
Allstate Indemnity Company (Allstate) covered damages an insured became
legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or death. The policy
covered Holly, Clinton, and three children, including Emma.
But the policy’s family exclusion clause precluded coverage for
bodily injury to an insured person if the benefit of the coverage
“would accrue directly or indirectly to an insured
person.”
Allstate argued the family exclusion clause precluded coverage for any
wrongful death damages asserted against Holly (stepmother) because Emma,
an insured party, was the one injured and any benefit of the coverage
would accrue to Clinton.
That is, Allstate argued that Clinton would be entitled to half of any
recovery that Wendy secured as a result of her wrongful death claim
against Holly, an insured party. Ultimately, Wendy brought her tort
action against Allstate directly under Wisconsin’s direct action
statute.
Recovery is individualized
Citing Bruflat v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2000
WI App 69, 233 Wis. 2d 523, 608 N.W.2d 371, a Wisconsin appeals court
granted summary judgment to Allstate. The appeals court concluded
that Clinton, an insured, would benefit from coverage “by virtue
of his legal right to collect a portion of the wrongful death
award.”
But the supreme court majority (4-3), in an opinion written by Justice
Ann Walsh Bradley, rejected the appeals court reasoning, concluding that
Allstate’s family exclusion clause did not preclude Wendy from
recovering on a wrongful death action.
In her opinion – joined by Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson,
Justices N. Patrick Crooks, and Patience D. Roggensack – Justice
Bradley explained that the right to sue and recover damages under the
wrongful death statute is distinguishable from ownership of any
recovery.
Both Clinton and Wendy have a right to make a wrongful death claim,
though such claims must be consolidated, and any wrongful death recovery
“may be an individualized amount that is based on a
beneficiary’s actual loss,” the court explained.
As an insured, Clinton would be precluded from recovering on a wrongful
death claim, the court explained. But Wendy is not an insured and no
portion of her recovery would accrue to Clinton.
“Although all members of a class (here, both Wendy and Clinton),
share the right to bring a wrongful death action, they do not
necessarily share joint ownership of the recovery,” Justice
Bradley wrote. The court denounced any portion of the Bruflat
case that suggests “a wrongful death recovery must be distributed
to all wrongful death beneficiaries.”
The supreme court ruled the appeals court erred in concluding that
Clinton, as Wendy’s ex-husband, would have a legal right to
collect a wrongful portion of Wendy’s wrongful death award. Thus,
the court ruled that Allstate’s family exclusion does not preclude
coverage of any award in favor of Wendy, because Clinton would not
directly or indirectly benefit from it.
“The court of appeals’ assertion that Clinton would have a
legal right to collect a portion of the wrongful death award fails to
distinguish the right to pursue a claim under the wrongful death statute
from the ownership of a wrongful death recovery when the parties are
divorced,” Justice Bradley wrote.
The court also rejected Allstate’s argument that the term
“benefit” in the family exclusion clause includes the
benefit of the insurer’s defense and indemnification, which would
preclude coverage based on Allstate’s defense of Holly, an insured
person.
“Allstate’s expansive definition is inconsistent with
Wisconsin case law interpreting identical policy language,”
Justice Bradley wrote. The majority also concluded that such an
interpretation would be inconsistent with how the term is used in other
provisions.
Dissent
Writing for the dissent, Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler (joined by
Justices David Prosser and Michael Gableman), fears the majority opinion
invites “insureds to manipulate intra-family claims so as to
obtain liability coverage where it otherwise would be
excluded.”
The dissent argued that under Whirlpool Corp. v. Ziebert, 197
Wis. 2d 144, 539 N.W.2d 883 (1995), the family exclusion clause should
be enforced because of the mere potential for intra-family collusion,
despite the low probability that it occurred in this case.
The dissent also argued that an “indirect” benefit would
accrue to Clinton’s and Wendy’s other children, both insured
under the Allstate policy, based on the assumption that the other
insured children would indirectly benefit from
their mother having more money.
Attorneys
Martha Heidt of Bye, Goff & Rohde Ltd., River Falls, argued on
behalf of Wendy Day. John Swietlik Jr. of Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik
S.C., Milwaukee, argued on behalf of Allstate.