U.S. Supreme Court Issues Massey v. Caperton Ruling

June 9, 2009 – The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on June 8 that a West Virginia Supreme Court Justice must recuse himself from a case involving a company whose CEO spent more than $3 million to help get him elected.

In a 5-4 decision, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that the massive expenditures made by Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship to elect West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin created the appearance that he was choosing Benjamin as his own judge in a dispute with a smaller coal company, headed by plaintiff Hugh Caperton. Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote in the court's 3-2 decision overturning an earlier verdict favoring Caperton.

“Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when -- without the other parties’ consent -- a man chooses the judge in his own cause,” Kennedy wrote for the majority. “Applying this principle to the judicial election process, there was here a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required Justice Benjamin’s recusal,” Kennedy wrote.

U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts dissented, arguing that the majority’s decision is too vague and fails to resolve such basic issues as “How much money is too much?” Roberts wrote, “The Court’s new ‘rule’ provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required.  This will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be.”

"This is a major victory for the rule of law," stated James Sample, Counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice. "The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the fundamental principle that money should not influence the courts, and that justice should not be for sale."

The courts have recognized a constitutional obligation to recuse when a judge has a direct financial stake in a case. In Caperton v. Massey, the court was asked to decide whether disproportionate campaign spending by a litigant should also require recusal.

A West Virginia jury had found in 2002 that Massey was liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious interference with existing contractual relations and awarded Caperton $50 million in damages. Knowing the State Supreme Court of Appeals would consider an appeal, Blankenship supported Benjamin rather than the incumbent justice seeking reelection in 2004. His $3 million in support of Benjamin’s election exceeded the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and by Benjamin’s own campaign committee. Benjamin went on to win by fewer than 50,000 votes.

Citing this involvement in Benjamin’s election, Caperton moved to disqualify the newly-elected Justice under the Due Process Clause and the State’s Code of Judicial Conduct. Justice Benjamin denied the motion, indicating that he found nothing showing bias for or against any litigant. The court then reversed the $50 million verdict.

The ruling holds that “because the objective standards implementing the Due Process Clause do not require proof of actual bias, this Court does not question Justice Benjamin’s subjective findings of impartiality and propriety and need not determine whether there was actual bias. Rather, the question is whether, ‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’ … There is a serious risk of actual bias when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. The proper inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total amount contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect of the contribution on the outcome.”

Kennedy also wrote that “Massey and its amici err in predicting that this decision will lead to adverse consequences ranging from a flood of recusal motions to unnecessary interference with judicial elections. They point to no other instance involving judicial campaign contributions that presents a potential for bias comparable to the circumstances in this case, which are extreme by any measure.”

In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts noted that he shares the “majority’s sincere concerns about the need to maintain a fair, independent, and impartial judiciary – and one that appears to be such. But I fear that the Court’s decision will undermine rather than promote these values.”

Roberts wrote that “Until today, we have recognized exactly two situations in which the Federal Due Process Clause requires disqualification of a judge: when the judge has a financial interest in the outcome of the case, and when the judge is trying a defendant for certain criminal contempts. Vaguer notions of bias or the appearance of bias were never a basis for disqualification, either at common law or under our constitutional precedents. Those issues were instead addressed by legislation or court rules.

“Today, however, the Court enlists the Due Process Clause to overturn a judge’s failure to recuse because of a ‘probability of bias.’ Unlike the established grounds for disqualification, a ‘probability of bias’ cannot be defined in any limited way. The Court’s new ‘rule’ provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required. This will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be. The end result will do far more to erode public confidence in judicial impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a particular case,” Roberts wrote.