Nov. 30, 2009 – When an institution receives notice that it is holding a prisoner wanted in order to face pending charges in another jurisdiction, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is triggered, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals said.

In State v. Onheiber, 2009AP460, the court also looked beyond whether the notice is actually called a “detainer” to consider whether the prisoner has suffered a detainer’s effects upon the terms and conditions of incarceration.

Notice of new charges

After selling marijuana to a confidential informant, William Onheiber was revoked from supervised release and began to serve a five-year term in federal custody. Nine months later, the Marathon County district attorney filed a criminal complaint to charge Onheiber in connection with those marijuana deliveries. The circuit court then issued a nationwide arrest warrant.

An official at the federal prison camp in Duluth, Minn. contacted the Marathon County Sheriff’s Department to confirm the issuance of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant for inmate Onheiber. Following that phone call, the sheriff’s office faxed those documents to the prison with a cover page stating, “No detainer placed at this time.” The prison responded with a form “Detainer Action Letter” modified to reflect the earlier exchanges rather than rely on the preprinted paragraphs indicating whether a detainer had been lodged.

Onheiber’s efforts to resolve the pending charges were unsuccessful because of the district attorney’s workload and failure to communicate with Onheiber’s attorney. Onheiber learned the prison would not send him his documents as required by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) and so he filed a motion for the final disposition of the complaint on Nov. 27, 2007. On May 30, 2008, Onheiber moved to dismiss the complaint because he had not been brought to trial within 180 days.

But the circuit court denied Onheiber’s motion, finding that the 180-day timeline was never triggered because a “detainer” within the meaning of Wis. Stat. sec. 976.05 had never been entered. Onheiber appealed, representing himself.

A functional detainer

In an opinion authored by Presiding Judge Michael Hoover, the court of appeals determined that the nationwide arrest warrant constituted a “detainer” under the IAD.

Noting the lack of a statutory definition, the court looked to case law in which “detainer” means “notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.” In this case, the court said that a detainer existed after the sheriff’s department verbally confirmed the existence of the criminal complaint and nationwide arrest warrant, followed by faxed copies of those documents and a request for notification prior to Onheiber’s release.

The court rejected the state’s arguments that the nationwide arrest warrant should not be considered a detainer because the federal prison learned of it indirectly. “We reject the notion that how a prison first learns of a warrant or pending charges has any bearing on whether a detainer has been lodged,” the court stated. “What matters is whether a notification satisfying the definition of a detainer is filed.”

Likewise, the court rebuffed the state’s argument that a nationwide arrest warrant is similar in intent and effect to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, which was determined not to be a detainer in State v. Eesley, 225 Wis. 2d 248 (1999).

In Eesley, the court explained, the writ was distinguished from a detainer because its purpose is to bring a person confined for some other offense before the issuing court – not to provide notice of pending charges. Further, the writ must be immediately executed because it is valid for only a short period of time whereas the detainer can remain for as long as the duration of a prisoner’s sentence. And because a temporary writ does not impose on a prisoner the detrimental effects of a longstanding detainer, the Eesley court concluded the IAD was unnecessary to compel the expeditious disposition of writs, the court of appeals reported.

By contrast, the court of appeals said, Onheiber has suffered many of the detrimental effects of a detainer, including a denied request for outside employment in the community service program, a denied transfer to the federal prison camp nearer to his two children, a loss of his community custody, and jeopardized eligibility for transfer to a halfway house.

“The State cannot file a detainer but then circumvent the requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers by simply informing prison officials the State does not want the detainer to be called a detainer,” the court said. “Such a result would be farcical. Given that the facts of this case fit precisely within the established definition of a detainer, and given the State’s knowledge of the continuing and irreversible detrimental effects of the detainer on Onheiber, the State’s position in this case is unfortunate.”

Accordingly, the court of appeals ordered that the arrest warrant and detainer be quashed.