Special circumstances won’t save a plaintiff seeking certiorari
review from improper service
While a special circumstances exception may be applicable to
condemnation-type proceedings, special circumstances won't work for
plaintiffs who improperly serve respondents in actions seeking
certiorari review in circuit court.
By Joe Forward, Legal Writer,
State Bar of Wisconsin
Jan. 13, 2011 – A plaintiff
who improperly served the respondents’ attorneys in commencing a
certiorari action could not rely on a “special circumstances
exception” to deflect respondents’ challenge that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over them.
Holly Bergstrom and 18 other Polk County property owners unsuccessfully
challenged a mining permit issued by the Polk County Land and Water
Resources Department to a subsidiary of Mathy Construction Company
(Mathy), then sought certiorari review in the circuit court.
Bergstrom’s complaint named Polk County and Mathy as
defendant-respondents.
But Bergstrom personally served Polk County’s corporate counsel
instead of the county clerk or the county board chairperson, as required
under Wis. Stat. section 801.11(4)(a)1.
Similarly, Bergstrom personally served Mathy’s attorney instead
of a Mathy officer, director, or managing agent, as required by section
801.11(5)(a).
In lieu of an answer, Polk County filed a motion to dismiss for
improper service. Mathy filed an answer requesting dismissal, then filed
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, alleging a lack of personal
jurisdiction based on improper service.
However, the circuit court accepted Bergstrom’s argument that
serving the defendants’ attorneys established personal
jurisdiction based on “special circumstances” –
namely, that the attorneys demonstrated authority to act as agents for
the purpose of service.
The circuit court also concluded that Mathy waived jurisdictional
objections by filing an answer before moving for judgment on the
pleadings. Both the county and Mathy appealed.
Special circumstances exception
The District III Wisconsin appeals court reversed the circuit court in
Bergstrom
v. Polk County, 2009 AP2572 (Jan. 11, 2011), holding that the
“special circumstances exception does not apply in a certiorari
action commenced by summons and complaint.”
The appeals court explained – in an opinion written by Judge
Gregory Peterson – that under Wisconsin case law, a “special
circumstances exception” only applies in condemnation proceedings
because such actions allow service by certified mail and do not require
“compliance with the personal service requirements of Wis. Stat.
ch. 801.”
The court suggested but did not hold that other proceedings, such as
actions involving review of Labor and Industry Review Commission
decisions, may allow application of the special circumstances exception
since such actions, like condemnation proceedings, also allow service by
certified mail and do not require compliance with ch. 801.
Even if the special circumstances exception applied, the appeals court
explained, “the facts of this case do not constitute special
circumstances.”
For the special circumstances exception to apply, the appeals court
noted that an attorney must demonstrate authority to accept service by
an “uncontradicted statement” and, here, neither the
county’s attorney nor Mathy’s attorney made such a
statement.
The appeals court also noted that the special circumstances exception
could apply if the person upon whom service is proper expressly directs
the documents to be served elsewhere, a situation that was not present
in the facts of this case.
Right to contest personal jurisdiction not
waived
In addition, Mathy did not waive its right to contest personal
jurisdiction by filing an answer before moving for judgment on the
pleadings, the appeals court ruled.
When a reviewing court reviews the decision of another court or
tribunal, sections 807.07(1) and 781.03(1) require a
“return” – the filing of the record of the body whose
decision is being reviewed – to be made with the reviewing court
by the person in possession of the record.
If a respondent “participates in a proceeding,” i.e., moves
for a judgment on the pleadings, before the reviewing court without
first moving to dismiss, the responding party is deemed to have waived
jurisdiction where “return” has been made to the reviewing
court.
Bergstrom argued that Mathy “participated in a proceeding”
without first moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by
filing an answer before filing the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
But the appeals court ruled that filing an answer does not constitute
“participation,” since a defendant can raise lack of
personal jurisdiction in its answer without waiving it.
Bergstrom also argued that Mathy delayed “return,” and thus
forfeited a right to invoke a lack of return as grounds for defeating
waiver.
But the appeals court disagreed, explaining that section 781.03(1)
“does not set forth a date by which a defendant must ‘cause
the record to be transmitted,’” and in any event, the county
was responsible for transmitting the record to the circuit court.