Wisconsin
Lawyer
Vol. 79, No. 11, November
2006
Homegrown Wheat, Machine Guns, and the Commerce Clause Today
When the Supreme Court struck down, as unconstitutional, the Gun-Free
School Zone Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(a), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 13981, which provided a civil remedy to victims of
gender-motivated violence, some experts expected an `enumerated powers
doctrine' rescue as the Court struggled with how much power Congress
should have when legislating using the Commerce Clause. Recent cases
suggest there will be no rescue.
by Thomas J. Coaty
Observers of the U.S. Supreme Court sat dumbfounded, trying to
comprehend what they had just heard. Chief Justice William Rehnquist had
delivered the Court's opinion in United States v. Lopez1 on the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 19902 and declared the law
unconstitutional, stating:
"The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a
requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce. We hold that the Act exceeds the authority of Congress `[t]o
regulate Commerce … among the several States …' U.S. Const.,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3."3
Lawyers immediately thought of Wickerd4 and the pain it had caused first-year law school
students studying constitutional law. Initially taught that citizens
enjoyed limited government because of enumerated powers, law students
were instructed to look no further than Article I, section 8 to see the
specific powers possessed by Congress5 or to
read James Madison who sought, through the Constitution, to limit the
federal government's control by giving it "few and definite"6 powers. Law students were reminded that the
Commerce Clause was a selling point for dispensing with the Articles of
Confederation and adopting the Constitution because of the "need for
commercial regulation at the national level."7 Such commercial regulation was desired to stop
self-serving state regulation and to treat each state equally.8 Finally, the students' lesson concluded with the
topic of power sharing - or what political theorists called "separation
of powers," which was present not just at the federal level, ensuring
that one branch did not dominate over another,9 but also was present between the individual states
and the federal government10 (federalism
and comity), again guaranteeing that the federal government would not
dominate over the citizens.
Thomas J. Coaty, John Marshall 1992, is a Brown County assistant
district attorney. He is a permanent instructor at the Department of
Justice Criminal Investigation School and an adjunct instructor at
Concordia University of Wisconsin.
Most law students understood the enumerated powers doctrine. But with
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the entire
meaning of enumerated powers had changed.11
Instead of interpreting "commerce among the states" as referring to a
buyer and a seller across state lines or economic activity in more than
one state, the Court elected to define commerce, beginning in 1937, as
the "interconnected nature of the national economy."12 Thus, anything could be regulated by Congress,
including poor farmer Wickerd's homegrown wheat that never left the
farm, as long as it was interconnected with the national economy.13
Lopez, however, had just trumped Wickerd. The
Supreme Court in Lopez reasoned that because the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 was a criminal statute by its terms, it had
nothing to do with "commerce," and because the Act had contained "no
jurisdictional element which could ensure, by a case-by-case basis, that
the firearm in question affected interstate commerce," the law was
unconstitutional.14 For only the second
time since the New Deal, the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down a
federal law based on a lack of enumerated power.15
This article briefly discusses 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (possession of
a machine gun) and its analysis with Lopez and how proponents
of using the enumerated powers doctrine to limit Congress's power
ultimately were disappointed. This article also reviews how the federal
court system analyzes legislation based on the Commerce Clause and pays
specific attention to how Justice Samuel Alito, the newest member of the
Supreme Court, determined constitutionality while sitting on the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals. Finally, this article touches on what the
future may bring for federal criminal legislation based on recent cases
interpreting the Commerce Clause.
Magistrate Crocker Instructs the Congress
In the Western District of Wisconsin a defendant, in United
States v. Kenney,16 had been charged
with a federal gun violation, that is, he was charged with the "unlawful
possession of a machine gun."17 According
to the Court's holding in the electrically charged Lopez,
however, possession of a machine gun had nothing to do with commerce nor
did that same gun possession substantially affect interstate commerce.
Based on this interpretation, the law outlawing machine gun possession
could be struck down.
Help arrived from the Southern District of Mississippi, where Chief
Judge William H. Barbour Jr. held in United States v.
Bownds18 that the same machine gun
possession law about to be argued in Wisconsin was unconstitutional in
his court.19 Judge Barbour began his
analysis with Wickerd and the homegrown wheat; he conceded,
"Congress can regulate an individual's activity if that activity `exerts
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce' regardless of
whether that individual's effect is direct or indirect."20 Judge Barbour, however, cautioned Congress about
its limited power to regulate through the Commerce Clause, which was not
limitless, and stated:
"This Court is concerned with the increasing federalization of crime
by Congress, when such federalization occurs in apparent disregard of
the Tenth Amendment mandate that rights not delegated to the federal
government be reserved to the States."21
On Aug. 4, 1995, Federal Magistrate Stephen L. Crocker held that 18
U.S.C. § 922(o) (possession of a machine gun) was
unconstitutional. The magistrate said that the federal courts were not
"apologists" for Congress and that the "Courts cannot and should not do
Congress's work for it."22 Magistrate
Crocker spelled out specifically what Congress should do to correct this
law.
"Congress easily could have: included as an element of the crime that
the possession or transfer have some effect on interstate commerce;
provided a paragraph or two of legislative findings or intent; or
perhaps even just incorporated by reference the legislative histories of
prior gun control bills such as the Gun Control Act or the Firearm
Owners' Protection Act. But Congress did not do any of these things.
"Absent some legislative history, how does Congress justify the
current criminalization of the intrastate use of a machine gun that
could well have been manufactured in the same state in which it is
possessed? Home conversion of semi automatic firearms into fully
automatic firearms is alarmingly easy and common.
"What nexus do such machine guns have to interstate commerce?"23
Prophetically, Magistrate Crocker saw the danger in allowing
Congress, through the Commerce Clause, to outlaw the mere possession of
an item when there is no nexus to interstate commerce.24 That recommendation was then forwarded to
Barbara B. Crabb, chief judge of the federal district court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.
Judge Crabb disagreed with the magistrate's recommendation and
declared that the machine gun possession law was constitutional. Her
reasoning was sound: although she and Magistrate Crocker both believed
that the federal government could regulate machine guns, Magistrate
Crocker believed that the federal government had not provided a nexus,
and Judge Crabb believed a nexus was not needed. She stated that machine
guns were "things in commerce" and therefore could be regulated.
Furthermore, citing United States v. Perez,25 Judge Crabb said that Congress did not have to
make "particularized findings in order to legislate" and, borrowing from
Lopez, stated "Congress normally is not required to make formal
findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on
interstate commerce."26 Because Judge Crabb
ruled that Congress did have the authority under the Commerce Clause to
make the possession of a machine gun illegal, the defendant in
Kenney pleaded to the charge with the hope of attacking the
constitutionality at the appellate level.
On Feb. 5, 1996, Kenney was appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The same argument that was advanced
before Magistrate Crocker and Chief Judge Crabb - that Congress lacked
the authority to outlaw mere possession of a machine gun because the law
neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that
the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce
- now was heard in Chicago.27
On July 30, 1996, virtually a year to the day after Magistrate
Crocker found 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) to be unconstitutional, the
Seventh Circuit appellate court handed down its decision.28 The court started its determination with the
standard of review: "in Commerce Clause cases the review is narrow and
deferential."29 The court also cited the
famous Hodel standard of review, which states, "[t]his power is
`complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the
constitution.'"30 The Seventh Circuit then
cited United States v. Darby31
when it declared 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (possession of a machine gun)
constitutional and reasoned:
"The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are
matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the
Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given
no control."32
It appeared the Seventh Circuit was not swayed by James Madison and
the Federalist Papers, the enumerated powers doctrine, or the holding in
Lopez. The Seventh Circuit had just suggested that whenever
Congress used the Commerce Clause, the court should virtually acquiesce.
Furthermore, the court instructed that Lopez was meant to stop
the outer reaches of congressional power, not roll back what has been
the jurisprudence in Commerce Clause cases since the late 1930s. It was
because the Gun-Free School Zones Act had a distance requirement (1,000
feet from a school) that it had no substantial effect on interstate
commerce, "whether taken as a single act or in the aggregate effect of
all acts," and this made the law unconstitutional.33 Logically, therefore, because the federal
statute against the possession of a machine gun had no area or zone
requirement it was constitutional. Constitutional because without an
area or zone requirement, the possession of a machine gun substantially
affected interstate commerce and thus could be outlawed by Congress.
As the Seventh Circuit was ruling that Congress did have the power to
regulate possession of a machine gun through the Commerce Clause, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was hearing the same
constitutional argument about Congressional power and machine gun
possession in United States v. Rybar.34 Like the Seventh Circuit in Kenney, the
Third Circuit also declared the statute constitutional and added
ominously that, "Lopez has `raised many false hopes,' [for
defendants] and that challenges based on Lopez `almost
invariably' fail."35
The Third and Seventh Circuits had used the same analysis, pioneered
in 1971 in United States v. Perez,36 when ruling as to whether Congress had violated
the Constitution in its use of the Commerce Clause when making
legislation. The Perez Court instructed that Congress may
regulate three broad categories of activity: "(1) the use of the
channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities; and (3) those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."
The Third Circuit then analyzed the machine gun statute under the
third prong and followed the Kenney analysis,37 stating Congress can "regulate singular
instances of intrastate activity when the cumulative effect has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce."38 Therefore, if Congress can regulate homegrown
wheat because it substantially affects interstate commerce, it can
regulate possession of a machine gun. Wickerd had returned.
Judge Alito Takes No Prisoners
Just when it seemed the issue had been settled, on Dec. 30, 1996,
Third Circuit appellate judge Samuel Alito looked at the legal landscape
and wrote, in essence, "nope." In the first two sentences of his dissent
in Rybar, Judge Alito made it clear he was not happy about the
federal appellate courts acquiescing to Congress's regulating of
intrastate activities. Indeed, he was taking no prisoners when he
rhetorically asked:
"Was United States v. Lopez a constitutional freak? Or did
it signify that the Commerce Clause still imposes some meaningful limits
on congressional power?"39
Judge Alito conceded that his "sister circuits" had ruled contrary to
him on the constitutionality of the possession of a machine gun,40 and yet Judge Alito demonstrated that those same
circuits could not agree on what prong of the Perez test should
apply. Judge Alito pointed out that some circuits upheld the
constitutionality because they claimed that machine guns fell under the
first Perez prong: the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. These circuits argued that because Congress could regulate
lottery tickets,41 adulterated food,42 and the interstate transportation of women for
immoral purposes,43 then logically, machine
guns also could be regulated. Judge Alito agreed and conceded that
government is "free to exclude from commerce any article the government
deems injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the
state has not sought to regulate that use."44 Judge Alito objected to the confusion between an
illegal transfer of a weapon and an interstate
transfer of that same weapon.45 He believed
that if the courts wished to find intrastate possession of a machine gun
illegal, they must use the third prong of the Perez analysis:
regulation of activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.
Judge Alito criticized other circuits for finding the machine gun
statute constitutional by their use of the second prong of the
Perez analysis. The Lopez court had cited two statutes
that would be constitutional under the Perez second prong: 18
U.S.C. § 32, which made it a crime to damage or destroy aircraft
that was used in interstate commerce, and 18 U.S.C. § 659, which
made it illegal to steal from interstate shipments.46 Using Lopez as his basis for reasoning,
Judge Alito believed that the U.S. Supreme Court defined
"instrumentalities" of interstate commerce as "the means of conveying
people and goods across state lines, such as airplanes and
trains."47 Additionally, Judge Alito
believed Congressional power can be extended to protect people or goods
traveling interstate by outlawing theft or setting rates.48 Thus, Judge Alito's dissent concerning placing
the statute in the Perez second category centered on
definition:
"18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (the machine gun law) would fall within this
second Lopez category if Congress had banned the intrastate
possession of machine guns in order to prevent them from being used to
damage vehicles traveling interstate, to carry out robberies of goods
moving in interstate commerce, or to threaten or harm interstate
travelers."49 Because there is no such
language in the statute, Judge Alito dissented on its
constitutionality.
Judge Alito's final argument concerned what he called the "crux of
this case:"50 "[T]he majority argues in
effect that the private, purely intrastate possession of machine guns
has a substantial effect on the interstate machine gun market."51
Judge Alito argued that if one accepts the majority's argument,
anything has an effect on the national economy and, therefore, Congress
can regulate anything. Such a theory ignores the reasoning of the
Lopez court, which began its opinion on "first
principles."52 Those principles give the
federal government enumerated powers and constitutionally mandated
divisions of authority (between the federal government and the states),
which "was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our
fundamental liberties."
Moreover, Judge Alito pointedly asked the majority, how is the
possession of a machine gun inherently more "economic" or more
"commercial" than possession of other firearms?53 Or, is the possession of a firearm in a school
zone less "economical" or "commercial" than possession elsewhere - say,
on one's own property?54 Thus, the future
Supreme Court justice believed the Lopez decision suggested
that the mere possession of a machine gun, without more, was not
"economic" or "commercial" and therefore could not be regulated by
Congress through the Commerce Clause. This is in direct contrast to
Farmer Wickerd and his homegrown wheat, which although intrastate, is
clearly "economic" or "commercial" and thus could be regulated by
Congress in its use of the Commerce Clause.55
More thunder was created in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, when the
Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison struck down 42
U.S.C. § 13981, which provided a civil remedy to victims of
gender-motivated violence.56 The Court
again, when analyzing federal legislation involving the Commerce Clause,
used the "third prong of the Perez test"57 and stated that it had rejected the government's
argument that "costs of crime" and "national productivity" were the
substantial effect on interstate commerce.58 The Court observed that by using this argument,
Congress "could regulate any activity as it was related to economic
productivity of the individual."59 The
federal government could regulate family law, criminal law, or
education, areas in which "States historically have been
sovereign."60 The Court finished with a
flurry by warning that Congress may "not regulate non economic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce."61 Morrison
was the heir to Lopez. It appeared that the Rehnquist Court was
returning limited government through enumerated powers to the
people.
Homemade Machine Guns on Interstate Commerce
Then it happened. Out of California and the 9th Circuit came the
ultimate case regarding the possession of a machine gun. In United
States v. Stewart the court pondered "[w]hether
Congress can, under its Commerce Clause power, prohibit the mere
possession of homemade machine guns?"62 In
its analysis, the 9th Circuit appellate court quickly pushed aside
United States v. Rambo,63 which
had held that an illegal possession must have proceeded with an illegal
transfer.64 The illegal transfer had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce and was thus constitutional.
The 9th Circuit appellate court noted that the defendant in
Stewart made his machine gun in his basement. The appellate
court then discussed the district court opinion, which found the machine
gun statute constitutional because there had to be some part, even in
this homemade machine gun, that had to have been purchased - and there
had been. Because a part had been purchased, the lower court reasoned,
it had to come from somewhere, and that somewhere meant it substantially
affected interstate commerce.65 The
appellate court sniffed: "This cannot mean that everything is
subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, else that
constitutional limitation would be entirely meaningless."66 Indeed, using Lopez as a hammer, the
Stewart court drove home the nail that Congressional power has
limits and to ignore those limits "obliterates the distinction between
what is national and what is local," the result of which would create a
"completely centralized government."67 The
9th Circuit appellate court finished by saying that the possession of a
homemade machine gun was not illegal because it did not have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.68
Supporters of limited government anticipated that once the United
States appealed, Chief Justice Rehnquist could ignite a Commerce Clause
jurisprudence rescue for the enumerated powers doctrine. Armed with
Lopez, and fortified with Morrison, Stewart
would make American legal history.
Homemade Machine Guns and Medicinal Marijuana
In its writ of certiorari, the U.S. government in Stewart
not only maintained that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) had been upheld in
every federal circuit court69 but also
argued that pursuant to Wickerd, "even non-commercial activity
occurring within a regulated market is subject to Congress' commerce
power."70 In its brief, the government
asked that the Stewart machine gun case be held until the U.S.
Supreme Court could decide Ashcroft v. Raich. In that case, the
issue was whether the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801,
exceeded the Commerce Clause when dealing with intrastate cultivation
and possession of marijuana for purported personal "medicinal" use or
the distribution of marijuana without charge for such use. The brief
went on to suggest that because both the Stewart and
Ashcroft cases deal with commodities that typically are
acquired through commercial transactions, it would "shed significant
light" on this case when the Court decided Ashcroft.71 The Supreme Court agreed and prepared to rule on
Ashcroft first.
Conclusion
Supporters of limited government read Ashcroft v. Raich, now
called Gonzales v. Raich, in stunned silence. They
learned that the U.S. Supreme Court had held that Lopez and
Morrison had been read too broadly inside the concept of
"modern day Commerce Clause jurisprudence" when it upheld the
constitutionality of the Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801.
Congress could outlaw medical marijuana, even though a
California law expressly allowed it.72 More
to the point, the Court said that this issue of medicinal marijuana was
analogous to homegrown wheat; the possession of marijuana for medical
purposes was an economic intrastate activity that substantially affected
interstate commerce, and thus it could be regulated.
The U.S. Supreme Court simply ordered the 9th Circuit to rehear
Stewart consistent with Gonzales and determined that a
homemade machine gun was an intrastate economic activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce, and thus it could be
regulated.73 If the U.S. Supreme Court could regulate
homegrown wheat, it could regulate homegrown machine guns.
In conclusion it appears that the "enumerated powers doctrine"
displayed in Lopez will be more aggressively argued on
constitutional exams in law school than it will be argued in the federal
court system. The Lopez decision was simply a shot fired across
Congress's bow warning that legislators must be circumspect in crafting
legislation. For Wisconsin lawyers, United States v.
Lopez does little more than suggest that Congress will no longer
draft criminal statutes with an area requirement (for example, within
1,000 feet of a school) to trigger enforcement. In a larger sense,
Lopez is a primer for the practitioner of our shared
constitutional and national history.
Endnotes
Wisconsin
Lawyer