Professional Discipline

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The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, an arm of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, assists the court in discharging its exclusive constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice of law in this state and to protect the public from acts of professional misconduct by attorneys licensed to practice in Wisconsin. The board is composed of eight lawyers and four nonlawyer members, and its offices are located at Room 315, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI 53703, and Room 102, 611 N. Broadway, Milwaukee, WI 53202.

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Hearing to Reinstate David D. Brown

A public hearing on the petition of David D. Brown for reinstatement of his law license will be held before the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility District 14 Committee on Tuesday, Sept. 14, 1999, at 9 a.m. in Room 360 (Branch 8) of the Brown County Courthouse, 100 S. Jefferson St., Green Bay, Wis.

Brown became licensed to practice law in 1957 and practiced in the Green Bay area. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered that Brown's law license be revoked by consent effective Oct. 21, 1993. The court based its order upon a Petition for Voluntary Revocation filed by Brown in September 1993. In his petition Brown admitted that he could not successfully defend against allegations of professional misconduct that were under investigation by BAPR.

Among the allegations under investigation were that: Brown converted to his own use $2,500 of client funds held in his trust account to pay a judgment creditor; he misrepresented to the creditor and BAPR that he held that money in trust; he converted to his own use $5,100 of another client's settlement funds; since mid-1988 he repeatedly diverted funds from his trust account for his own use and deposited his own funds into his trust account to pay overdrafts written on the trust account; and he failed to maintain required trust account records, despite having certified on three occasions that he had done so.

Brown's revocation petition acknowledged his liability to pay restitution in specified amounts to persons or entities entitled to funds he had converted. The court ordered Brown to make restitution within six months from the date of his revocation. Prior to the revocation, Brown previously had received a private reprimand in 1983 and a BAPR public reprimand in 1988.

Brown is required by SCR 22.28 to show that:

1. he desires to have his law license reinstated;
2. he has not practiced law during the license revocation;
3. he has complied fully with the terms of the order and will continue to comply with them until his license is reinstated;
4. he has maintained competence and learning in the law;
5. his conduct since the revocation has been exemplary and above reproach;
6. he has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity with the standards;
7. he can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts, and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the court;
8. he has fully complied with the requirements of SCR 22.26;
9. he indicates the proposed use of his license, if reinstated;
10. he has fully described all business activities during the period of revocation; and
11. he has made restitution or settled all claims from persons injured or harmed by his misconduct or, if the restitution is not complete, his explanation of his failure or inability to do so.

Brown is required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence possession of the moral character to practice law in this state and to demonstrate that his resumption of the practice of law within Wisconsin will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice, or subversive of the public interest.

Any interested person may appear at the hearing and be heard in support of or in opposition to the petition for reinstatement. Further information may be obtained from Mary A. Ahlstrom, Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 110 E. Main St., Room 315, Madison, WI 53703-3383; (608) 267-7274.

Public Reprimand of John Miller Carroll

On Jan. 22, 1997, a woman met with John Miller Carroll, 38, Milwaukee, to discuss retaining him regarding the woman's potential probation revocation. On Jan. 23 the woman was taken into custody, and on Jan. 24 her husband paid Carroll a $1,500 retainer. For the next six weeks, the woman sat in jail with little communication from Carroll and little to no substantive work performed on her case. During the six weeks she was incarcerated, Carroll never met with the woman. There was little telephone contact, and, based upon the correspondence from the woman's husband, the woman did not know what was happening with her case or what her options were. She then retained new counsel who secured her release within two weeks. Carroll refused to return the woman's retainer. After the woman filed a grievance with the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR), Carroll asserted that she owed him money. While Carroll did some work on the case, primarily reviewing and responding to the husband's requests for information, the woman received no benefit from the representation. Carroll did little of a substantive nature on the woman's case.

BAPR found that Carroll failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the woman, in violation of SCR 20:1.3. BAPR also found that Carroll failed to respond to her reasonable requests for information and explain the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the woman to make informed decisions regarding the representation, contrary to SCR 20:1.4(a) and (b). Finally, BAPR found that Carroll failed to return an advanced payment of fee that had not been earned, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).

The public reprimand was conditioned upon Carroll either returning the entire $1,500 retainer to the client or agreeing to submit his fee to fee arbitration. In determining the appropriate sanction, BAPR considered that Carroll had previously been privately reprimanded in 1992 for failing to hold disputed funds in trust, and again in 1997 for misrepresentation and for filing a motion after having been discharged.

Petition to Reinstate Emil Drobac

A hearing on the petition of Emil Drobac for the reinstatement of his law license will be held before the District 2 Professional Responsibility Committee on Monday, Aug. 9, 1999, at 6 p.m. at the office of the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 342 N. Water St., Suite 300, Milwaukee, Wis.

Drobac's law license was revoked by the Wisconsin Supreme Court effective Dec. 6, 1983. Drobac had petitioned for the voluntary revocation of his license based upon an inability to defend himself against the following allegations, that he:

1. converted approximately $40,000 from the account of an individual for whom he had been the legal guardian since 1968;
2. neglected the legal matters of five clients;
3. failed to refund fees to two of those clients; and
4. failed to cooperate with the investigation of five grievances.

Drobac pleaded guilty to a felony charge relating to the conversion and was ordered to pay $54,000 in restitution by the criminal court. In addition, he was sentenced to five years of probation, the first of which was spent in the House of Correction on work release.
Drobac is required by Supreme Court Rule 22.28 to establish by evidence that is clear and convincing, the following:

1. he desires to have his license reinstated;
2. he has not practiced law during the suspension;
3. he has complied with the terms of the disciplinary order;
4. he has maintained competence and learning in law;
5. his conduct since the discipline has been exemplary and above reproach;
6. he has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity with the standards;
7. he can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the court;
8. he has made restitution or settled all claims from persons injured or harmed by his misconduct, or in the event such restitution is not complete, has explained the failure or inability to do so;
9. he has indicated the proposed use of the license after reinstatement; and
10. he has fully described all business activities during the period of suspension.

Any interested person may appear at the hearing and be heard in support of or in opposition to the petition for reinstatement. Further information may be obtained from Jeananne L. Danner, Deputy Administrator, Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 342 N. Water St., Suite 300, Milwaukee, WI 53202, (4l4) 227-4623.

Disciplinary Proceeding against Jane A. Edgar

On March 17, 1999, the Wisconsin Supreme Court temporarily suspended Jane Edgar's law license, pending disposition of the disciplinary proceeding. The suspension was based upon Edgar's stipulation admitting that she had converted approximately $11,000 of funds belonging to a client and to an adverse party in a divorce action, commingled her own funds and client funds in her law office business account and made deposits and disbursements from that account for her personal expenses, and falsely certified on her State Bar dues statement that she had a trust account and maintained trust account and bank records in compliance with the rules. The temporary suspension was effective March 22, 1999.

Hearing to Reinstate Donald S. Eisenberg

A public hearing on the petition of Donald S. Eisenberg for reinstatement of his law license will be held before the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility District 9 Committee on Wednesday, Sept. 1, 1999, at 7 p.m. in Room 318 (Third Floor Conference Room) of the Tenney Building, 110 E. Main St., Madison, Wis.

Eisenberg became licensed to practice law in 1956 and practiced in Madison. Eisenberg's law license was revoked effective Nov. 1, 1989 (Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eisenberg, 152 Wis. 2d 91, 447 N.W.2d 54 (1989)). Prior to his revocation, Eisenberg had been the subject of several other disciplinary proceedings. He was publicly reprimanded in 1965 (State v. Eisenberg, 29 Wis. 2d 233, 138 N.W.2d 235 (1965)), and in 1984 the court suspended his law license for six months (Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eisenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 332, 344 N.W.2d 169 (1984)).

Further, in 1985 Eisenberg was twice denied reinstatement of his license because he had continued to practice law while his license was suspended (Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eisenberg, 122 Wis. 2d 627, 363 N.W.2d 430(1985), and 126 Wis. 2d 435, 377 N.W.2d 160 (1985)). A third petition for reinstatement was withdrawn. A fourth reinstatement petition was stayed until disposition of the 1989 disciplinary proceeding, which petition was dismissed as moot following the revocation. In 1996 the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied a fifth reinstatement petition on two grounds: Eisenberg's statement on a television program in 1990 that he believed a former client of his was guilty of the crime with which she had been charged; and Eisenberg's failure to repay a fee to a former client whom he had represented in the presence of a conflict of interest (Disciplinary Proceeding Against Eisenberg, 206 Wis. 2d 263, 556 N.W.2d 749(1996)).

In May 1998 the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Eisenberg's sixth reinstatement petition by reason of his not having made restitution for or settled all claims of persons injured by his professional misconduct; by his expressed willingness to comply with the continuing legal education requirements for reinstatement only if he were assured that, having met those requirements, his license would be reinstated; and by his stated intention to practice law in Wisconsin only occasionally but to maintain a trust account on his own, rather than in association with another lawyer or law firm in the state.

Eisenberg's law license was revoked based on evidence that he repeatedly misused his trust account. On Feb. 10, 1981, Eisenberg's trust account ledger showed a receipt of $2,000 on behalf of a named client. No such deposit was made. On the same day the deposit allegedly was made, Eisenberg drew a check payable to himself on the trust account in the amount of $2,000. By doing so, Eisenberg made a payment to himself on behalf of one client from funds on deposit in his trust account belonging to other clients.

In May 1981 Eisenberg drew a $20,000 check on his client trust account payable to his uncle. He concealed the transaction by making the check stub "VOID" and not recording the check on the trust account ledger or subtracting its amount from the balance on that ledger. When that check was written, there were no monies belonging to the uncle on deposit in the trust account. Eisenberg testified that he was lending his uncle the money. Later that month, Eisenberg deposited $20,000 into the trust account on behalf of his uncle. This transaction also was not recorded on the account ledger.

Later that month, Eisenberg made another loan to his uncle by this means, again in the amount of $20,000. He did so again in June 1981 in the amount of $5,000. In the latter case, Eisenberg concealed the transaction by writing on the check stub a different payee and a different amount than was the case on the actual check.

On Aug. 21, 1981, Eisenberg deposited $10,000 into the firm's trust account and listed it in the receipt book, general trust account ledger, and individual trust account ledgers as attributable to another named client of the firm. Those funds were withdrawn immediately from the trust account and used to conclude a bank transaction known as a repurchase agreement, totally separate from the trust account. Subsequently, Eisenberg made disbursements from his trust account totaling approximately $7,300 for the benefit of the named client, although that client had no funds on deposit in the trust account.

Further, there were insufficient funds in that account to pay for the above-described disbursements. Later in August 1981, Eisenberg wrote a trust account check in the amount of $10,000 payable to another attorney who also was representing the named client, but that withdrawal was not recorded on the trust account ledger. Again, there were insufficient funds in the trust account to cover the check.

On Sept. 3, 1981, the trust account receipts ledger showed an entry on behalf of one of Eisenberg's partners in the amount of $15,000. Five days later, $15,000 was transferred from that account to another account, on which Eisenberg then drew a $15,000 check payable to his uncle.

Also during 1981, Eisenberg withdrew funds from his firm's trust account for his personal use on four occasions in the total amount of $58,000. At the time these withdrawals were made, Eisenberg had no personal funds on deposit in the trust account. He did not record the transactions and subsequently admitted that he was borrowing money illegally from the trust account.

During 1981 Eisenberg deposited a total of approximately $954,000 into the firm trust account without recording the amounts of deposits on the account ledger or indicating on whose behalf the deposits were made. In the same year, he caused the sum of almost $70,000 to be recorded in the account ledger as deposits when, in fact, no such deposits had been made. Also in 1981, Eisenberg withdrew approximately $930,000 from the trust account without reporting those withdrawals on the account ledger or otherwise identifying the clients on whose behalf they were made.

On the basis of these facts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that: Eisenberg violated SCR 11.05(1) by commingling funds in his client trust account and by using the funds of other clients to pay the debts of a client; he violated SCR 11.05(2) by failing to maintain and preserve complete records of client funds coming into his possession; and he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20.04(4) by attempting to conceal these transactions.

The court stated that regardless of his prior discipline for professional misconduct, the seriousness of his misuse of a client trust account and conversion of client funds warranted the revocation of Eisenberg's law license.

Eisenberg is required by SCR 22.28 to show that:

1. he desires to have his law license reinstated;
2. he has not practiced law during the license revocation;
3. he has complied fully with the terms of the order and will continue to comply with them until his license is reinstated;
4. he has maintained competence and learning in the law;
5. his conduct since the revocation has been exemplary and above reproach;
6. he has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity with the standards;
7. he can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts, and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the court;
8. he has fully complied with the requirements of SCR 22.26;
9. he indicates the proposed use of his license, if reinstated;
10. he has fully described all business activities during the revocation; and
11. he has made restitution or settled all claims from persons injured or harmed by his misconduct or, if the restitution is not complete, his explanation of his failure or inability to do so.

Petitioner is required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence possession of the moral character to practice law in this state and to demonstrate that his resumption of the practice of law within Wisconsin will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice, or subversive of the public interest.

Any interested person may appear at the hearing and be heard in support of or in opposition to the petition for reinstatement. Further information may be obtained from Mary A. Ahlstrom, Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 110 E. Main St., Room 315, Madison, WI 53703-3383; (608) 267-7274.

Disciplinary Proceeding against Nicholas C. Grapsas

On May 6, 1999, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered a public reprimand of Nicholas C. Grapsas, 60, Madison.

Grapsas represented a Taiwanese national, who was present in the United States on a student visa and was lawfully employed at a music school during the one-year period following her education. The client's visa status was due to expire June 21, 1995, after which she could lawfully remain in the United States for an additional 60 days to prepare for departure.

Grapsas was retained to petition the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for a change in visa status from student to specialty occupation worker. As part of the retainer, Grapsas provided legal services to the client's employer concerning whether it could lawfully employ the client after June 21, 1995. Grapsas advised the client and her employer that the client could work subsequent to June 21, 1995, provided she had filed by that date an application for change of status and the application was pending. Certain judicial authority supported Grapsas' contention. Grapsas was aware, however, that INS had not acquiesced in the judicial decisions on which he relied, and at no time did Grapsas explain to the client or her employer that INS's stated position was that a person in the client's position could not continue employment upon expiration of the one-year employment period. Consequently, there was a substantial risk that the client's continued employment could render her "out of status" and ineligible for the status change she was seeking or that the employer could be subject to sanctions for employing an alien without work authorization.

The court determined that Grapsas violated SCR 20:1.4(b) by failing to explain the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

On or about July 10, 1995, Grapsas mailed to INS the client's petition and a $155 check drawn on his trust account for the filing fee. Notwithstanding inquiries from the client as to case status, the fact that his filing fee check was not negotiated by INS, and his knowledge that INS routinely issues a notice of receipt of a petition, it was not until Oct. 2, 1995, that Grapsas wrote to INS inquiring as to the status of the petition. In January 1996 the client, who had learned independently that INS had no record of her petition, contacted Grapsas, who said he would refile. It was not until April 29, 1996, that Grapsas did so, and the petition was received at INS on May 3, 1996. The court determined that Grapsas failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in ascertaining the status of the client's petition and in refiling the petition, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.

INS approved the music school's petition to employ the client, but denied the client's status change petition because her student status had expired prior to the filing of her petition, and consequently, she was not eligible for a change in nonimmigrant status. INS further determined that she was "out of status" and ineligible for status change because she had been employed unlawfully by the music school after June 21, 1995. As a result, the client was obligated to return to Taiwan for the sole purpose of reapplying there for a nonimmigrant specialty occupation worker visa, incurring about $1,000 in travel expenses.
In addition to engaging in misconduct during the above representation, Grapsas also failed to respond to two notices from BAPR for a written response to the client's grievance, in violation of SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(3).

In conjunction with the public reprimand, the court ordered that Grapsas make restitution to the client in the amount of $1,505, reflecting the fee paid by the client and the travel expenses incurred as a result of his misconduct.

Grapsas was previously publicly reprimanded by the court for misconduct in another immigration matter, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grapsas, 174 Wis. 2d 816, 498 N.W.2d 400 (1993).

Disciplinary Proceeding against Daniel J. Kanera

On May 14, 1999, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered a one-year suspension of the law license of Daniel J. Kanera, 55, Two Rivers. Kanera was convicted in Manitowoc County circuit court on Jan. 8, 1999, of felony manufacture of THC after the discovery of what appeared to be 11 marijuana plants growing on his land. The court determined that the conduct for which Kanera was convicted constitutes a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(b).

Disciplinary Proceeding against Mario M. Martinez

The Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the law license of Mario M. Martinez, 39, Wauwatosa, commencing May 6, 1999. In addition, the court ordered that Martinez pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding. The court has held the issue of restitution in abeyance, pending further input from BAPR.

The revocation, which follows a Sept. 18, 1998, temporary suspension, is based primarily upon Martinez's conversion of approximately $158,000 from 27 different clients and third persons who were entitled to those funds, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a) and (b) and SCR 20:8.4(c). Most of the funds were from clients' personal injury settlements. However, in a criminal matter, upon being given a blank check by a client's mother to be used for bail, Martinez inserted the name of an associate, the amount of $1,900, and added false information about the check's purpose. He then had the check deposited in his business account and failed to refund the $1,900 to the woman for approximately a year. While the matter was being investigated, Martinez provided BAPR with what purported to be a copy of a check refunding the $1,900. However, Martinez never sent that check to the woman.

In addition to the conversions, Martinez signed settlement checks and releases without his clients' knowledge or authorization, made misrepresentations to clients about the status of their cases, and made multiple misrepresentations regarding the status of various legal proceedings to a third party who had provided several of Martinez's clients with medical care, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). He also failed to inform three clients of settlement offers, in violation of SCR 20:1.2(a). Furthermore, he failed to maintain appropriate trust account records, violating SCR 20:1.15(e); submitted false certifications to the State Bar regarding the maintenance and retention of those records, violating SCR 20:1.15(g); made material misstatements of fact to BAPR during its investigations, violating SCR 20:8.1(a); and failed to cooperate with some of the investigations, violating SCR 21.03(4), and SCR 22.07(2) and (3).

In revoking his license, the court concluded that Martinez "has established that he cannot be trusted with the property of others obtained in the course of representing clients."

Revocation of License of John E. Pederson

On May 3, 1999, the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted the petition of John E. Pederson for revocation of his law license by consent. Pederson, 78, Milwaukee, filed the petition in the course of a BAPR investigation. In the petition, Pederson stated that he could not successfully defend against the allegations of misconduct that were the basis for BAPR's investigation. The misconduct stemmed from Pederson's handling of three estates.

A man died on Dec. 23, 1994, and Pederson was retained as attorney for the estate. The man's wife died on March 13, 1995, and Pederson also served as attorney for that estate. The wife left her estate to four siblings who were unrelated to either decedent. One of the siblings served as personal representative for both estates. The husband of one of the heirs became concerned with the delay in making final distributions from the wife's estate and met with Pederson in June 1998 to discuss the matter. At that meeting, Pederson eventually admitted that the money for the final distribution was not there, and that he had converted the money to his own use. An examination of bank records reveals that Pederson converted approximately $84,071.75 from the estates of the man and his wife to his own use.

In another matter, Pederson served as personal representative for the estate of a woman who died on Aug. 8, 1995. The estate was informally probated, and there was no separate attorney for the estate. Pederson wrote himself $10,400 in checks from the estate account, but requested only $800 in fees. Pederson could not account for the excess $9,600 he paid himself and stated that the money was not available to make final distributions.

By converting estate funds to his own use, the court found that Pederson committed criminal acts which reflected adversely on his trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(b), and that Pederson engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or mis-representation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). Pederson has been charged criminally as a result of these actions. Pederson had no prior discipline.

Disciplinary Proceeding against Gaar W. Steiner

The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Gaar Steiner, 61, Milwaukee, for 60 days, commencing June 21, 1999. In addition, the court ordered that Steiner pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.

In 1991 Steiner began representing real estate developer, Frank P. Crivello. Two years later Steiner established his own firm, the primary clients being Crivello, Crivello's cousin and business partner, Joseph Crivello, and various Crivello-related business entities. In October 1993 Steiner prepared a fee contract with Plaza 14, a Crivello corporation. The agreement included a $50,000 retainer fee, $25,000 of which was nonrefundable. In conjunction with that agreement, Steiner deposited $108,000 in Plaza 14 funds into his trust account. Despite the terms of the agreement, Steiner did not deposit any of those funds into his business account for fees, thereby failing to hold his own property separate from the property of clients, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a).

The purpose of the agreement was to shelter the $108,000 from a creditor. Steiner disbursed the funds to the Crivellos or on their behalf whenever they so directed. The funds were used to pay creditors, or third persons, including Steiner, in matters unrelated to Plaza 14. In addition, a review of Steiner's trust account records revealed that Steiner made at least 23 disbursements either to or on behalf of the Crivellos and their various business entities from funds that belonged to other clients, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a). In late 1994, after hiring an accountant, Steiner discovered the extent of the problems and deposited appropriate funds to cover the Crivello-related overdrafts.

In March 1994 Steiner filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of Plaza 14. In November 1995 Steiner was indicted by the U.S. Attorney's Office on two misdemeanor counts of knowingly and fraudulently entering into an agreement with Plaza 14 to be paid legal fees out of assets of the bankruptcy estate, without disclosing same to the bankruptcy court. Steiner pleaded guilty to the two counts and subsequently was sentenced to home confinement not to exceed 180 days, fined $10,000, and placed on probation for three years. Steiner thereby committed a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(b).
During the summer of 1993 Steiner loaned Joseph Crivello $35,000. There apparently was no interest charged on the loan, no security for it, and no deadline by which it was to be repaid. However, none of those terms were put in writing, nor did the client consent in writing, in violation of SCR 20:1.8(a).

In early 1994 Steiner received $40,000 in cash from Joseph Crivello, which he placed into a safe deposit box in Steiner's own name at Crivello's request. The box was not clearly designated as a "client's account" or "trust account," in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a).
In imposing the 60-day suspension, the court noted that BAPR could not produce clear and convincing evidence that Steiner's trust account was used to conceal his clients' assets. The court also noted that Steiner had not attempted to conceal the fees from the Bankruptcy Court; they were disclosed in the monthly report that was filed regarding the bankruptcy.

Public Reprimand of M. Joanne Wolf

M. Joanne Wolf, 50, Prairie du Chien, was publicly reprimanded by BAPR for engaging in the practice of law while her law license was administratively suspended and for failing to cooperate with BAPR's investigation of her conduct. Wolf was suspended from the practice of law for nonpayment of State Bar dues, effective Nov. 2, 1992, and has remained under suspension since that date.

On May 28, 1997, Wolf appeared in Crawford County circuit court on behalf of a juvenile. State Public Defender records show that Wolf performed services on more than 30 public defender cases after Nov. 2, 1992.

In May 1998 BAPR was notified by the Wisconsin Supreme Court about an allegation that Wolf had appeared in the 1997 juvenile matter while suspended. Wolf thereafter failed to respond to two letters from BAPR staff requesting that she submit a written response to that allegation.

BAPR concluded that in providing legal services to clients while she was under suspension for nonpayment of dues, Wolf violated SCR 20:5.5(a), which proscribes engaging in the practice of law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction. BAPR further concluded that Wolf failed to cooperate with a BAPR investigation, contrary to SCR 21.03(4) and  SCR 22.07(1).

In concluding that Wolf's misconduct warrants a public reprimand, BAPR noted that because she has been under a dues suspension for more than three years, should she wish to return to the practice of law, she will be obliged to file a petition with the Wisconsin Supreme Court seeking reinstatement of her law license, as per State Bar By-Laws, Article I, Section 3. At that time, Wolf will be required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that she is fit to resume the practice law in this state, according to SCR 22.28(6).

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