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Vol. 70, No. 9, September
1997
Professional Discipline
The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, an arm of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, assists the court in discharging its exclusive constitutional
responsibility to supervise the practice of law in this state and to protect
the public from acts of professional misconduct by attorneys licensed to
practice in Wisconsin. The board is composed of eight lawyers and four nonlawyer
members, and its offices are located at Room 410, 110 E. Main St., Madison,
WI 53703, and Room 102, 611 N. Broadway, Milwaukee, WI 53202.
Disciplinary proceeding
against Ronald W. Hendree
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Ronald W. Hendree,
46, Milwaukee, for one year, effective Aug. 4, 1997. Hendree's suspension
was based upon numerous counts of misconduct involving many different matters.
Hendree stipulated to the sanction and to the underlying violations. The
court accepted the stipulation, which included restitution to several clients.
Hendree mishandled his trust account by commingling his personal funds
in the trust account and allowing the account to become overdrawn, violating
SCR 20:1.15(a). Hendree also failed to keep the records required by SCR
20:1.15(e) and filed false certifications with the State Bar that he had
complied with recordkeeping requirements, violating SCR 20:1.15(g).
In one client matter, a fugitive's family retained Hendree to represent
him on federal drug charges. Hendree arranged for the client to surrender
himself and return $25,000 of the government's money from an undercover
drug buy. In exchange, the client was to receive a reduced sentence. Hendree
returned $17,000 of the $25,000, but reported that $7,500 of the government's
money was stolen from his car trunk before he could return it. Due to Hendree's
failure to safeguard the money, his client lost the benefit of the agreement
with the government. Hendree's failure to safeguard the funds violated SCR
20:1.15(a). Hendree withdrew from the representation due to the conflicts
of interest created by the alleged theft and Hendree's acceptance of a car
from the client in lieu of fees. The car, which had been used in the crimes
allegedly committed by the client, was seized by the government. During
the investigation, Hendree misrepresented to the Board of Attorneys Professional
Responsibility (BAPR) about accepting the car and its seizure, and about
the dates he claimed to have communicated with his client, violating SCR
20:8.1(a) and SCR 22.07(2).
In a second matter, Hendree represented a client in a misdemeanor battery
case. The client paid Hendree $750 to represent him at trial, but Hendree
did not appear for trial due to a scheduling conflict. The client proceeded
on his own and obtained a dismissal of the case. The client requested return
of the $750 paid for trial. Hendree failed to return it, violating SCR 20:1.16(d).
The client eventually obtained a binding arbitration award of $750 in February
1996, but Hendree did not pay the award, thus he disobeyed an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal in violation of SCR 20:3.4(c).
In a third client matter, Hendree failed to appear at several probation
revocation hearings and failed to respond to several inquiries from the
Division of Hearings and Appeals as to his status in the revocation matter.
By failing to respond to the Division's inquiries, Hendree disobeyed an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal, violating SCR 20:3.4(c).
In a fourth matter, Hendree represented a client regarding several legal
matters, including "collections, money judgment/consultation for visitation
and child support." Hendree failed to communicate with the client regarding
the status of these matters, violating SCR 20:1.4(a). And, a provision in
the fee agreement allowing Hendree to keep the client's file until all fees
were paid violated SCR 20:8.4(a) in that the provision was an attempt to
violate SCR 20:1.16(d).
In a fifth matter, a client informed Hendree that he wished to pursue
an appeal of his criminal conviction. Hendree neglected to file a Notice
of Intent to Pursue Postconviction Relief, violating SCR 20:1.3. Even though
he had failed to file a notice, Hendree misrepresented to the client that
he had done so, violating SCR 20:8.4(c). Hendree also misrepresented to
BAPR that the notice had been filed, violating SCR 20:8.1(a) and SCR 22.07(2).
In a sixth matter, Hendree began representation of a client in a defamation
action in March 1996. In late April 1996, Hendree failed to file a response
to a motion for summary judgment and failed to timely file a request for
adjournment, resulting in the dismissal of the client's case. Hendree's
failure to respond to the motion violated SCR 20:1.3. Subsequent to the
dismissal of her case, the client requested that Hendree return her file
materials to her, which she required to defend against a counterclaim that
was still pending. Although a hearing had been scheduled for September 1996,
Hendree failed to surrender the file until November 1996, violating SCR
20:1.16(d).
In a seventh matter, Hendree accepted funds from a man for a representation
that never occurred. Hendree failed to refund the unearned fees to the man
for six months after it was clear there would be no representation, violating
SCR 20:1.16(d).
In an eighth matter, Hendree represented a client on drug charges. Hendree
accepted $500 from the client to retain a drug abuse expert. Hendree did
not deposit the funds into his trust account, violating SCR 20:1.15(a).
Hendree claimed that the money was immediately disbursed to several experts,
but no experts were ever paid. Hendree's misrepresentation in that regard
violated SCR 20:8.1(a) and SCR 22.07(2). When the representation ended,
Hendree returned no funds to the client, violating SCR 20:1.16(d). In a
seizure action filed against his client, Hendree never filed an answer,
and a default judgment was entered. This conduct violated SCR 20:1.3.
Hendree's prior discipline consisted of a public reprimand to which he
consented in February 1997. The reprimand was based upon Hendree's misconduct
during representation of a union. Pursuant to the reprimand, Hendree agreed
to return the $3,750 advance from the union for costs of litigation he never
pursued. However, Hendree failed to comply with the terms of repayment to
which he agreed. The order suspending Hendree's license, therefore, included
an order for restitution to the union, and to other clients to whom Hendree
owed money. The court ordered that the payment of restitution be a condition
of reinstatement. |