Professional Discipline

The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, an arm of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, assists the court in discharging its exclusive constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice of law in this state and to protect the public from acts of professional misconduct by attorneys licensed to practice in Wisconsin. The board is composed of eight lawyers and four nonlawyer members, and its offices are located at Room 410, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI 53703, and Room 102, 611 N. Broadway, Milwaukee, WI 53202.

Disciplinary proceeding against Myron L. Erickson

On Dec. 11, 1996, the Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the Wisconsin law license of Myron L. Erickson, 55, now of Menominee, Mich.

Erickson was convicted of two counts of deviate sexual assault, following a jury trial in Callaway County, Mo. As a result of the conviction, Erickson's Missouri law license was terminated on April 10, 1991, by order of the Missouri Supreme Court. Pending his appeal of the conviction in Missouri, the Wisconsin Supreme Court indefinitely suspended Erickson's Wisconsin law license on Feb. 1, 1994, as per the referee's recommendation. The court also required Erickson to submit a report within six months of the indefinite suspension and every six months thereafter on the status of his conviction and of his license to practice law in Missouri. The court further ordered that the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) file a report with the court so that identical discipline to that finally imposed in Missouri could be imposed in Wisconsin.

After Erickson's conviction was affirmed, and he had not notified the court of that fact, BAPR filed a motion as to why Erickson's license should not be revoked. Erickson did not respond to the court's order to show cause.

Disciplinary proceeding against Eli Frank

On Dec. 20, 1996, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Eli Frank, 58, Milwaukee, for 90 days, effective that date. He also was ordered to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.

In November 1995 Frank was convicted of the felony charge conspiracy to commit bank fraud in the federal district court after he pled guilty to that charge. Frank then entered into a stipulation with BAPR as to the factual allegations of misconduct and that imposing a 90-day suspension was an appropriate sanction. The supreme court rejected the sanction, a referee was appointed, and a hearing was held.

Based on the record, the court found that Frank's client, a real estate developer, had used Frank's letterhead to fabricate two invoices totalling $44,020 for legal services relating to the client's construction project. The developer fraudulently submitted the invoices to the lender bank for reimbursement. When Frank received the $44,020 payment in the form of two checks from the client, Frank was aware that his firm had performed only $3,089 in legal services related to that project. At that time, the client owed the law firm more than $600,000. Notations on the checks indicated the city of location of the construction project, but Frank stated he assumed that notation to be an internal matter and directed that the checks be credited to a different account as specified by the client.

Two years later, Frank became aware of the fraudulent invoices when he received copies from the lawyer representing the banker in an unrelated proceeding in which Frank's client was a principal witness. The client was then under criminal investigation, and the attorney representing the client in that matter told Frank not to respond to any requests from the banker's lawyer as any information or documents Frank might have regarding the matter were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Frank stated that this, in part, was why he failed to act to correct the matter.

The court took note of Frank's full cooperation with the federal prosecutor and BAPR, his sincere remorse, his 30 years as a highly respected practitioner, his extensive civic and charitable work, and the fact that this appeared to be an isolated lapse. The court also noted that the absence of a full factual record delayed the court's action such that Frank had already incurred the equivalent of a nine-month suspension.

On the basis of all the circumstances, including the nine-month suspension equivalent, the court determined that an additional 90-day suspension was a proper disposition.

Disciplinary proceeding against Eugene Pigatti

The Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the law license of Eugene Pigatti, 38, Milwaukee, on Jan. 22, 1996, based upon a petition filed by Pigatti for revocation of his license by consent. In his petition, Pigatti acknowledged that he could not successfully defend against allegations of professional misconduct under investigation by BAPR.

Pigatti violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by converting significant amounts of client funds under his control to his personal use. In 1991 Pigatti was retained by an out-of-state personal representative to probate an estate. The personal representative also gave Pigatti a power of attorney to manage both the estate and a "spendthrift" testamentary trust that was to be established out of the estate funds. From October 1991 until February 1996 Pigatti had complete control over the estate funds. During this period, more than a dozen checks were written to cash. These checks totalled more than $40,000. Pigatti has not explained the purpose of most of these disbursements.

In December 1992 Pigatti listed the estate's available assets as $125,000. In March 1993 Pigatti closed the estate account by transferring $95,000 into the testamentary trust account he had established. Pigatti has not explained the $30,000 differential between the estate's available assets and the money actually transferred into the trust.

In July 1994 Pigatti deposited about $76,000 into the testamentary trust account. The funds for this deposit were from three certificates of deposit and a savings account, all in the name of the deceased. These funds were never reported in the estate's General Inventory or the Final Account prepared and filed by Pigatti.

From March 1993 through February 1996, the testamentary trust account was under Pigatti's complete control. During this period, Pigatti admits that he took more than $80,000 from the trust for his personal use. This transfer of funds was in the form of 38 checks made out to cash. Pigatti characterizes these transfers as "loans," but no documentation corroborates this assertion.

During this same period, Pigatti wrote more than 30 additional checks, totalling about $80,000, to cash from the testamentary trust account. Some of these funds were used to purchase $35,000 worth of cashier's checks which were verifiably sent to the spendthrift beneficiary. Pigatti claims he sent the additional $45,000 to the spendthrift in the form of $100 bills mailed to the spendthrift's home. Conflicting affidavits were prepared by Pigatti and signed by the spendthrift. The first affidavit indicated that the spendthrift received $35,000 from Pigatti; the second affidavit indicated that he received $80,000.

By October 1995 there was only $3,000 remaining in the trust's account. In December 1995 Pigatti met with an investment advisor and informed him that he was going to invest $90,000 in the trust's name. At that meeting, Pigatti wrote a check for $5,000 to invest in mutual funds. On Feb. 16, 1996, the same day that the personal representative made a complaint to BAPR regarding Pigatti's activities, Pigatti invested about $85,000 more into the mutual funds. Pigatti characterizes this amount as a repayment of the $80,000 "loans" with interest.

Pigatti also violated SCR 20:1.2(a) by disbursing thousands of dollars to the spendthrift beneficiary, which were outside the provisions of the will establishing the spendthrift trust, thereby acting beyond the scope of the representation; and he violated SCR 20:1.4(b) by failing to keep the personal representative informed as to the actions he was taking in both the probate of the estate and in his management of the testamentary trust.

Pigatti had no prior discipline.