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Vol. 73, No. 12, December 2000
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Fighting City Hall
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Conclusion
The present municipal immunity statute, as
interpreted by judicial decisions in the 1990s, does not work. It
does not accomplish any of the public policy goals ever posited for
it. When the crypto-sporidium cases were filed in 1993, it was unlikely
that the municipal defendants could prevail on an immunity defense
under the cases that had been decided up to that point.
However, beginning in 1995, the courts broadened their interpretation
of section 893.80(4) of the Wisconsin Statutes, and the city's chances
of prevailing increased. Finally, in 1999, following six years of
litigation and the expenditure of millions of dollars in attorney
fees and costs by all parties, the city filed its motion for summary
judgment based upon its "discretionary" immunity. Before the court
ruled on that motion, the parties reached a settlement that the court
approved on a class-action basis.31
The fairness of the settlement was based, at least in part, upon the
prospect that the case would be tied up for several more years in
an appeal of the trial court's ruling on immunity, regardless of who
won in the trial court.
The unresolved question is whether the legislature in 1963 intended
to reinstate municipal immunity beyond the "legislative, quasi-legislative,
judicial, and quasi-judicial" functions that survived the Holytz
decision. If it did find that public policy required it to restore
the court-abolished rule and legislatively overrule Holytz,
the legislature could and should have done so in much more direct
and comprehensive language. However, in the absence of compelling
empirical evidence that this is necessary, the legislature should
leave the current immunity statute alone. Instead, plaintiffs' and
defendants' attorneys, and judges, need to reexamine the public policy
considerations identified in Lister before applying the "discretionary/ministerial"
function test to anyone other than police, jailers, teachers, and
foster care workers.
It also is unnecessary to resurrect the "proprietary/governmental"
function test. Rather, immunity should be seen as the affirmative
defense that it is, and the burden should be placed upon the municipal
government to establish that the conduct for which it is being sued
is "legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial."
This should be a legal decision that the courts can resolve upon a
motion to dismiss. The parties should not have to engage in discovery
to determine that issue.
In many cases, better defenses and procedural motions exist to accomplish
the stated goals of the municipal immunity defense. If that is not
enough protection for fragile public treasuries, more municipalities
should consider obtaining liability insurance. That also would be
the best protection for those injured due to the occasional negligence
of public employees.
Example
Cases in which Government Conduct
Was Found to be Discretionary or Ministerial
The following is a list of cases showing examples of cases
in which government conduct has been found to be discretionary
(immune) or ministerial (not immune). The list is not exhaustive.
CaseName
|
Date
|
Court
|
Plaint.1
|
Defend.2
|
Cause of
Action
|
PI3
|
Public Work
|
Immunity4
|
Coffey v. City of Milwaukee |
1976 |
S.Ct. |
Individ. |
M |
Negligence |
No |
Bldg./fire inspect. |
No
|
Lister v. Board of Regents
|
1976 |
S.Ct. |
Individ. |
S |
Declaratory judgment |
No |
Law school registrar |
Yes |
Lange v. Town of Norway |
1977 |
S.Ct. |
Individ. |
M |
Nuisance |
No |
Dam |
No |
Cords v. Anderson |
1977
|
S.Ct. |
Individ. |
S |
Negligence |
Yes |
State park |
No |
Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County |
1980 |
S.Ct. |
Individ. |
M |
Negligence |
Yes |
Coroner |
Yes / No |
Domino v. Walworth County |
1984 |
App. |
Individ. |
M |
Negligence |
Yes |
Police |
No |
Hillcrest Golf & Country Club v. City of Altoona |
1986 |
App. |
Bus. |
M |
Nuisance |
No |
Sewer |
No |
C.L. v. Olson |
1988 |
S.Ct. |
Individ. |
S |
Negligence |
Yes |
Parole agent |
Yes |
Energy Complexes v. Eau
Claire County |
1989 |
S.Ct. |
Bus. |
M |
Breach of contract |
No |
Power plant |
No |
Stann v. Waukesha County |
1991 |
App. |
Individ. |
M |
Negligence |
Yes |
Beach lifeguards |
Yes |
Sheridan v. City of Janesville |
1991 |
App. |
Individ. |
M |
Negligence |
Yes |
Police |
Yes |
Barillari v. Milwaukee |
1995 |
S.Ct. |
Individ. |
M |
Negligence |
Yes |
Police |
Yes |
Kara B. v. Dane County |
1995 |
App. |
Individ. |
M |
Negligence |
Yes |
Foster care |
Yes |
Menick v. City of
Menasha |
1996 |
App. |
Individ. |
M |
Nuisance |
No |
Sewer |
No |
Kimps v. Hill |
1996 |
S.Ct. |
Individ. |
S |
Negligence |
Yes |
University phy. ed. class |
Yes |
Estate of Cavanaugh v.
Andrade |
1996 |
S.Ct. |
Individ. |
M |
Negligence |
Yes |
Police |
No / Yes |
Bauder v. Delavan-Darian
School District
|
1996 |
App. |
Individ. |
M |
Negligence |
Yes |
School gym class |
Yes |
Ottinger v.
Pinel |
1997 |
App. |
Individ. |
S |
Negligence |
Yes |
Prison guards |
Yes |
Spencer v. Brown
County |
1997 |
App. |
Individ. |
S |
Safe-place |
Yes |
Jail |
Yes |
Anderson v. City of Milwaukee |
1997 |
S.Ct. |
Individ. |
M |
Safe-place |
Yes |
Sidewalk |
No (waived) |
Pichler v. Hamilton
Sch. Dist. |
1999 |
App. |
Individ. |
M |
Negligence |
Yes |
School |
Yes |
Kierstyn v. Racine Unified
Sch. Dist. |
1999 |
S.Ct. |
Individ. |
M |
Negligence |
No |
School |
Yes |
Willow Creek Ranch LLC
v. Town of Shelby |
2000 |
S.Ct. |
Bus. |
M |
Negligence |
No |
Zoning |
Yes |
1 Plaintiff: Individ. = Individual; Bus. = Business.
2 Defendant: M = Municipality; S = State.
3 PI = Personal Injury.
4 Immunity: Yes / No = Municipality immune but individual
employees are not; No / Yes = Municipality not immune but individual
employees/officers are.
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Michael Pollack, Tulane 1978, is engaged in a private civil litigation
practice in Milwaukee. In 1999, he was appointed lead counsel for
the Plaintiff Class in the litigation arising out of the 1993 cryptosporidium
contamination of Milwaukee's drinking water supply, in which he recently
concluded settlements of $1.8 million. He also is admitted to practice
law in Florida and Illinois.
Endnotes
1 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.
2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
2 115 N.W.2d at 625 and 627.
3 Wis. Stat. § 895.43, later renumbered as § 893.80.
4 Id.
5 Holytz, 115 N.W.2d at 625.
6 Anderson v. City
of Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 18, 559 N.W.2d 563 (1997).
7 Barillari v. Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 247,
258, 533 N.W.2d 759 (1995).
8 Willow Creek
Ranch LLC v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, 59, 235 Wis. 2d 409,
611 N.W.2d 693 (June 20, 2000). The dissenters further elaborated that
"The law on governmental immunity has become so muddled that it no longer
provides reasonable guidance about when local governments may be sued,
what remedies are available to persons claiming injury, and the circumstances
in which local governments and their employees may be held liable." 120.
9 E.g., Barillari v. Milwaukee, supra note
7.
10 Foss v. Town of Kronenwetter, 87 Wis.
2d 91, 102, 273 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1978). Interestingly, the court noted,
"Sec. 81.15,
Stats., has spawned a line of cases which have not always been consistent
in their development, theory, or language." 87 Wis. 2d at 100.
11 Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d
282, 299, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).
12 Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis.
2d 663, 683, 292 N.W.2d 816, 826 (1980).
13 Stann v. Waukesha County, 161 Wis.
2d 808, 468 N.W.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1991).
14 Sheridan v. City of Janesville, 164
Wis. 2d 420, 474 N.W.2d 799 (Ct. App. 1991).
15 Kimps v. Hill,
200 Wis. 2d 1, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996). See also, Barillari, supra
note 7, and Kara B. v. Dane County,
198 Wis. 2d 24, 542 N.W.2d 777 (Ct. App. 1995).
16 Domino v. Walworth County, 118 Wis.
2d 488, 347 N.W.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1984).
17 Id. at 492, 247 N.W.2d at 919.
18 Spencer
v. Brown County, 215 Wis. 2d 641, 573 N.W.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1997).
19 C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 422
N.W.2d 614 (1988).
20 Bauder
v. Delavan-Darien Sch. Dist., 207 Wis. 2d 312, 558 N.W.2d 881
(Ct. App. 1996); Pichler v. Hamilton
Sch. Dist., 1999 WL 486927 (Ct. App. unpublished).
21 Kara B.
v. Dane County, 198 Wis. 2d 24, 542 N.W.2d 777 (Ct. App. 1995).
22 E.g., Barillari, n.5, supra note 7.
23 Wis. Stat. § 895.46.
See Graham v. Sauk Prairie Police Comm'n, 915 F. 2d 1085 (7th Cir.
1990).
24 Penterman v.
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 468-69, 565 N.W.2d
521 (1997).
25 According to reports in the local press.
26 Estate of Cavanaugh
v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 550 N.W.2d 103 (1996). The police
officer who was engaged in a high-speed chase that resulted in the death
of an innocent bystander was found to be immune from liability, but the
municipality itself was not immune for failing to adopt adequate high-speed
chase guidelines.
27 Energy Complexes Inc. v. Eau Claire County,
152 Wis. 2d 453, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989).
28 Menick
v. City of Menasha, 200 Wis. 2d 737, 547 N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App.
1996). "The actions of the city in operating and maintaining a sewer system
do not fall within the immunity provisions of § 893.80." 200 Wis. 2d at
739, 740.
29 Wisconsin recovery limit for victims of municipal
torts: A conflict of public interests, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 155.
30 Kierstyn
v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999).
31 The case was originally certified as a class
action for litigation purposes, but that was reversed on appeal, Markweise
v. Peck Foods, 205 Wis. 2d 207, 556 N.W.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1996).
After remand, further hearings on class certification were held, and ultimately
the trial court denied certification for litigation purposes.
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