Public Reprimand of Mario J. Tarara

The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Mario J. Tarara, Rockford, Ill., agreed to the imposition of a public reprimand pursuant to SCR 22.09(1). A Wisconsin Supreme Court-appointed referee approved the agreement and issued the public reprimand on Jan. 7, 2015, in accordance with SCR 22.09(3).

Tarara primarily practices in Illinois. At all times relevant to this matter, Tarara’s Wisconsin law license was suspended for his failure to pay annual dues and assessments or failure to comply with mandatory CLE-reporting requirements.

In 2008, a woman hired Tarara to represent her in an ongoing Wisconsin litigation matter related to the sale of a business, eviction, and continued use of a trade name. After Tarara became counsel of record, the opposing party filed a second and a third amended answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaim. Tarara failed to file a response to the third amended answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaim or a motion for an extension of time to file a response, resulting in the court granting the opposing party’s motion for default. The court entered judgment against Tarara’s client for damages, enjoined her from further use of the disputed trade name, and ordered that continued use of the trade name would result in a $500 per day penalty.

The client asked Tarara to begin working on an appeal. Tarara advised the client that he would “take a look at the situation to see if anything could be done” but determined that an appeal was unlikely to be successful. He did not, however, advise the client of his determination or that he would take no further action with regard to the judgment against her.

Opposing counsel notified Tarara by email that he had been informed that Tarara’s client continued to use the trade name, and that the defendant would seek damages at the rate of $500 per day as long as the client continued to display the name. Tarara failed to discuss the email with his client.

The court awarded the defendant $50,000 in additional damages for the client’s continued use of the trade name.

Tarara violated SCR 10.03(6), SCR 31.10(1), and SCR 22.26(2), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f), by engaging in the practice of law in Wisconsin when his license was suspended.

Tarara violated SCR 20:1.3 by failing to file a response to the defendant’s third amended answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaim.

Tarara violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) by failing to advise the client of the contents of opposing counsel’s email.

Tarara violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) and (b), by failing to advise the client that he had determined that an appeal was unlikely to be successful; and SCR 20:1.16(d), by failing to inform her that he would not file an appeal and that the representation was concluded.

Tarara violated SCR 20:7.1(a) and SCR 20:7.5(a) by stating on his letterhead that he was licensed in Wisconsin while his license was suspended.

Tarara has no prior discipline.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Michael G. Trewin

Effective Nov. 7, 2014, the Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the law license of Michael G. Trewin, New London, and ordered Trewin to pay the full cost of the disciplinary proceeding. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin, 2014 WI 111.

Trewin’s revocation was based on 14 counts of misconduct, many of which fell into the same pattern of using knowledge of clients’ financial weaknesses to take advantage of those clients in business transactions with them.

Each of three couples (the clients) initially hired Trewin when they were facing legal problems regarding their debts, either in the context of a foreclosure proceeding or a possible bankruptcy. The clients were financially unsophisticated, viewed Trewin as their attorney, and relied on his expertise and judgment, believing that he was acting in good faith and looking out for their best interests.

Trewin loaned the clients money, often at relatively high interest rates, starting with fairly small amounts and increasing the amounts of the loans over time as the clients needed additional funds. In some instances, there were no signed promissory notes or conflict waivers. In other instances, the description of the transaction in the conflict waiver was not consistent with the date or terms set forth in the promissory note. The conflict waivers did not disclose all the facts regarding the transactions, provide any meaningful explanation of the disadvantages of entering into the transactions with Trewin, or discuss available alternatives.

When the clients fell behind on their loan payments, Trewin’s practice was not to attempt to enforce the existing loans. Instead, Trewin created another loan, which was often a mixture of existing indebtedness and new money. Trewin’s manner of handling these transactions left the clients confused about which loans were outstanding, what payments they had made toward which loans, and the loan balances.

Ultimately, when the clients had difficulties making their payments to Trewin or another creditor, Trewin persuaded the clients to transfer their property to him, with the promise that he would lease the property back to them and they could reacquire the property. The couples, however, were not in adequate financial condition to ever regain ownership of their property. Because of Trewin’s actions, some of the clients continued to hold the mistaken belief that they really did retain ownership or control of the property even after they had transferred ownership to Trewin.

In his dealings with one or more of the clients, Trewin violated SCR 20:1.8(a) and (b), former SCR 20:1.7(b), current SCR 20:1.7(a)(2), and SCR 20:8.4(c).

Trewin violated SCR 22.03(6) and SCR 21.15(4), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h), by attempting to persuade two couples to withdraw their grievance and cease cooperating with the OLR’s investigations.

Trewin violated SCR 22.04(1) and SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h), by failing to timely provide information and records to a district committee and the OLR.

Trewin’s law license was suspended for five months in 2004. He was publicly reprimanded in 2006.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Emory H. Booker

Effective Jan. 16, 2015, the supreme court revoked the law license of Emory H. Booker, Milwaukee. The court also placed conditions on Booker’s reinstatement and ordered Booker to pay the full cost of the disciplinary proceeding. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Booker, 2015 WI 2.

Booker’s revocation was based on 47 counts of misconduct, involving numerous client matters.

Booker promoted his law practice in advertisements as the “Light Hero.” Between May 2010 and March 2011, Booker filed several hundred Chapter 128 petitions on behalf of homeowners facing the possible disconnection of utility services. In many of the petitions, Booker did not use court-approved forms or include required certification language. Beginning in April 2011, Booker began ghostwriting Chapter 128 filings, preparing and filing certain documents and including return envelopes addressed to his post office box, without appearing as counsel of record. Many of these filings were incomplete or noncompliant with the court’s requirements. The information that Booker provided to his clients often consisted of information the clients could obtain without a fee at the courthouse. Also, Booker failed to adequately explain to clients the limited nature of his representation.

After a Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge ruled that filing of Chapter 128 petitions did not stay utility disconnection for nonpayment, Booker changed the focus of his practice to filing actions in the federal bankruptcy court. The Eastern District bankruptcy court encountered problems with Booker’s filings and decided to bar him from filing bankruptcy petitions until he had obtained continuing legal education in the area of consumer bankruptcy practice. Booker satisfied this CLE requirement but continued to have difficulties regarding bankruptcy filings.

 Between April 2012 and June 2012, the Eastern District bankruptcy court received more than 140 petitions that showed the debtor as filing pro se and listed a business in Indiana as the petition preparer. In exchange for a fee, Booker had provided the debtors with a packet of information and sent the debtors’ financial information to the Indiana petition preparer, which in turn prepared the bankruptcy petitions.

Booker did not adequately explain the limited nature of his representation to his clients. In many cases, Booker conducted no meaningful review as to the debtors’ suitability for bankruptcy. Much of the information that Booker provided to his clients was inaccurate. Many of the court filings contained incorrect information or were missing required documents. Booker failed to make certain disclosures to clients that are required by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. He charged unreasonable fees for his services.

Booker violated SCR 20:1.1, SCR 20:1.2(c), SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.4, SCR 20:1.5(a), SCR 20:1.15(b)(4), SCR 20:1.16(d), SCR 20:3.3(a)(1), SCR 20:3.4(c), SCR 20:7.2(c), SCR 20:8.4(c) and (f), SCR 22.03(6), and SCR 21.15(4), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).

Booker had no prior discipline.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Joshua F. Stubbins

On Oct. 14, 2014, the supreme court revoked the Wisconsin law license of Joshua F. Stubbins, Rockville, Md. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stubbins, 2014 WI 115. Stubbins was admitted to practice in Wisconsin in 2007, and he formerly practiced in Milwaukee. His license was administratively suspended in October 2013 for Stubbins’ failure to pay State Bar dues and file an annual trust account certification, and later for failure to comply with mandatory CLE-reporting requirements.

In July 2014, Stubbins filed a petition for consensual license revocation, stating he could not defend against numerous allegations of misconduct relating to four client matters. The first matter involved the foreclosure of two land contracts. Stubbins failed to file the foreclosure complaints for nearly two years and made multiple misrepresentations to the clients, leading the clients to believe that the foreclosures had been initiated.

In the second matter, Stubbins failed to take steps necessary to the termination of a commercial lease on behalf of a holdover tenant, which led to the client being held responsible for seven months of double rent charges and Stubbins’ law firm having to make a claim on its malpractice insurance policy. In addition, Stubbins billed the client for work that he never performed.

In the third matter, Stubbins defended an auto finance company against a claim that it had improperly seized a vehicle and sold it at auction. Stubbins falsely claimed that he had lost a deposition notice and would be unable to appear on the scheduled date. The deposition was rescheduled to three subsequent dates, and each time Stubbins falsely informed the opposing counsel that his client’s representative was ill and could not be deposed, when in fact she was healthy and had no knowledge that the depositions had even been scheduled. Stubbins also made other misrepresentations to opposing counsel.

Further, Stubbins failed to advise the client that the court had denied his motion for summary judgment and had, instead, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the opposing party. The court imposed sanctions of $9,600 against Stubbins, which he paid personally. Stubbins failed to inform the client of the sanctions. Finally, Stubbins filed a notice of appeal from the grant of partial summary judgment, without having obtained the client’s consent to do so.

In the fourth matter, Stubbins failed to inform the client in a civil action of a mediation session that Stubbins attended, which concluded in a written settlement agreement that Stubbins signed on the client’s behalf without the client’s authority. Stubbins communicated numerous times with the client but did not inform the client of the mediation or the settlement, and he led the client to believe that the mediation had not occurred.

Stubbins’ actions in these four matters implicated SCR 20:1.2, SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.4(a), SCR 20:1.16(a)(2), SCR 20:3.4, SCR 20:4.1(a), and SCR 20:8.4(c) and (f).

Disciplinary Proceedings Against John J. Carter

On Dec. 12, 2014, the supreme court suspended the law license of John J. Carter, Milwaukee, for three years. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter, 2014 WI 126.

Carter stipulated to the 11 counts of misconduct charged in the OLR’s complaint. The first seven counts related to Carter’s representation of a client in the sale of her business. Carter failed to enter into a written fee agreement with the client, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(b)(1). Carter failed to promptly disburse the client’s $112,500 in sale proceeds pursuant to her requests and refused to release the balance of the sale proceeds to her until they had resolved their fee dispute, in violation of 20:1.15(d)(1). Carter failed to respond to the client’s requests concerning information about the status of her funds, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).

Carter withdrew $5,000 in fees without providing the client any notice, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(g)(1). He failed to hold at least $72,053.59 of the client’s funds in trust and converted them to his own purposes or for third-party purposes without the client’s knowledge or consent, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) and SCR 20:8.4(c). Carter engaged in a months’-long scheme of making repeated misrepresentations to the client that he had invested on her behalf the balance of her $112,500 in various investment instruments, when in fact he had never made any such investments and had already converted her funds for his own or third-party purposes, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). Carter failed to respond to the client’s requests for a billing statement, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(b)(3).

The remaining counts of misconduct related to Carter’s client-trust-account management. Carter made an unidentified $2,500 deposit to his trust account by telephone transfer, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)b. On at least 10 occasions, Carter deposited $2,000 of a client’s funds to his business account, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(b)(1). Carter failed to maintain trust account records showing the required information, including a transaction register, subsidiary client ledgers, deposit records, canceled checks, and monthly account reconciliations, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(f)(1). Finally, Carter issued numerous trust account checks without including the client matter and purpose of such checks on the memo line, in violation of SCR 20:l.15(f)(1)e.1.

Carter had no prior discipline.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Richard W. Steffes

On Dec. 18, 2014, the supreme court publicly reprimanded Richard W. Steffes, Beaver Dam, and ordered him to pay the cost of the disciplinary proceeding, totaling $7,805.09. The court also ordered Steffes to attend an OLR trust account seminar and to provide his trust account records to the OLR every two months for six months, commencing on his first post-reprimand deposit to or disbursement from his trust account. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steffes, 2014 WI 128.

A man entered into a construction contract with a company owned by Steffes’ son and provided the company five checks totaling $27,228.50. The company began the work but never completed the construction project, and the man subsequently filed a civil action against the company. During litigation, the man discovered that the checks previously written to the construction company had been deposited into Steffes’ trust account and Steffes was asked to provide an accounting of the funds deposited in and disbursed from his client trust account. Steffes did not provide an accounting, and the man reported Steffes to the OLR.

Steffes did not respond to several OLR requests for a response to the grievance and his law license was temporarily suspended pursuant to SCR 22.03(4) due to his willful failure to cooperate with the investigation. Steffes eventually responded to the OLR and admitted he had allowed his son to use his law firm client trust account as a business checking account for the construction company. Steffes acknowledged that the man’s payments to the construction company were deposited into his trust account. Steffes also admitted that he did not notify the man in writing that funds were deposited into his client trust account, and he did not maintain a separate trust account ledger for the funds.

By failing to notify the man of the receipt of funds in his trust account and in failing to render a full accounting on request, Steffes violated former SCR 20:1.15(b).

By allowing his son to use client trust account checks to make disbursements from the client trust account and by allowing his son to fill in the names of payees and the amounts for various disbursements for both personal and business purposes, Steffes failed to protect client funds on deposit in his client trust account, and thereby violated former SCR 20:1.15(a).

By failing to keep complete records of his trust account funds and other trust property, Steffes violated former SCR 20:1.15(e).

By failing to timely respond to the OLR’s requests for information, Steffes violated SCR 22.03(2) and (6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).

Steffes had no prior discipline.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Michael J. Briggs

On Oct. 28, 2014, the supreme court suspended the law license of Michael J. Briggs, Oregon, for 90 days, effective Nov. 28, 2014. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Briggs, 2014 WI 119. The order followed a stipulation between Briggs and the OLR. The supreme court imposed no costs.

A married couple hired Briggs to represent them as plaintiffs in a land-contract dispute. Briggs filed a motion for default judgment, which the circuit court granted. In violation of SCR 20:1.1, Briggs believed that docketing the civil judgment in circuit court was sufficient to restore clear title to the property to the clients, and he failed to file the default judgment or any other document with the register of deeds so as to clarify that title had reverted to the clients.

In the same matter, Briggs violated SCR 20:1.3 by failing to diligently take steps to determine the procedures that would be necessary to garnish the wages of the defendants, who had moved out of state. In violation of SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4), Briggs repeatedly failed to respond to telephone and email inquiries from the clients, who sought updates about the status of the garnishment efforts and related matters. Briggs failed to timely respond to the clients’ grievance, contrary to SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6) and SCR 20:8.4(h), and did so only after the court issued an order to show cause and suspended Briggs’ law license pursuant to SCR 22.03(4). The period of suspension was Feb. 12, 2013 to Dec. 16, 2013. Briggs further violated SCR 22.03(6) and SCR 20:8.4(h) by making misrepresentations to the OLR regarding his efforts on behalf of the clients in the land-contract matter and the extent of his communications with them.

Between Feb. 12, 2013 and Dec. 16, 2013, Briggs continued to practice law in Wisconsin, including drafting documents, providing legal advice, and appearing in court on behalf of clients, in violation of SCR 22.26(2) and SCR 20:3.4(c). In one such matter, in February 2013, Briggs began representing a client as the plaintiff in an eviction action. Briggs failed to notify the client, the defendants, and the presiding court of his suspension, in violation of SCR 22.26(1)(a), (b) and (c), and SCR 20:3.4(c).

Briggs also violated SCR 22.03(6) and SCR 20:8.4(h) by making misrepresentations to the OLR concerning the timing of his knowledge of his license suspension, the timing of his communications with the defendants, his failure to provide notice of his license suspension to his client, and the extent of his law practice while suspended.

Briggs had no prior discipline.

Petition for Reinstatement of P. Nicholas Hurtgen

A public hearing will be held at 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, May 20, 2015, before referee John Nicholas Schweitzer at the Madison Public Library, Room 209, 201 W. Mifflin St., Madison, on the petition of P. Nicholas Hurtgen, Winnetka, Ill., to reinstate his Wisconsin law license. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and be heard in support of or in opposition to the petition for reinstatement.

On Sept. 9, 2009, the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted Hurtgen’s petition for consensual revocation and revoked Hurtgen’s Wisconsin law license. Hurtgen’s petition alleged his inability to defend against misconduct allegations that related to Hurtgen’s federal felony conviction of aiding and abetting wire fraud. That conviction was later overturned and vacated on the basis that the counts against Hurtgen failed to allege an offense.

To be reinstated, Hurtgen has the burden of substantiating by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that 1) he has the moral character to practice law in Wisconsin, 2) his resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of the public interest, 3) all of his representations in his reinstatement petition are substantiated, and 4) he has complied fully with the terms of the order of suspension or revocation and with SCR 22.26.

Relevant information may be provided to or obtained from OLR investigator Sarah Peterson or OLR assistant litigation counsel Julie M. Spoke, 110 E. Main St., Suite 315, Madison, WI 53703. The OLR’s toll free telephone number is (877) 315-6941. Spoke’s direct phone number is (608) 261-8295.