By Joe Forward, Legal Writer, State, Bar of Wisconsin

Sept. 3, 2010 – Interrogation evidence will be suppressed in its entirety when an officer places a juvenile in custody and interrogates the juvenile without recording the conversation, even if incriminating statements are later recorded.

In State v. Dionicia M., 2009AP3109 (Aug. 24, 2010), a Wisconsin Appeals Court reversed a juvenile court order denying a juvenile defendant’s motion to suppress statements made to a police officer in connection with a battery case.

In October of 2008, Dionicia M. (Dionicia) was skipping school. The high school truancy officer requested that a police officer locate and return Dionicia to the high school. The officer located the juvenile a half block from school and placed her in the back of the squad car.

While in the squad car, the officer questioned Dionicia about a battery case, and she stated that she had been involved. She agreed to sign a statement concerning her involvement, but the officer was not recording the conversation.

In an office at the high school, the officer read Dionicia her Miranda rights and began recording while he continued to question her about the battery case. The officer prepared, and she signed, a confession statement. The district attorney charged her with substantial battery.

Dionicia moved to suppress the interrogation evidence, and the juvenile court denied the motion. She later pled no contest to a charge of misdemeanor battery as a party to a crime, and the court sentenced her to spend 30 days in secure detention. Dionicia appealed.

Partially recorded interrogations inadmissible 

Under State v. Jerrell, C.J., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110, the appeals court explained, all custodial interrogations of juveniles must be electronically recorded where feasible. The state argued that Dionicia was not “in custody” while in the locked police car.

But the appeals court disagreed, reasoning that Dionicia was in a locked police car, and a “reasonable person, particularly a fifteen-year-old, would not feel free to leave the back of a patrol car under the circumstances.”

The appeals court also held that it was “feasible” for the officer to record the interrogation by waiting until they arrived at the school. That is, the officer could have refrained from interrogating the teenager before arriving at the school, which had recording equipment.

The state argued that it was not feasible for the officer to record the conversation in the squad car because the squad car did not have recording equipment. But as the appeals court noted, “nothing prevented him from waiting to question Dionicia until after the short time it took to return to school.”

Finally, the court rejected the state’s argument that even if the squad car statements were inadmissible, the later statements should be admissible because they were recorded.

The Jerrell C.J. rule, the court explained, does not allow partially recorded interrogations to be admitted since a major purpose of the rule is to “avoid involuntary, coerced confessions.”

Sentence credit 

Dionicia was placed in shelter care pending the outcome of the battery case. One night, she failed to return to shelter care and was placed in secure detention for five days. She requested credit for five days served on the 30-day sentence. The juvenile court denied the request.

On appeal, the appeals court concluded that Dionicia was entitled to the five days credit. Under Wis. Stat. section 938.34(3)(f)(1), the court explained, a juvenile is entitled to “credit for time previously spent in secure detention provided the time was ‘in connection with the course of conduct for which the detention … was imposed.’”

The state argued that Dionicia’s detention was connected to violation of the order that placed her in shelter care, not the battery. The appeals court disagreed.

“Were in not for Dionicia’s original course of conduct – the battery – she would not have been placed in shelter care, and there would have been no authority to confine her in secure detention for failing to return to shelter care,” the court reasoned.

The court analogized the juvenile credit sentence statute to the adult sentence credit statute, under which a person can commit a new offense, be taken into custody, and still get credit if the custody is in connection with the pending case.