Civilly committed individual has burden to prove fitness for
release
An individual, committed for sexual violence, has the burden to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he or she meets the statutory
criteria to be released under supervision.
By Joe Forward, Legal Writer,
State Bar of Wisconsin
Aug. 18, 2011 – Persons deemed sexually violent have the burden
to prove otherwise when seeking supervised release, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court recently clarified.
Edwin was convicted of second degree sexual assault in 1993 and
committed to a treatment center as a sexually violent person in 1997
under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (sexually violent person commitments). He was
continually denied supervised release the next 10 years.
In 2008, West asked the circuit court to interpret Wis. Stat. section
980.08(4)(cg) as placing the burden of proof on the state to show
release is not warranted.
Courts can authorize supervised release under section 980.08(4)(cg) if
the court finds that a person has made significant progress in
treatment, it is substantially probable the individual won’t
engage in sexually violent behavior if released, continued treatment is
available, and the person will comply with treatment requirements.
An amendment to the statute in 2006 removed language that placed the
burden on the state. The revised version did not specify which party,
the state or the petitioner, carries the burden, but the circuit and
appeals courts concluded the statute places the burden on the
petitioner.
Burden of proof
In State
v. West, 2011 WI 83 (July 26, 2011), a Wisconsin Supreme Court
majority (5-2) affirmed the appeals court, concluding that a person
committed as a sexually violent person has the burden to prove his or
her fitness for release.
“We hold that the plain language of amended §
980.08(4)(c)(g) is unambiguous and clearly assigns the burden of proving
probative evidence to the committed individual,” wrote Justice
David Prosser for the majority.
The majority also concluded that the civilly committed individual has
the burden to persuade, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she
is fit to be released under supervision.
“[I]n the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary, it is
appropriate to require the committed individual to bear the burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is entitled to
supervised release,” Justice Prosser wrote.
Contrary to West’s argument, the majority concluded that placing
the burden of clear and convincing evidence on the civilly-committed
individual does not violate the guarantees of substantive or procedural
due process.
“While West might have a liberty interest in freedom from
physical restraint, this right is not absolute, and was constitutionally
limited when he was determined to be a sexually violent person,”
Justice Prosser wrote.
The majority also explained that placing the burden on West does not
violate the equal protection clause when compared to persons committed
in other situations, like under ch. 51 (state alcohol, drug abuse,
developmental disabilities, and mental health act).
“Because procedures between similarly situated classes need not
be identical, and the difference in assigning the burden of proof is
directly related to the difference in relative danger to public safety,
we hold that there is no equal protection violation,” wrote
Justice Prosser
In dissent, Justice Bradley argued that absent express language from
the legislature, circuit courts should have the discretion to assign the
burden “based on the statutory criteria and all the evidence available.” She also argued the
majority’s interpretation of section 980.08(4)(cg) “pushes
chapter 980 one step closer to a punitive scheme,” which is not
the goal of ch. 980.
Attorneys
Assistant Attorney General Warran Weinstein represented the state.
Assistant State Public Defender Ellen Henak represented Edwin West.