Professional Discipline

Public Reprimand of Reesa Evans

On March 31, 1997, Reesa Evans, 48, Madison, consented to a public reprimand by the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) for misconduct in two matters.

A man convicted of two felonies in 1986 retained Evans to at least evaluate the viability of seeking sentence modification. Subsequent to 1990 Evans did not advance the case, failing to either pursue sentence modification or prepare an opinion regarding the viability of seeking such relief, contrary to SCR 20:1.3, which requires reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. By failing to provide the client with any meaningful report as to the viability of pursuing sentence modification or any clear statement that the actual pursuit of relief (as opposed to its mere evaluation) would entail a separate phase of representation, Evans violated SCR 20:1.4(b), which states, "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." Following a March 1992 meeting with Evans, the client was unable to contact her despite numerous attempts by the client, his mother and a Veterans' Administration representative. Evans' failure to communicate with the client violated SCR 20:1.4(a).

In a separate matter, Evans represented the plaintiffs in a suit stemming from the alleged sexual assault of a minor at a public school. The named defendants included the city and the school district in which the school was located. Counsel for the city promptly informed Evans that the city and the school district were distinct entities and that the city was not responsible for operating the school district. While she ultimately agreed with the city's position, Evans did not so inform counsel for the city, nor did she inform counsel or the court of her intention to not oppose the city's motion to dismiss, violating SCR 20:1.3. On Nov. 22, 1995, the court entered a judgment for costs against the plaintiffs and Evans, but the plaintiffs were not informed of the judgment until March 1996, shortly before their March 7, 1996, supplemental examination. Evans violated SCR 20:1.4(a) by failing to promptly inform her clients of the judgment.

Petition to Reinstate Joseph A. Malek

Joseph A. Malek, La Grange Park, Ill., has filed a petition for reinstatement of his law license. The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended Malek's license for two years, effective April 3, 1990, reciprocal to a disciplinary action in Illinois. On April 28, 1995, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended Malek's law license for another year, effective Sept. 23, 1994, in a second proceeding also reciprocal to an Illinois disciplinary proceeding. Malek's misconduct included neglect, misrepresentations, a conflict of interest, comingling of personal and client funds, improper withdrawal of funds from a trust account and failure to promptly advise Wisconsin authorities about his Illinois suspension.

A public hearing on the reinstatement petition will be held before the District 12 Professional Responsibility Committee on Friday, Aug. 1, 1997 at 9 a.m. in Room N-1, Fourth Floor, Rock County Courthouse, 51 S. Main St., Janesville, WI 53545.

Malek has the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he has the moral character to practice law in this state and that his resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice or subversive of the public interest. Malek also must demonstrate that he has settled all claims from persons harmed by his misconduct.

Any interested person may appear at the hearing in support of or in opposition to the petition for reinstatement. Further information may be obtained from Elsa P. Greene, Deputy Administrator, Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 110 E. Main St., Room 410, Madison, WI 53703-3383, (608) 267-7274.

Disciplinary Proceeding Against Robert T. Malloy

The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Robert T. Malloy, 33, Milwaukee, for one year, effective June 10, 1997. Malloy's suspension was based upon several counts of misconduct involving many different clients and on Malloy's prior disciplinary history. Part of Malloy's misconduct consisted of his failure to properly handle his client trust account. These violations included Malloy's failure to keep client funds in trust, by using funds deposited by one client to pay for the court costs of another client and by comingling his own personal and business funds with his client's funds, both in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a). In addition, the court found that Malloy's trust account records were filled with discrepancies and missing information, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(e). While the court noted that the referee found that Malloy's mishandling of his trust account was not intended for his own personal gain, the court also noted that the trust account violations were substantially similar to the misconduct for which Malloy received a public reprimand in July 1994.

In several separate matters, the court found that Malloy both neglected his client's legal matters and failed to communicate with his clients, in violation of SCR 20:1.3 and SCR 20:1.4. For example, in a divorce case, Malloy did not file final divorce papers and a quit claim deed until six months after the divorce was granted. When he did file the documents, he never informed his client. When the client discovered that the documents had been filed and that they were incorrect, she requested that Malloy amend the findings. Malloy did not respond to this request and the client eventually had to retain a new lawyer to amend the findings.

In a modification of custody case, after taking a retainer, Malloy failed to appear at a meeting with his client to discuss the matter. In fact, Malloy never contacted the client again, despite the client's repeated telephone calls and numerous letters. In a bankruptcy case, after Malloy had obtained financial information and bills from the client, Malloy failed to respond to the client's weekly telephone calls for six months and never took any actions to file the bankruptcy.

In addition, in two instances, the court found that Malloy failed to promptly refund unearned retainers, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d). Finally, the court found that Malloy had failed to cooperate in all of BAPR's investigations, in violation of SCR 21.03(4) and SCR 22.07(2).

In determining that a one-year suspension was the appropriate discipline, the court considered Malloy's 1994 public reprimand. The court stated that, notwithstanding this prior discipline, "Attorney Malloy has continued to ignore his professional responsibilities in representing clients and to comingle his own personal and law office funds with funds belonging to his clients."

In addition to the one-year license suspension, the court imposed several conditions on Malloy's reinstatement of his license. These conditions require that Malloy institute practices that will ensure the following: regular contact with his clients, prompt dealing with his client's cases and making scheduled court appearances, and maintaining the required client trust account records. The court also imposed a condition that Malloy shall submit his client trust account for quarterly audits at his own cost in the first two years following his reinstatement.

Suspension of Michael B. Sandy

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has suspended the law license of Michael B. Sandy, 41, Milwaukee, for two years, commencing June 3, 1997, consecutive to a previous one-year suspension. Sandy stipulated to the sanction and to the underlying violations, which include:

1) failing to exercise reasonable diligence and promptness in seeking a waiver of costs that were imposed in connection with the client's release on bond (SCR 20:1.3);

2) failing to exercise reasonable diligence in representing a second client regarding postconviction relief, despite repeated requests from the client and an order by the court of appeals (SCR 20:1.3);

3) failing to hold in trust $1,107 in funds belonging to a third party, by depositing into a personal bank account a check from the State Public Defender's Office (SPD) which constituted, in part, the payment of an investigator's fee (said funds ultimately were withdrawn from Sandy's account pursuant to an IRS levy) (SCR 20:1.15(a));

4) failing to notify the investigator in writing of his receipt of those funds and failing to promptly deliver said funds to her (SCR 20:1.15(b));

5) engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and misrepresentation by thereafter advising the SPD that he could not "in good conscience" pay the fee to the investigator because it was inflated and exceeded the amount that had been authorized by the SPD (the full fee had been authorized, and Sandy had never advised the investigator of any objection to her bill) (20:8.4(c));

6) failing to act with reasonable diligence in another criminal matter by failing to take any action for six months after being appointed by the SPD and by subsequently failing to ask for a progress report prior to the client's sentencing (SCR 20:1.3);

7) making a false statement to the court and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and misrepresentation by advising the court at the client's sentencing hearing that he had attempted to obtain the progress report (SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) and SCR 20:8.4(c));

8) failing to communicate with the client and respond to his letters seeking information and documents regarding the case (SCR 20:1.4(a));

9) engaging in offensive personality, violative of the Attorney's Oath (SCR 40.15), by shouting an obscenity at the client who was in a holding cell with other inmates (SCR 20:8.4(g));

10) failing to comply with successor counsel's requests for the client's file (SCR 20:1.16(d));

11) failing to exercise reasonable diligence in a fourth matter by failing to take any action for 12 months after being appointed as appellate counsel and by failing to meet with his client during that time (SCR 20:1.3);

12) failing to provide the client's file, including transcripts that had been sent to him by the SPD, to successor counsel (SCR 20:1.16(d)); and

13) failing to respond to BAPR's investigative inquiries in each of the above matters, as well as a sixth one (SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2) and (3)).

The court also ordered Sandy to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.

Disciplinary Proceeding Against Stephen C. Solomon

The Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the law license of Stephen Solomon, 49, Minneapolis, Minn., effective Jan. 27, 1997, based upon professional misconduct in handling five matters.

Two of the matters concerned Solomon's solicitation of business from jail inmates. Solomon gained access to the inmates by misrepresenting on the inmate visiting card that his relationship to the inmates was "attorney."

After meeting with one inmate, Solomon telephoned that inmate's mother and said he required $2,000 to represent her son. Solomon opened a personal checking account and the $2,000 was wired to that account.

Solomon appeared at the client's preliminary hearing but failed to order a transcript or file discovery motions. When the court indicated that Solomon's suppression motion was insufficient, Solomon asked the court for the name of the leading case governing searches and seizures. About one month after Solomon received the $2,000, Solomon wrote the client that he would be unable to complete the representation because he was about to accept a job in a different field. Solomon indicated that he would refund $500 and turn over the file to successor counsel. Solomon neither refunded the money nor turned over the file to successor counsel.

Solomon appeared at a second inmate's motion hearing seeking bail reduction and advised the client to testify about the factual circumstances relating to the underlying criminal matter in order to obtain a bail reduction. The court admonished Solomon and the client and told Solomon the client would be ill-advised to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege in order to seek bail reduction.

In another matter, Solomon agreed to be substituted as counsel to represent a criminal defendant knowing that the case was scheduled for trial in about one week. Solomon filed a Motion for Continuance and, at the motion hearing, informed the court that he would be ready to try the case in a week to 10 days. Solomon also acknowledged that he was unprepared to proceed to trial and stated that he agreed to represent the defendant because he thought the matter would be resolved by plea rather than by trial.

The next day Solomon notified the court of his refusal to continue representing the defendant. Solomon asserted that he was incompetent, unable and unwilling to represent the client, had not completed the necessary interviews and investigation of the client's alibi defense, had failed to complete the requisite legal research on evidentiary questions and had not reviewed extradition papers. Solomon further advised the court that he would not be ready to proceed to trial as scheduled due to new developments in the case and because he was in the process of changing careers.

In the above matters, the court found that Solomon's initiation of personal contact with prospective clients at the jail violated SCR 20:7.3(c). The court further concluded that Solomon failed to competently represent his clients, contrary to SCR 20:1.1; failed to hold in trust separate from his own property a retainer received from a client in connection with a representation, contrary to SCR 20:1.15(a); and failed to refund the unearned portion of fees, to contact successor counsel and to turn over the client's file, contrary to SCR 20:1.16(d).

In a fourth matter, Solomon represented a client in a visitation dispute and on a potential defamation claim. Solomon agreed to represent the client regarding the visitation dispute for $500. The defamation matter was to be handled on a contingency fee basis, provided the client paid a $1,000 advance retainer. The client's mother sent a $1,000 check to Solomon, which he cashed.

Solomon subsequently failed to appear at a hearing regarding the visitation dispute. With respect to the defamation matter, Solomon made an initial $50,000 demand but never responded to opposing counsel's rejection of that offer. Approximately one month later, Solomon notified the client that he would be unable to complete the representation. Solomon also indicated that he would return one-half of the retainer, but failed to do so.

The court found that Solomon failed to appear for the visitation hearing, contrary to SCR 20:1.3, and failed to keep the client reasonably informed of the status of the matter and provide the client with sufficient information to permit the client to make an informed decision regarding the representation, contrary to SCR 20:1.4(a) and (b). The court also determined that in telling the client that he had a viable defamation claim and in accepting the retainer to represent the client when Solomon knew that he had no intention of completing the representation, in failing to provide any significant work in the matter and in abandoning the client without refunding any portion of unearned retainer, Solomon engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).

In the final matter, Solomon was retained to represent a client on a traffic matter. The client paid Solomon a $1,000 retainer with an additional $500 to be paid by the client if the matter went to trial. Solomon entered by mail a plea of not guilty and requested that the matter be set for trial. Less than one month after agreeing to represent the client, Solomon informed the client that he could not complete the representation and that he would return one-half of the retainer, but failed to do so. The court concluded that in accepting a $1,000 retainer and in providing no services other than writing one letter to the court, Solomon charged an unreasonable fee, contrary to SCR 20:1.5(a).

In addition to the license revocation, the court ordered that Solomon make restitution to clients from whom he accepted an advance payment but did not complete the representation in the amount of 75 percent of the total amount advanced. The court further ordered that Solomon pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings. Solomon had two prior private reprimands and one public reprimand.

Revocation of Robert S. Sosnay

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has revoked the law license of Robert S. Sosnay, 48, Milwaukee, effective June 10, 1997. Sosnay had been disciplined on three prior occasions. He was privately reprimanded in 1984; suspended for 90 days in 1988; and publicly reprimanded by BAPR in 1991.

The revocation is based upon Sosnay's misconduct in multiple legal matters, the most serious of which involved his conversion of approximately $42,000 from several clients, the bulk of which was from the estate of an elderly relative, which he was informally probating (SCR 20:8.4(c)). After BAPR alleged the conversion from the estate, Sosnay provided a $29,000 promissory note to the estate's primary heir. In addition, Sosnay failed to maintain the trust account records required by SCR 20:1.15(e); falsely certified to the State Bar in his annual dues statements that he was maintaining those records (SCR 20:1.15(g)); and failed to submit trust account records to BAPR that it requested during an audit of the account (SCR 20:1.15(f)). The audit revealed that Sosnay's trust account had been overdrawn 32 times in 29 months; that he had comingled at least $2,600 in personal funds in the account (SCR 20:1.15(a)); and that, while he should have had a balance of approximately $46,000 in trust on June 3, 1994, the actual balance was $124.

In addition, Sosnay commenced a lawsuit in a personal injury case despite his conclusion that the claim could not be proven (SCR 20:3.1(a)(2)). He thereafter failed to comply with discovery deadlines and the case was dismissed. He then misrepresented to the client that he had obtained $7,500 in the action and paid the client $5,000 from his own funds (SCR 20:8.4(c)). Contrary to his own professional judgment, Sosnay subsequently filed another action (unrelated to the first) on behalf of this client (SCR 20:2.1). Sosnay failed to inform the client of the dismissal of that action for 15 months (SCR 20:1.4(a)) and failed to provide the client with the files, despite his requests (SCR 20:1.16(d)).

In another matter, Sosnay represented a client who was seeking a refund of $40,000, which had been paid to purchase a franchise. Although Sosnay did not believe a lawsuit would be successful, he succumbed to client pressure and filed an action (SCR 20:2.1), which was dismissed without prejudice due to improper service. Three years later, he commenced a second suit that was dismissed for want of prosecution. He then filed a third suit, which resulted in a dismissal with prejudice and an award of $100 in costs to the defendant. Sosnay thereafter misrepresented to the client that he had obtained a $40,000 judgment, and that it was secured by a property lien. He paid the client approximately $22,000 from his own funds and from the assets of the above-referenced estate (SCR 20:8.4(c)). When the client sought other counsel and requested his file, Sosnay failed to release it (SCR 20:1.16(d)).

Sosnay also neglected a client's claim regarding defects in a home (SCR 20:1.3); failed to respond to the client's requests for information over four years (SCR 20:1.4(a)); and failed to hold in trust $650 in costs that the client had advanced (SCR 20:1.15(a)). During the disciplinary proceeding, Sosnay refunded the costs, along with interest. In addition, Sosnay neglected a client's postconviction matter (SCR 20:1.3); filed a motion to withdraw another client's Alford plea when he did not believe there was a basis to do so (SCR 20:2.1); and made a misrepresentation regarding the resolution of a traffic matter (SCR 20:8.4(c)). Finally, Sosnay failed to cooperate with BAPR investigations regarding each of these matters (SCR 22.07(2) and (3) and SCR 21.03(4)).

In addition to revoking his license, the court also ordered Sosnay to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding and made his reinstatement contingent upon the following conditions: establishing that his psychological condition will not impair his practice of law; satisfying the promissory note to the estate from which he converted assets; and agreeing to the monitoring of his trust account for a minimum of two years.

Petition to Reinstate Mark W. Strigenz

A hearing on the petition of Mark W. Strigenz for the reinstatement of his law license will be held before the District 2 Professional Responsibility Committee on July 16, 1997, at 6 p.m. in the Grain Exchange Room, 225 E. Michigan St., Milwaukee, Wis.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended Strigenz' license effective June 30, 1994, for one year. The suspension was based upon Strigenz engaging in nonconsensual sexual contact with a client and upon his lying to police investigators about his conduct. He was convicted of fourth degree sexual assault regarding the matter. At the time of the misconduct, Strigenz knew that his client was suffering from manic depression and was taking medication. In addition, he thought her to be at risk for suicide.

Strigenz is required by Supreme Court Rule 22.28 to establish by clear and convincing evidence that:

1) he desires to have his license reinstated;

2) he has not practiced law during the suspension;

3) he has complied with the terms of the disciplinary order;

4) he has maintained competence and learning in law;

5) his conduct since the discipline has been exemplary and above reproach;

6) he has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity with them;

7) he can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the court;

8) he has made restitution or settled all claims from persons injured or harmed by his misconduct, or in the event such restitution is not complete, his explanation of the failure or inability to do so;

9) he has indicated the proposed use of the license after reinstatement; and

10) he has fully described all business activities during the suspension.

Any interested person may appear at the hearing and be heard in support of or in opposition to the petition for reinstatement. Further information may be obtained from Jeananne L. Danner, Deputy Administrator, Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 6ll N. Broadway, Suite l02, Milwaukee, WI 53202, (4l4) 227-4623

Wisconsin Lawyer