Private
Reprimand Summaries
Professional Discipline
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Keith E. Broadnax
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Keith E.
Broadnax, 40, Milwaukee, for 90 days, effective March 12, 1997. The
court also ordered that for three years Broadnax comply with specified
conditions directed to his rehabilitation from alcohol and chemical
dependency. Those conditions include random drug testing and quarterly
reports from his doctor. Broadnax also was ordered to pay restitution to
a client and the cost of the disciplinary proceedings.
Broadnax was paid a $500 retainer to defend a client in an action
brought by an insurance company. Broadnax failed to attend a scheduled
pretrial hearing, resulting in a default judgment against his client.
Broadnax asked the insurer's attorney to agree to reopen the case but
filed no motion to reopen the default judgment. Moreover, Broadnax did
not inform his client that the $6,500 default judgment had been entered
against him. Several months later, the same client was named defendant
in an action by another insurer arising out of the same matter. Broadnax
did not file a notice of appearance or answer to the complaint, and the
plaintiff obtained a default judgment in the amount of $13,291 against
the client. The client did not learn of either default judgment until he
applied for a loan. Additionally, Broadnax repeatedly promised to reopen
the second judgment but took no action to do so.
The court found that Broadnax failed to diligently represent the
client in the two matters, violating SCR 20:1.3; failed to keep the
client reasonably informed of the status of those matters, violating SCR
20:1.4(a); failed to communicate the basis of his fee, contrary to SCR
20:1.5(b); and failed to refund the client's $500 retainer, violating
SCR 20:1.16(d). In addition, Broadnax failed to respond to numerous
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) requests for
information, contrary to SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2).
In another matter, a client retained Broadnax to serve an eviction
notice upon a tenant, but the client immediately cancelled the
representation when the tenant paid the rent later that day. The client
had given Broadnax a check for $166 for his services, which Broadnax
negotiated. When the client repeatedly asked for return of her money,
Broadnax told her that his "consulting fee" was $60 and said he would
return the remainder promptly. When he did not do so, the client
contacted BAPR which asked Broadnax for an explanation. Broadnax did not
respond to BAPR's requests for information. The client ultimately
received a $160 refund 11 months after Broadnax was retained.
The court found that Broadnax failed to promptly return an advance
payment of fees, violating SCR 20:1.16(d); and failed to cooperate with
BAPR's investigation, violating SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2).
Broadnax also did not respond timely to requests for information from
BAPR investigating the grievances of two other clients. The court found
that in both matters Broadnax failed to cooperate with BAPR's
investigations, violating SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2).
Broadnax was privately reprimanded in 1989 for failing to timely file
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment in a divorce
matter and for his misrepresentation to BAPR during its subsequent
investigation.
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Robert Glickman
On March 12, 1997, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law
license of Robert Glickman, 34, Atlanta, Ga., for 60 days. Glickman
formerly practiced in Madison.
In February 1992 Glickman filed a legal malpractice action on behalf
of a client in circuit court. Thereafter, Glickman did not comply with
the terms of the court's pretrial order setting a time for disclosing
expert witnesses, completing medical examinations and identifying and
marking all exhibits intended to be offered at trial. When opposing
counsel filed a motion seeking to prohibit the plaintiff from presenting
the testimony of any experts, Glickman did not file a response. At the
end of the week preceding the scheduled trial, Glickman filed a motion
for a continuance. The court granted the defense motion and denied the
motion for continuance. The supreme court adopted the referee's
conclusion that Glickman failed to provide competent representation,
violating SCR 20:1.1, and failed to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness, violating SCR 20:1.3.
In a separate matter, the State Public Defender appointed Glickman to
represent a man who was sentenced to prison following the revocation of
his probation. Between his May 13, 1994, appointment and the
reassignment of the case to other counsel on Nov. 7, 1994, Glickman
filed nothing to either initiate review of the probation revocation or
to convey to the court, the PD and the client that such review would
have no merit.
Glickman did not respond to the client's written and telephonic
requests for contact, nor did he respond to the SPD's written inquiries
about the case. Prior to the appointment of successor counsel, Glickman
decided to terminate his Wisconsin law practice, but he did not
communicate that decision to the client or the SPD. Glickman notified
the courts of his decision to close his law practice only after the
client's case was assigned to other counsel and further inquiries were
received from the SPD.
In the second matter, Glickman was found to have violated SCR 20:1.3
and 20:1.4(a), which require an attorney to keep a client reasonably
informed of the status of a matter and to comply with reasonable
requests for information, and SCR 20:1.16(d), which requires an
attorney, upon termination of representation, to take reasonably
practicable steps to protect a client's interests.
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Charles R. Koehn
Effective April 7, 1997, the Wisconsin Supreme Court imposed a 60-day
suspension on Charles R. Koehn, 53, Green Bay, based upon his misconduct
in four matters. In the first matter, Koehn knowingly disobeyed the
rules of a federal court by failing for one year to pay a fee to a
witness whom he had subpoenaed, contrary to SCR 20:3.4(c).
In the second matter, Koehn's client, who had been charged with
municipal ordinance battery, did not appear at a hearing on that charge,
and Koehn entered a plea of no contest on the client's behalf. Although
the client had authorized Koehn to engage in plea negotiations, the
client had not authorized a plea to the battery charge. The supreme
court adopted the referee's conclusion that Koehn's failure to inform
the client he was unable to obtain a reduction of the charge to
disorderly conduct, and failure to inform the client that Koehn would
enter a no contest plea to the battery charge violated SCR 20:1.4(a),
which requires a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed of the
status of a legal matter.
In the third matter, Koehn represented a client who was attempting to
obtain a reduction in his prison sentence. At a hearing on a motion to
withdraw the client's no contest plea, Koehn made misrepresentations to
the circuit court regarding the status of an appeal that he previously
had filed on the client's behalf. The supreme court adopted the
referee's conclusion that Koehn's misrepresentations of fact to the
circuit court violated SCR 20:3.3(a)(1).
In the fourth matter, Koehn accepted a retainer of $1,500 to pursue a
collection matter. Although Koehn informed his client that he had sent a
demand letter to the debtor, he had never done so. Koehn repeatedly
failed to respond to the client's requests for information about the
case status, and the client terminated his services. Koehn did not
return any part of the client's retainer. Thereafter, the client sued
Koehn in small claims court and obtained a judgment for the entire
amount of the fee. During trial of the small claims matter, Koehn
knowingly made false statements of fact to the circuit court.
The supreme court concluded that Koehn's false statement to his
client violated SCR 20:8.4(c), which proscribes conduct involving
misrepresentation; his failure to keep the client reasonably informed
about the case status violated SCR 20:1.4(a); his failure to act with
reasonable diligence violated SCR 20:1.3; his failure to return the
unearned retainer violated SCR 20:1.16(d); and his misrepresentations of
fact to the court during the small claims trial violated SCR
20:3.3(a)(1).
Suspension of Robert G. Stuligross
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has suspended the law license of Robert
G. Stuligross, 33, Kenosha, for two years, effective March 20, 1997. The
suspension is based upon several violations to which Stuligross pleaded
no contest, including: 1) his unlicensed practice of law in Illinois
(SCR 20:5.5(a)); 2) his making a false statement of material fact to
BAPR during its investigation (SCR 20:8.1(a) and 22.07(2)); 3) his
making false statements of fact to a tribunal and engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty by using another attorney's bar identification
number when filing pleadings in Illinois (SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) and
20:8.4(c)); 4) his engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation by altering an Illinois court's order to
reflect that he had been admitted to appear in a case on a pro hac vice
basis (SCR 20:8.4(c)); 5) his use of a false and misleading letterhead
(SCR 20:7.5(b)); and 6) his failure to timely, fully and fairly respond
to BAPR's investigative inquiries (SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2) and
(3)).
Stuligross has no prior discipline, but he was denied a certificate
of good moral character by the dean of the law school from which he
graduated, based upon a two-year dismissal from the school. The
dismissal stemmed from his having falsified a date stamp on a discovery
motion that was prepared during a law school internship and from his
making misrepresentations to the law school committee that investigated
that matter.
The unauthorized practice of law count stemmed from Stuligross's
abuse of pro hac vice admission privileges in Illinois while he was
seeking a law license in that state. Between May 1992 and at least June
1993 Stuligross represented 47 clients in marital dissolution
proceedings in Illinois circuit courts. In addition, he appeared in
eight other proceedings without any such judicial authorization. When
filing pleadings in those cases, he used the attorney identification
number of an Illinois attorney with whom he shared office space, without
making it clear to the court that the number was not his own. In
addition, Stuligross used a letterhead listing a Chicago office address,
without adding a disclaimer indicating that he was not licensed in
Illinois.
The court concluded that, since at least his law school days,
Stuligross had "established a pattern of serious misrepresentations to
courts and others, something that cannot be tolerated in a person this
court licenses to represent others in our legal system."
The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, an arm of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, assists the court in discharging its exclusive
constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice of law in this
state and to protect the public from acts of professional misconduct by
attorneys licensed to practice in Wisconsin. The board is composed of
eight lawyers and four nonlawyer members, and its offices are located at
Room 410, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI 53703, and Room 102, 611 N.
Broadway, Milwaukee, WI 53202.
Wisconsin Lawyer