Coping With the Legal Perils of Employee Email
Email communication between a company's employees, or with its
clients and the public, is fast, easy - and potentially dangerous. Learn
what steps companies are taking to protect themselves by regulating
employee use of email and the Internet.
Editor's Note:
To view Wisconsin Statutes and Acts referenced in this article you
must have and/or install Adobe
Acrobat Reader 3.0 on your computer.
By Michael McChrystal, William Gleisner & Michael
Kuborn
Today, email can be created easily and
transmitted with virtually no difficulty, either within a company or
over the Internet. Email encourages an informality and directness of
communication that is hard to achieve, even in person or over the
telephone. It allows for the rapid dissemination of ideas, plans,
documents, and images throughout a company or throughout the world
literally at the touch of a (mouse) button. In short, this miracle of
the information age appears to be just what business in our fast-paced
world needs to compete and thrive.1 Even
lawyers are becoming convinced that email is the answer to communicating
with counsel, the courts, and clients.2
However, consider for a moment the potential problems that email can
create for a business or law firm,3 and then
ask yourself how does a business protect itself from those problems? For
example, is a company liable when an employee sends harassing email, or
downloads pornographic material from a Web site and distributes it to
fellow employees? Can a company be held responsible if an employee sends
libelous email over the Internet? What if an employee is angry or
malicious enough to send confidential information to competitors or
anonymously post such information on the Internet? What if an employee
decides to leave a job, but only after he or she emails confidential
customer or client information or trade secrets outside the firm for
improper postemployment use? In dealing with such problems, how does a
business balance its needs against the privacy rights of its
employees?
The difficulties of email communication are magnified a thousandfold
because it is, in a very real sense, becoming ubiquitous. Email4 is very rapidly becoming "the" way to
communicate, within a business or over the Internet. According to an
article by attorneys Mark S. Dichter and Michael S. Burkhardt,
Electronic Interaction in the Workplace: Monitoring, Retrieving and
Storing Employee Communications,5
published in early October 1996, 90 percent of all large companies, 64
percent of mid-size companies, and 42 percent of small businesses used
internal email, and more than 40 million workers were corresponding via
email. Within the span of two years, email use has increased
dramatically. It's estimated that Internet users sent more than 6
billion email messages last year,6 and it is
estimated that worldwide there has been an explosion of business users
on the Internet.7 Internet email will grow
exponentially as the worldwide use of email increases.8 Moreover, the distinction between internal
company email and Internet email is blurring, especially as more
companies make Internet access available from desktop systems or via an
Internet server using routers or similar technology.
Ease of use or abuse
The problems posed by email are very real and have resulted in very
real liability for several companies. The very ease with which email can
be created and disseminated appears to reduce a user's inhibitions.
An employer can be held liable for sexual or
racial harassment perpetrated or furthered by email.9 There is some suggestion that prompt action
to remedy a hostile atmosphere thus created may exculpate the
employer.10 It would be dangerous for an
employer to hope that it will escape liability merely because it does
not know such harassment is ongoing, especially if the probability of
such harassment is foreseeable.11 Of
course, email is just one of many vehicles by which offensive conduct
may be communicated in the workplace. However, unlike other forms of
misconduct, the average employer may have more difficulty detecting or
preventing email harassment. Nevertheless, "a company will be liable if
management-level employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known, about a barrage of offensive conduct."12
Some courts have held employers subject to liability if an employee
with apparent authority libels a third party or inflicts trade
disparagement in the furtherance of his or her employer's business.13 The problem for an employer who permits a
large number of employees to send out email over the Internet from a
company Internet server or from a company computer, lies not just in the
fact that employees may be viewed as clothed with apparent authority.
Especially if an employer also maintains a Web page, Internet email that
travels across state and international boundaries may potentially
subject an employer to the jurisdiction of foreign courts, with all of
the difficulties and costs that inevitably attend the defense of an
action far from the employer's home jurisdiction.14
If an angry employee publishes confidential information anonymously
over the Internet, or sends it to a competitor, the information loses
its confidential protection and becomes part of the public domain.15 Obviously, given the sophistication of
today's Internet email systems, confidential information and trade
secrets can be easily shared with unauthorized third parties.
Protecting against the misuse of email
Certainly, email abuse can and will occur. Unfortunately, guarding
against such abuse is not easy. There will be a growing
interrelationship between internal, or "intranet," email systems and
Internet email systems in the years ahead, especially if companies such
as Microsoft have their way.16 The
potential will soon exist for an uncomfortable transparency between an
office environment and the Internet. Therefore, regardless of how
companies police the email activities of employees, they must exercise
considerable caution in implementing new technological solutions that
permit employees extensive access to the Internet.
While the need for employer policing or monitoring of employee email
activity will become more important in the years ahead, such activity
will have to be undertaken with extreme care. Although the Fourth
Amendment and other constitutional proscriptions do not as a rule apply
to private businesses,17 there are both
state18 and federal19 statutes that could be construed as
prohibiting such monitoring on the grounds that it invades the privacy
or protected labor law rights of employees.20 There always have been limitations on the
extent to which an employer can search or otherwise monitor employee
activities at work,21 and these cases often
have been resolved on the grounds that an employer unreasonably invaded
the employee's privacy.22
Courts have carved out exceptions to the monitoring of employee
activity where a legitimate business purpose can be demonstrated,23 and that includes the monitoring of email
communications.24 However, Congress has
evinced a serious concern with the privacy of email,25 including email generated in the workplace.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) defines
electronic communication in such a way that it can be construed as
applying to email. According to the Act, electronic communication:
"[includes] any transfer or signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photo-optical system that
affects interstate commerce."26
The ECPA makes it illegal to intentionally intercept, use, or
disclose oral, wire, or electronic communications,27 and it provides for criminal, civil, and
injunctive relief, as well as attorney fees and other equitable
relief.28 It could be argued that the
ECPA's definition does not apply to internal email systems, but the
growing interrelationship between intranet and Internet email systems
undoubtedly will render such a distinction virtually meaningless in the
years ahead. There are several relevant exceptions to the application of
the ECPA proscriptions. The most important exceptions are predicated on
business necessity and consent.
The business exception to the ECPA
To the extent employees are using email at work via company
computers, an employer may be justified in monitoring that email. While
unlimited and indiscriminate monitoring is very hard to justify,29 the courts will tolerate some monitoring.
However, to the extent that "monitoring" involves the surreptitious
interception or surveillance of employee email, monitoring activities
will very probably find disfavor in the courts. By analogy to telephone
wiretap cases, while occasionally permitted,30 surreptitious interception or surveillance
of employee telephone calls has not been received well by the courts.31The authors submit that any email monitoring
should be done only after notifying employees that their email will be
monitored.32 While there may be a
justifiable business reason for undisclosed monitoring, a business that
does so runs a considerable risk.33
The consent exception to the ECPA
If employees have received full notice that email monitoring may take
place and have clearly and unambiguously consented to that monitoring,
the employer's hand is strengthened considerably, providing the employer
limits its monitoring to business-related email (in terms of email, an
interesting problem in and of itself).34 At
minimum, this consent should be either explicit or very clearly
inferable from the conduct of the parties.35 While Congress intended that the ECPA
consent requirement be construed broadly,36
courts examine a claim of consent very carefully. According to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit:
"[Under the ECPA] consent inheres where a person's behavior manifests
acquiescence or a comparable voluntary diminution of his or her
otherwise protected rights. Of course, implied consent is not
constructive consent. Rather, implied consent is 'consent in fact' which
is inferred 'from surrounding circumstances indicating that the [party]
knowingly agreed to the surveillance.' Thus, implied consent - or the
absence of it - may be deduced from 'the circumstances prevailing' in a
given situation. The circumstances relevant to an implication of consent
will vary from case to case, but the compendium will ordinarily include
language or acts that tend to prove (or disprove) that a party knows of,
or assents to, encroachments on the routine expectation that
conversations are private. And the ultimate determination must proceed
in light of the prophylactic purpose of [the ECPA] - a purpose that
suggests that consent should not casually be inferred."37
Incidentally, some
commentators have suggested that an employer could argue it has the
right to monitor email on the grounds that the employer is the provider
of email service to its employees. While there is such an exception
under both state38 and federal law,39 it seems clear that this exception is
intended to permit the technical administration of an email system and
not the monitoring of the content of the email transmitted over that
system.
Implementing a monitoring policy
The best, and perhaps the only, solution lies in establishing a
monitoring plan based upon a carefully conceived email policy that is
disseminated to all employees and agreed to by all employees. Several
commentators have attempted to delineate the contents of such a
policy.40 Attorneys Dichter and Burkhardt
have constructed a thoughtful outline of what such a policy should
contain, and how it should be worded.41
Whatever policy is decided upon, a physical copy should be given to all
employees (not emailed to them42), and
posted with other official legal notices to employees. Further,
employees should be required to acknowledge, by their signature, receipt
of and agreement with that policy.43
Several suggested policies directed toward employee use of email and the
Internet are posted on the Web and on Westlaw.44 However, the most complete and
well-developed policy model the authors have found is the one crafted by
attorneys Dichter and Burkhardt, which appears near the end of their
online article entitled Electronic Interaction in
the Workplace: Monitoring, Retrieving, and Storing Employee
Communications.45 A small portion
of their suggested policy on email and Internet procedure appears as a
sidebar to this article.
![Authors](/SiteCollectionImages/WisconsinLawyer/1999/03/3lawyers.jpg)
Michael McChrystal, top, Marquette 1975, is a professor of law at the
Marquette University Law School.
William Gleisner, middle, Marquette 1974, both a practicing attorney
and computer consultant, maintains a law firm-based litigation support
service bureau in Milwaukee.
Michael Kuborn, bottom, Marquette 1998, is with Olsen, Kloet,
Gundersen & Conway, and is trained in computer recovery and computer
search and seizure techniques. Products and services mentioned in this
article should not be construed as an endorsement.
|
If an employer decides to implement such a monitoring policy, several
other factors become important. First, as a practical matter, how does
one actually monitor email or Internet use by employees? In the
information age, it should come as no surprise that several companies
are actively involved in developing software that will facilitate such
employer monitoring of employee email usage.46 The Equitrac Corporation, for example,
introduced a new type of software at the beginning of 1997 that may
assist an employer in monitoring employee email traffic and Internet
usage. According to Equitrac:
"Companies looking for a way to track Internet usage for billing and
project management purposes should evaluate Equitrac Corporation's
E.P.I.C. - Equitrac's Professional Internet Client - Internet
client/server software tool. E.P.I.C. is a tracking, monitoring, and
blocking Internet access tool enabling lawyers and other service
professionals to track time spent online, monitor online research, and
track email sent and received."47
Email is rapidly becoming a vehicle for intra-office communication
that is as important, if not more important, than "snail" mail and
hardcopy memoranda. Companies should begin to think seriously about
retention and destruction policies regarding email, because email
increasingly will become the subject of discovery. Indeed, there already
have been cases involving discovery requests to inspect a company's
computer hard drives for email,48 and one
only need consider the Microsoft antitrust litigation to recognize how
devastating email can be even to a computer literate litigant.49 In developing those email policies,
however, remember that simply deleting office email from a hard drive
may not result in its actual destruction.50
Conclusion
Nowhere are the legal challenges of the information age more clearly
apparent than in the area of email communication. Inevitably, both
lawyers and clients need to consider carefully how they are going to
deal with both the benefits and the unavoidable risks presented by the
growing use of email.
Endnotes
1An article in
USA Today reports:
"Email has become so popular that many managers are using it more
than the telephone for business communication. More than 35% of 400
managers polled say they use email the most of any communications tool,
based on an April survey by the American Management Association and
Ernst & Young. That beats the 26% who use the phone most frequently
and 15% who rely on face-to-face meetings."
2 R. Timothy Muth, Security on the Internet, 70
Wis. Law. 17 (Oct. 1997).
3This article is not concerned with
possible viruses, spam email, or other similar potential dangers
commonly associated with Internet browsing and email communication.
4 Senate Report No. 99-541, which
is the chief legislative source of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §
2510, et seq., defines email, or "electronic mail," in terms that
could apply to both internal company or Internet email:
"Electronic mail is a form of communication by which private
correspondence is transmitted over public and private telephone lines.
In its most common form, messages are typed into a computer terminal,
and then transmitted over telephone lines to a recipient computer
operated by an electronic mail company. If the intended addressee
subscribes to the service, the message is stored by the company's
computer 'mail box' until the subscriber calls the company to retrieve
its mail, which is then routed over the telephone system to the
recipient's computer. If the addressee is not a subscriber to the
service, the electronic mail company can put the message onto paper and
then deposit it in the normal postal system. Electronic mail systems may
be available for public use or may be proprietary, such as systems
operated by private companies for internal correspondence."
From Westlaw Online version of S. Rep. 99-541, p. 16-17.
5This article is located online. Attorneys
Dichter and Burkhardt are with the Philadelphia office of Morgan, Lewis
& Bockius LLP. Their scholarly article is recommended to anyone
interested in the topic of this article.
6 PBS Online
7 International
Communications Headcount.com
8 "Unleash
E-Commerce Now", an article from Wired Magazine. See
also ZD-Net
E-Business Homepage.
9Harley v. McCoach, 928 F.
Supp. 533 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 814 F.
Supp. 1186, 1193-94 (S.D. N.Y. 1993).
10 Harley, 928 F. Supp.
at 540.
11 It appears that negligence and
not strict liability continues to be the standard for determining
whether an employer is liable for creating a hostile work environment,
at least in the Seventh Circuit. According to an en banc determination
of the court in Jansen v.
Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997), "All
the judges with the exception of Judges Easterbrook, Rovner, and Wood
believe that negligence is the only proper standard of employer
liability in cases of hostile-environment sexual harassment even if as
here the harasser was a supervisor rather than a coworker of the
plaintiff." Id. at 494.
12Noble v. Monsanto
Corp., 973 F. Supp. 849, 858 (S.D. Iowa 1997). See Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998), wherein the U.S.
Supreme Court stated:
"In order to accommodate the principle of vicarious liability for
harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII's
equally basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and
saving action by objecting employees, we adopt the following holding in
this case and in Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, ante,
___ U.S. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at ___, also decided today. An employer is
subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate
(or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible
employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c).
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an
employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint
procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the
need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may
appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element
of the defense."
13Paine Webber Jackson and
Curtis Inc. v. Winters, 579 A.2d 545, 548 (Conn. App. 1990).
14 While the law is unsettled and
still in a state of flux, the existence of a Web page can be sufficient
to subject a company to the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal.
Heroes Inc. v. Heroes Found, 958 F. Supp. 1, *4 (D.D.C 1996);
cf. Inset Sys. Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161,
164 (D. Conn. 1996). Where a company responded to "hits" from
out-of-state visitors to its Web page by sending out email across state
lines, at least one court found that the Web page and email responses
were sufficient to confer jurisdiction over that foreign company.
Maritz v. CyberGold Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo.
1996) ("CyberGold automatically and indiscriminately responds to each
and every Internet user who accesses its Web site. Through its Web site,
CyberGold has consciously decided to transmit advertising information to
all Internet users, knowing that such information will be transmitted
globally.").
15 Castano v. American
Tobacco Co., 896 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. La. 1995).
16 Consider the following
description of the new Microsoft Office 2000:
"With Office 2000, you can save Office documents in HTML file format
and retain the fidelity of your native Office file format. By saving as
HTML, you ensure that anyone with a Web browser can view your documents.
Office 2000 also simplifies publishing your Office documents to your
intranet or to an Internet site. New File Open and File Save dialog
boxes make saving documents to a Web server as easy as saving them to
your hard disk or to a file server."
Quoted from Microsoft
Office 2000 WWW site.
17 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 453 (1974); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
18See, e.g., Wis.
Stat. § 895.50.
19 Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §
2510, et seq.
20 There are other reasons why an
employer needs to be cautious about how it treats employee email. For
example, the NLRB recently ruled that employee email could be found to
be a protected activity. 14 Comp. Law. 22 (September 1997).
21 K-Mart Corp v.
Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 634-35, 640-41 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (where
an employer was found liable for $100,000 for conducting a search of an
employee's locker on a suspicion of wrongdoing); cf. Doe v. Kohn,
Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (involving
the searching of an attorney's desk by his partner).
22 K-Mart, at 638.
23Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes
Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Mich. App. 1989); Simmons v.
Southwestern Bell Tel., 452 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
Even public employers can monitor employees or search their workspaces
if there is a legitimate business reason for such searches, although the
Fourth Amendment obviously increases the extent of an employee's right
to privacy. See, e.g., O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-20 (1987).
24 Smyth v. Pillsbury
Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Despite the fact that an
employer assured employees that email communication would be private
[Id. at 98], the employer escaped liability because the
employee who was terminated after the company searched for and found
offensive email was an at will employee.). Id. at 101.
25 Regardless of privacy issues,
it would seem that an employer will be protected if the employer
attempts to block employee access to pornographic, violent, harassing,
or otherwise objectionable Web sites or third-party email sent into a
company, under the Good Samaritan exception to the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, which provides in pertinent
part:
"No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of -
"(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
"(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1)."
26 18 U.S.C. §
2510 (5). While it could be argued that the quoted definition does
not reach email, it is clear from the legislative history underlying
this Act that it was intended to reach email. See, e.g., the
quoted language from Senate Report No. 99-541, reproduced supra
at footnote 4.
2718 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522; 2701-2711, 3121-3127.
2818 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520.
29Cf. Sanders v. Robert Bosch
Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 1994).
30Watkins v. L.M. Berry &
Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he general rule seems to be
that if the intercepted call was a business call, then Berry Co.'s
monitoring of it was in the ordinary course of business." Id.
at 582).
31 Deal v. Spears, 980
F.2d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1992).
32 James v. Newspaper Agency
Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1979).
33 In addition to the ECPA,
consider the terms of Wis. Stat. section 968.31, which proscribes the
interception of wire and electronic communication, that contains
exceptions similar to those found in the ECPA. According to section 968.31
(2):
"(2) It is not unlawful under §§ 968.28 to 968.37:
"(a) For an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee or agent
of any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, whose
facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic
communication to intercept, disclose or use that communication in the
normal course of his or her employment while engaged in any activity
which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his or her service or
to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
service, except that a provider of a wire or electronic communication
service shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except
for mechanical or service quality control checks.
"(b) For a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire,
electronic or oral communication, where the person is a party to the
communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to the interception."
34 Cf. Watkins v. L.M. Berry
& Co., 704 F.2d at 583.
35Deal v. Spears, 980
F.2d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[c]onsent under [the ECPA] is not to
be cavalierly implied.... [K]nowledge of the capability of monitoring
alone cannot be considered implied consent.").
36Griggs-Ryan v.
Connelly, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v.
Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987).
37Griggs-Ryan v.
Connelly, 904 F.2d at 116-17.
38 See Wis. Stat.§
968.31
(2), supra.
39 Cf. United States v.
Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472, 1478.
40See, e.g., Brown,
Developing Internet, Intranet and Email Policies, 520 PLI/Pat
347 (July 1998); Ballon, The Emerging Law of the Internet, 507
PLI/Pat 1163, 1270-73 (Feb. 1998); Ciapciak and Matuszak, "Employer
Rights in Monitoring Employee Email," For the Defense (Nov.
1998).
According to Ballon, Alternate Corporate Responses to Internet
Data Theft, 471 PLI/Pat 737, 750-751:
"Companies should adopt and enforce email and Internet use policies.
Companies should adopt Internet policies [in order] (i) To negate any
expectation of privacy employees might otherwise have. (ii) To limit
liability under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. By taking
affirmative action to monitor email transmissions for offensive conduct,
a company may be able to avoid indirect liability for third party
violations of state law (such as sexual harassment and defamation) under
the Good Samaritan exemption created by the Telecommunications Act of
1996. [A]n Email Policy [should specify that] (i) The company owns the
computer system and all data stored on or transmitted over company
networks. (ii) The employee has no right to privacy in any information
stored on the system. The employer reserves the right (but does not
assume the obligation) to monitor employee email. (iii) Define
categories of email that should be retained in the ordinary course of
business and specific procedures for retaining such communications. (iv)
Purge all other email messages at regular intervals."
41 This article is located online.
Supra.
42See In re Prudential Ins.
Co. Sales Practices Litigation, 169 FRD 598 (D. N.J. 1997), where
the court found that distribution by email was an ineffective method of
distributing a company policy. Id. at 603-04.
43 Id.
44 See supra note
40.
45 This article is located online.
46 Companies such as Equitrac and
Sequel Technology. See
47 From the Equitrac Web page
48 See, e.g., Fennel
v. First Step Designs Ltd., 83 F.3d 526 (1st Cir. 1996),
involving a request to examine an employer's hard drive for the purposes
of learning whether a particular email memorandum had been predated to
avoid liability. Id. at 532-33.
49 See Law Journal Extra: United
States v. Microsoft, specifically a Nov. 3, 1998,
story, wherein it is reported, "Gates seemed most argumentative on
the [video] tape [of his deposition by Government lawyers] when
questioned about a June 23, 1996, [email] memo he wrote to Paul Maritz
and Brad Silverberg, two top Microsoft executives. The email describes a
meeting Gates had two days prior with Apple executives."
50 See McChrystal,
Gleisner, and Kuborn, Document Destruction and
Confidentiality, 71 Wis. Law. 25 (Aug. 1998).
Wisconsin Lawyer