Third-party Visitation in Wisconsin
Wisconsin law is a mixture of different standing
requirements and standards for grandparent visitation and other
third-party intervention. Thus, some of these statutes are vulnerable to
constitutional attack in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision.
by Gregg M. Herman & Lucy Cooper
In
June 2000 the U.S. Supreme Court waded into the emotionally charged
issue of grandparent visitation and, by implication, other third-party
visitation, where a child lives with a fit parent or parents.
Third-party vistation cases frequently pit well-meaning grandparents
against well-meaning parents in situations of historical conflict.
Neither side is necessarily wrong, but their positions are
irreconcilable. These cases will have an impact in Wisconsin as our
courts and Legislature grapple with similar issues.
U.S. Supreme Court Ruling
The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Troxel v. Granville1 involved a woman named Tommie Granville - the mother of
two daughters whose father had committed suicide. The father's parents
sought and obtained court-ordered visitation. On appeal, the Washington
Supreme Court invalidated its state's statute on federal constitutional
grounds.2 The Washington Supreme Court held that any
third-party visitation statute that allowed a court to contravene the
decision of a fit parent as to her child's association with third
parties, without a showing of some harm to the child necessitating such
an order, would be an unconstitutional interference with a parent's
right to raise her child free from unwarranted government
interference.3
In Troxel, the Supreme Court upheld the result, without
fully endorsing the rationale of the Washington Supreme Court. The U.S.
Court did not adopt the "harm" test, although Justice Souter, writing in
concurrence, urged that it do so. Rather, Justice O'Connor, writing for
the plurality, authored a wide-ranging criticism of the Washington law.
In the end, the Court held only that the statute was unconstitutional,
as applied, because it failed to accord the decision making of a fit
parent any material weight or deference. The plurality specifically
rejected the "harm" test, stating:
"We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the
parental due process right in the visitation context.
"...
" [W]e would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation
statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a matter of law."4
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court essentially threw the hot button issue
of third-party visitation rights back to the 50 state legislatures and
appellate courts with the admonition to make sure fit parents are given
due deference. The Court recognized that these issues are not just
driven by constitutional rights but by policy determinations best left
to legislatures. Just because a law may be constitutional does not, of
course, mean that it is good policy, and the U.S. Supreme Court lacks
the collective expertise to make policy in the law of domestic
relations.
Two state supreme courts, Illinois and Maine, have ruled on the
constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes since
Troxel.5 Both courts have been every bit as
cautious as the U.S. Supreme Court. In the two decisions discussed here,
the courts have each taken the "as applied" route, much to the
consternation of their own concurring and dissenting colleagues. In both
cases, the facts illustrate a pattern of deep and long-term intra-family
conflict that drives many of these disputes. Similar to the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Troxel, the effect of these decisions is to
require the legislatures to undertake the politically explosive review
of their third-party visitation laws.
Illinois
In the Illinois case of Lulay v. Lulay,6
Michael and Kiley Lulay, the parents, were divorced from each other, but
shared legal custody. Michael's mother, Gail Lulay, petitioned for
visitation with her grandchildren. Both parents, though divorced and
living separately, joined in their opposition to court-ordered
visitation for Michael's parents.
The Illinois statute, unlike the statute addressed in
Troxel, limited standing to grandparents, great grandparents,
and siblings of a minor child. Also, unlike the Washington statute, the
Illinois law allowed a petition to be filed only under limited
circumstances - if the parents were not currently cohabiting or if one
of the parents was deceased. Similar to the Washington statute, however,
the Illinois standard was "best interests of the child," with no
presumption that parental choice should govern, absent some compelling
interest to the contrary.
The Illinois court, looking to the plain wording of the statute,
swept aside the argument that the statute did not apply if the
petitioner's own child opposed the petition. Having determined that the
statute permitted grandparents to seek visitation with their
grandchildren where both parents oppose such visitation, the court then
held that the statute violates the fundamental constitutional rights of
parents to make decisions regarding their children. The court left for
another day the issue of the application of the balance of the
statute.
Maine
In the Maine case of Rideout v. Riendeau,7
the maternal grandparents, the Rideouts, sought visitation with their
daughter's three children. The daughter, Heaven, had a conflicted
relationship with her parents for years but also had relied upon them
for substantial help in raising her children, particularly the oldest
child, who had resided with the grandparents for more than a third of
her life by the time the petition was filed. Heaven's husband of eight
years, Jeffrey Riendeau, was the father of Heaven's youngest child. The
Rideouts acted after Heaven returned to her husband following
allegations of domestic abuse, taking all three of her children into the
now intact marriage. Heaven eventually cut off her parents from contact
with the grandchildren they had lived with and helped raise.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld the constitutionality of
Maine's grandparent visitation law, as applied to a de facto parent. The
court concluded that an "urgent reason" exists where grandparents who
have functioned as parents to the child seek continued contact. The
court held that the cessation of such contact may have a dramatic and
even traumatic effect upon the child's well-being.
The Maine court, like the Illinois court, left other considerations
in other fact situations for a later day.
The two state court decisions are not all that helpful because they
only address two specific situations, and their statutes differ from
those in Wisconsin. All we really know is that Illinois will not let a
lower court impose grandparent visitation where both divorced parents
oppose it, absent a compelling reason, and that Maine will allow a
grandparent, who has at some time in the past functioned as a de facto
parent, to make a case for visitation, even over the strong objections
of the grandchildren's parents.
Wisconsin's Third-party Visitation Law
How these cases affect us in Wisconsin is not an academic question.8 Wisconsin has a medley of statutes, and at least one
court-created remedy, allowing courts to order third-party visitation.
Inevitably, one of the many trial court challenges to the law will be
well pled and will be decided by Wisconsin's appellate courts. As one of
these authors previously wrote:
"By limiting the risk and establishing factors, including standing,
each of the Wisconsin provisions is more narrow than the Washington
statute. Whether the Wisconsin statutes are, in fact, narrow enough to
pass constitutional muster is something only time - and future
litigation - will tell."9
In Wisconsin, there are four statutes and at least one recent
court-created equitable remedy for de facto parents who do not find
themselves fitting in under any of the four statutes. The statutes were
enacted over the course of the past 25 years, often in reaction to a
court decision that limited access for third parties and resulted in
publicity that upset opinion makers and legislators. The common law or
equitable rules were crafted in response to very specific social issues.
Scrutinizing Wisconsin law in light of Troxel reveals two
things:
1) Unlimited standing makes the U.S. Supreme Court very nervous.
Justice O'Connor emphasized the constitutional problems of allowing
standing to anyone, anytime, to bring a case, but ultimately did not
decide the case on the basis of standing at all. Still, the paragraphs
criticizing the extremely liberal standing allotted interested third
parties must be considered in analyzing the import of the decision.
2) Whatever third-party access law a state enacts, the standard for
imposing visitation upon an unwilling but fit parent must include some
requirement that the parent's wishes be accorded due deference and
material weight.
With this in mind, here's a look at Wisconsin law.
Chapter 767 - Actions Affecting the Family
Section 767.245 of the Wisconsin Statutes allows third-party
visitation in divorce and paternity cases. There are really two separate
statutes here, enacted at different times (1975 for sub (1), 1995 for
sub (3)), but combined in the same statutory section in the family
code.
Sub. (1) of the statute applies to third parties seeking visitation
when parents are going through a divorce, legal separation, annulment,
or independent custody action. In Van Cleve v. Hemminger,10 the requirement was added that there must be an
underlying family court action pending when an action under this statute
is initiated. In Van Cleve, a far-seeing trial and appellate court
questioned whether the Legislature could enact a law that allowed
interference in an intact family by third parties. The court answered
"no" and, except for statutory changes enacted later in the case of
deceased parents and a Wisconsin Supreme Court case11
creating standing for de facto parents with no place else to go, the
ruling has stood.
Under sub. (1), standing is limited to a grandparent, great
grandparent, stepparent or a person who has maintained a relationship
similar to a parent-child relationship with the child. The "or" is
important, as it appears that any of the three described relatives may
petition, but that anyone else who petitions under this statute must
show that she or he had maintained a relationship similar to a
parent?child relationship. Thus, de facto parent status need not be
shown unless the petitioner fails to meet the relationship test.
Under sub. (1), once the petitioner has cleared the standing hurdle,
the standard for imposing court-ordered visitation on an unwilling, but
otherwise competent parent, is simple best interest. This is the
standard that the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel held violated a
fit parent's fundamental right to direct his or her child's upbringing.
Unless the Legislature changes the statute, the Wisconsin appellate
courts eventually will be confronted with a well-pled challenge to this
law. At that point, the court can 1) ignore Troxel and invite
an appeal, 2) give the statute a saving construction by defining best
interest in such a way that it includes a strong presumption in favor of
parental decision making, or 3) hold that the statute is simply
unconstitutional and toss the issue back to the Legislature.
Sub. (3) governs grandparent petitions in paternity cases. The
standing requirements, intended to reverse specific court cases, allow a
petition by any grandparent so long as the parents have not married each
other and the child has not been adopted. In the case of a paternal
grandparent, paternity must have been established, either separately or
in the visitation action itself. The statute also requires that the
grandparent has maintained or attempted to maintain "a relationship"
with the child, but has been prevented from doing so by the legal
custodian. There is no requirement that the grandparent show that she or
he has acted as a de facto parent.
As to the standard, it is something more than best interest. There is
a requirement that the court find that "the grandparent is not likely to
act in a manner that is contrary to decisions that are made by a parent
who has legal custody of the child and that are related to the child's
physical, emotional, educational, or spiritual welfare."12
This standard, combined with the limited standing - grandparents only
- probably will allow the statute to survive constitutional challenge,
even though there is no explicit presumption in favor of deferring to
the parent's wishes regarding the placement itself.
Section 767.245 also contains a recently enacted prohibition against
allowing placement to a grandparent who has killed one of the parents,
absent the meeting of a very high burden. That prohibition also should
survive judicial scrutiny,13 because the burden is on
the grandparent to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
visitation is in the child's best interests.
Probate Law: Deceased Parent, No Adoption
Section 880.155 of the Wisconsin Statutes has been through several
revisions, each one expanding the standing of grandparents and others
following the death of a parent. As the law stands now, grandparents and
stepparents have standing to petition following the death of one of the
parents where the child is in the custody of the surviving parent or
other person, whether or not the surviving parent has remarried. A
stepparent explicitly retains standing even where the surviving parent
has remarried, as does a grandparent.
There is no requirement that the petitioning grandparent or
stepparent must have acted as a de facto parent. The standard is best
interest, with a requirement to consider the child's wishes. There is no
statutory requirement that the wishes of the custodial parent be given
any particular deference.
Except for the somewhat limited standing - grandparents and
stepparents only - this statute deals with the same fact situation
presented in Troxel. This statute may be vulnerable to
constitutional attack because of the same broad "best interest" standard
as under the Washington statute in Troxel.14
Children's Code: Adoption
In Soergel v. Soergel Raufman,15 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the voluntary termination of parental
rights by a father, combined with an adoption by a stepparent, ended the
visitation rights of the paternal grandparents. This holding is
certainly in line with the law treating adoptive families identically to
biologically created intact families. The Legislature reacted to this
decision by enacting section 48.925. In doing so, the law created a very
strict standing requirement allowing certain relatives to seek
visitation following a stepparent or other relative adoption.
Under that statute, standing is limited to relatives who, within the
two years preceding the petition, have maintained a parent?child
relationship with the child. The standard also is protective of the
adoptive family. In addition to the usual requirement for a finding of
best interest, and a requirement that the child's wishes be considered,
there are two more required findings:
1) that the petitioner will not undermine the adoptive parent's or
parents' relationship with the child, or if a birth parent is the spouse
of an adoptive parent, the adoptive parent's and birth parent's
relationship with the child.
2) that the petitioner will not act in a manner that is contrary to
the parenting decisions that are related to the child's physical,
emotional, educational, or spiritual welfare and that are made by the
adoptive parent or parents, or, if the birth parent is the spouse of an
adoptive parent, by the adoptive parent and the birth parent.
So, after a stepparent or relative adoption, certain relatives - but
only those who have been de facto parents within two years of
petitioning - have standing to seek continued contact with the child.
This limited standing should satisfy any constitutionally mandated
standing requirement. Further, the standard itself goes beyond best
interest to require both a finding that the visitor will not try to
undermine the adoption and will not act in a manner contrary to the
decisions of the new family. While the statute lacks an explicit
presumption against forcing visitation on fit parents, the standard is
very protective of the adoptive family.
Of all the third-party statutes in Wisconsin, this one is the most
restrictive, and, therefore, the one most deserving of passing
constitutional muster under Troxel, even though it also is the
only statute that allows court intervention in an intact, two-parent
family, where both parents are legal parents of the subject child.
Equitable Actions: Court-created Remedy for De Facto
Parents
In 1995 the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized an equitable cause of
action, independent of any statute, allowing a de facto parent to
petition for visitation if that person's relationship with the legal
parent(s) deteriorated to the point where the parent(s) disallowed
contact, and the contact was found by a court to be in the child's best
interest.16
While the term "de facto parent" does not appear in the court's
opinion, it is clear that that is what the decision requires. The court
also held that a petition must be made within a "reasonable time" after
the "triggering event" (break-up and breakdown of amicable relations
regarding the child). The court also made clear that this equitable
remedy only applies where the petitioner has no statutory remedy.
While the decision is painstakingly crafted to avoid the implication
that it is targeted at same-sex couples like the one in the case, the
inescapable conclusion is that it is same-sex couples whom the decision
will primarily affect. Of course, it also applies in the somewhat rare
circumstance where the heterosexual partner who never married the
parent, but who lived in a household with the child, helped with
childrearing and seeks to maintain a relationship after the rift with
the parent. Perhaps the result also may be applicable to nonromantic
friends or relatives not otherwise covered by the statutes described
herein.
While the standing requirements of the case are carefully crafted,
the standard is the broad "best interests." An undefined "best
interests" test offers no real protection to a fit legal parent and, in
fact, invites judicial meddling in the life of a fragile family at a
time of great stress. As such, it is unlikely that the broad holding of
Holzman is sustainable after Troxel.
Conclusion
In sum, Wisconsin law is a mixture of different standing requirements
and standards for intervention. Some are more protective of the right of
a fit parent to raise his or her child as that parent sees fit. As
result, some of these statutes are quite vulnerable to constitutional
attack in light of Troxel, whereas others seem likely to
survive constitutional scrutiny.
Wisconsin should harmonize its statutes in such a manner that they
will survive constitutional scrutiny in light of Troxel. In
doing so, care must be taken to the extent that third-party visitation
laws are good for children and, therefore, good public policy. In making
this determination, the Legislature must consider whether sympathy for
certain adults and disapproval of others should drive the analysis of
what truly benefits children.
Many fit parents, particularly young and unmarried ones, often
exasperate courts, which tend to agree with grandparents that the
parents need to be overseen by older and wiser adults. What these courts
fail to see is that by empowering unwelcome grandparents to force their
attentions on the families, the court-ordered contact ultimately may
undermine a struggling parent's authority and create bitter conflict
between the adults and chaos for the children.
Certainly, one must have sympathy for the grandparent who is
attempting to substitute for a dead or absent parent. On the other hand,
serious questions remain about the benefit to a child of ordering
grandparent visitation where both parents are alive and available.
The Wisconsin Legislature and judicial system also need to look
honestly at the costs to the parties and children of letting these cases
go to court in the first place and to the extent that the costs create
an imbalance in favor of the party with more economic resources. A court
looking only at constitutionality cannot do justice to all of these
issues. The Legislature can - and should.
Gregg M. Herman, U.W. 1977, is a partner in Loeb & Herman S.C.,
Milwaukee, where he practices in family law.
Lucy Cooper, U.W. 1972, is a Milwaukee County assistant family court
commissioner.
Endnotes
1 Troxel
v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
2 137 WN2d 1 (1998).
3 By the time Tommie's case
reached the U.S. Supreme Court, she had married and her husband had
adopted the girls. But the fact that Tommie and the girls were now in an
"intact family" was not stated as a driving rationale for either the
Washington Supreme Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court.
4 Troxel,
supra, at 2064.
5 The California Court of
Appeals has held its statute unconstitutional. Kyle O. v. Donald R.,
et. al., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476 (Cal Ct. App. 2000).
6 Lulay v. Lulay,
2000 WL 1608769 (Ill. Oct. 26, 2000).
7 Rideout v.
Riendeau, 2000 WL 1707359 (Me. Nov. 13, 2000).
8 There are at least four
third-party visitation disputes currently pending in Wisconsin raising
the constitutionality of Wisconsin statutes.
9 "High Court Invalidates
Grandparents' Rights Law," Wisconsin Opinions, June 21, 2000.
10 Van Cleve v.
Hemminger, 141 Wis. 2d 543, 415 N.W.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1987).
11 Holtzman v.
Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995).
12 Wis. Stat. § 767.245(3)(e).
13 Curiously, the statute
requires the court to consider the child's wishes, but accords no
specific deference to the wishes of the surviving parent.
14 The court of appeals
addressed this issue in F.R. v. T.B., 225 Wis. 2d 628, 593
N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1999), and found the statute constitutional.
However, the court did not have the benefit of the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Troxel.
15 Soergel v. Soergel
Raufman, 154 Wis. 2d 564, 453 N.W.2d 624 (1990).
16 Holtzman v.
Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995).
There is actually a collection of nonstatutory cases recognizing a
court's power to protect a child's interest in third-party contact in
special situations. One situation is where a third party is really
substituting for an absent parent. Gotz v. Gotz, 274 Wis. 472 (1956);
Weichman v. Weichman, 50 Wis. 2d 407, 184 N.W.2d 882 (1971). The second
situation is where the petitioning third party had functioned as a de
facto parent and sought to preserve the relationship after the child's
return to a legal parent. In re DMM, 137 Wis. 2d 375 (1987).
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