Interpreting Wisconsin's Borrowing Statute
Wisconsin's "borrowing statute," section 893.07,
determines which state's statute of limitations applies in actions that
are deemed "foreign." Since the statute took effect, Wisconsin courts
have had numerous opportunities to interpret and apply the statute and
thereby have resolved some of the questions that the statute raised.
by Shirley A. Wiegand
Imagine that a Wisconsin corporation manufactures and ships paper
products throughout the United States. On one particular shipment, the
company negligently loads a semi-trailer with the paper products. A
Wisconsin trucker drives the vehicle from Wisconsin to New Jersey to
deliver the product. In Pennsylvania, the driver opens the rear of the
truck to check on his load and the paper products fall on him, causing
serious injury. Wisconsin's personal injury statute of limitations is
three years. Assume that Pennsylvania's is two years. If the Wisconsin
driver sues the Wisconsin corporation in a Wisconsin court
two-and-a-half years after his injury, will the Pennsylvania statute of
limitations bar his action?
Prior to the 1970s, courts faced with a case involving interstate
connections chose between two options. They might apply choice of law
principles to determine which statute of limitation applied. This is the
approach recommended by the Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act,
approved in 1982 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.1 It "treats statutes of limitations as
substantive, to be governed by the limitations law of a state whose law
governs other substantive issues inherent in the claim," regardless of
whether or not the forum's law would be shorter or longer. But states
were more likely instead to consider statutes of limitation to be
"procedural" and therefore apply their own statute of limitations.
Needless to say, this often led to forum shopping, with the plaintiff
searching for an available forum with the longest limitations period.
Beginning in the 1970s, states began to pass "borrowing statutes," so
called because they direct courts to borrow the statute of limitations
of other states under specified circumstances, thereby avoiding a
complex choice of law analysis2 and discouraging forum
shopping.
Prior to 1979, Wisconsin's borrowing statute applied only to personal
injury cases. When an injury occurred outside the state and a statute of
limitations at the place of injury was shorter than Wisconsin's
three-year period, that shorter period applied unless the plaintiff was
a Wisconsin resident. For plaintiffs who were Wisconsin residents, the
longer Wisconsin period applied.3
In 1979, the Wisconsin Legislature adopted section 893.07.
The statute provides that for actions "brought in this state on a
foreign cause of action," the action cannot be maintained if either
Wisconsin's or the foreign state's statute of limitations has expired.4 In other words, when a cause of action is considered
"foreign" because of events that occur outside of Wisconsin, the court
will consider the statutes of limitation of both states and apply the
shorter of the two. Residency is no longer relevant; both Wisconsin and
out-of-state residents will be barred by the shorter limitations period
if the action is deemed "foreign." In the example above, if the cause of
action is deemed foreign because the injury occurred in Pennsylvania,
the action will be barred by Pennsylvania's shorter period of
limitations regardless of the residence of either the plaintiff or
defendant.
Wisconsin's borrowing statute reflects a statutory choice of law
decision. Courts have noted that it eliminates the need to apply what is
often a difficult and imprecise choice of law theory in a case involving
more than one state. It is designed to reduce forum shopping, prevent
stale claims, expeditiously advance litigation, and avoid "uncertainty
in assessing the timeliness of bringing an action in this state without
the necessity of a court hearing to make such a determination, thereby
preserving scarce judicial resources."5
Wisconsin's current borrowing statute honors these values at the
expense of others. Suppose that drivers of two vehicles are from
Wisconsin, both heading south on Interstate Highway 94. They are
involved in a car crash seconds after they cross the Wisconsin-Illinois
border. Wisconsin's applicable statute of limitations is three years.
Because the Illinois statute of limitations is two years,6 the action will be barred after two years under section
893.07.
Although the Wisconsin Legislature has determined that stale claims
arise only if an action is brought after three years, the result in this
case means that this Wisconsin plaintiff must bring the action against a
Wisconsin defendant within two years because the Illinois Legislature
has determined that two years is more appropriate. Though the statute
eliminates uncertainty - the shorter of the limitations periods applies
- it may seem illogical to apply the Illinois statute of limitations in
a Wisconsin court simply because the two residents crashed less than a
mile over the border. Nevertheless, the state legislature has
determined, as it must for all legislation, that some values prevail at
the expense of others.
The court's task then is to interpret and apply the borrowing statute
as enacted. However, the statute does not define a "foreign" cause of
action. Nor does it indicate whether or not foreign tolling statutes or
statutes of repose also should be borrowed when applying a foreign
statute of limitations. In the example above involving two drivers who
crash in Illinois, Wisconsin's current borrowing statute directs the
court to apply the shorter Illinois two-year statute of limitations if
the action is foreign. But what if the plaintiff is only 19 when he is
injured and Illinois has a tolling statute that tolls the statute of
limitations for anyone under the age of 21 at the time of injury? Does
the Wisconsin court follow that as well, rather than its own tolling
statute, section 893.16, that applies only to one who is injured prior
to the age of 18?
The Wisconsin courts have now had more than 20 years to interpret
section 893.07.
This article traces the statute's development and interpretation as
reflected in the cases that have been decided since 1979. The courts
have now defined "foreign" cause of action for both tort and contract
cases and have determined that neither foreign tolling statutes nor
statutes of repose will be borrowed along with foreign statutes of
limitation.
What is a Foreign Cause of Action?
 Shirley A. Wiegand, University of Kentucky
1983, is associate dean for academic affairs and professor of law at
Marquette University Law School, where she teaches civil procedure,
conflicts of law, and remedies. Prof. Wiegand has published numerous
articles on civil litigation and dispute resolution.
|
Wisconsin's borrowing statute applies only if the cause of action is
"foreign"; if it is not foreign, Wisconsin will apply its own statute of
limitations. Section 893.07's
predecessor specifically applied only to tort actions: "injuries to the
person, received without this state." The new statute does not clearly
state whether it applies to both tort and contract actions, nor whether
"foreign" simply replaced "injuries ... received without this
state."
The first court to interpret Wisconsin's new borrowing statute did so
in 1982. In Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corporation,7 the Eastern District of Wisconsin conducted a
"center-of-gravity" choice of law analysis8 to
determine whether or not a cause of action was foreign. (In federal
diversity cases, federal courts apply the substantive law of the state
in which they sit, including its choice of law analysis, and "[t]he law
of the forum state ... controls the choice of which statute of
limitations applies.")9 The court found that the
contract cause of action was not foreign because Wisconsin had
significant contacts with the contract; therefore, the borrowing statute
was inapplicable and Wisconsin's longer statute of limitations applied.
By conducting a choice of law analysis to determine if the borrowing
statute applied, however, the court disregarded the raison d'être
of the borrowing statute - to avoid complex and uncertain choice of law
analysis.
In 1987, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals corrected this mistake
in two cases decided that year. In both Johnson v. Deltadynamics Inc.10 and Beard v. J.I. Case Co.,11 the
court, without engaging in any choice of law analysis, held that the
Wisconsin borrowing statute applied because the cases involved a foreign
cause of action. The court in Johnson recognized that the new statute
expanded its reach from personal injury actions to all actions.
Furthermore, since the injury occurred in Indiana, the tort constituted
a foreign cause of action. In Beard, since the injury occurred in
Tennessee, the action also was foreign. In both cases then, Wisconsin's
borrowing statute directed application of the shorter statute of
limitations.
The first state court decision to discuss section 893.07
was Guertin v. Harbour Assurance Company.12 It
involved a Wisconsin truck driver injured in a slip and fall off a
semi-trailer in Illinois. He sued numerous defendants, most of whom were
Wisconsin residents, after the Illinois two-year statute of limitations
had run but before Wisconsin's three-year statute had run. Guertin
argued that the court should conduct a choice of law analysis to
determine whose statute applied. He urged the court to apply a "grouping
or assessment of significant contacts" analysis, which, he argued, would
lead the court to conclude that this case did not involve a foreign
cause of action because of its significant contacts with Wisconsin. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the borrowing statute
applied because the injury arose in another state. In this case, the
Illinois statute of limitations barred the action.
The Guertin plaintiff also asserted that the law violated the federal
Equal Protection Clause and Article 1, section 1 of the Wisconsin
Constitution,13 in that it denied some Wisconsin
residents the benefit of their own state's statute of limitations solely
because their injury occurred out of state. The court noted a "strong
presumption of constitutionality of statutes" and that "a statute will
be sustained if there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation
may reasonably rest." Applying a rational basis test, the court found
that the two classes of plaintiffs are 1) those injured within the
state, regardless of whether or not they are Wisconsin residents; and 2)
those injured outside the state, regardless of whether or not they are
Wisconsin residents. The rational basis for the distinction is to
"obviate[] uncertainty where more than one statute of limitation might
apply, protecting all parties by the creation of a bright line rule
which allows predictability in an area previously fraught with
confusion." This satisfied the rational basis test. Finally, the court
noted that when an injury occurs in Wisconsin so that the borrowing
statute is inapplicable, Wisconsin courts should apply their own statute
of limitations.14
In 1995, the Wisconsin federal district court in Terranova v.
Terranova15 determined when a contract cause of action
is foreign, thus implicating the borrowing statute. The court followed
the lead of Guertin and held that a contract cause of action is foreign
when the breach occurs outside of the state. Here the defendants were
residents of Wisconsin and Michigan. The plaintiffs were residents of
California. The causes of action arose when two groups of family members
terminated their business relationship and entered into an "Agreement
and Plan of Separation and Reorganization." The agreement divided
various assets, resulting in a large California tax assessment against
some of the parties to the contract. The actions were all based on the
"defendants' alleged failure either to disclose to plaintiffs the
California tax liability before the separation agreement was executed or
to indemnify plaintiffs for any portion of the liability."16
The court held that the contract causes of action were not foreign,
because although the plaintiffs resided in California when they demanded
indemnification, the Wisconsin defendants rejected the plaintiffs'
demands in Wisconsin. Thus, because the borrowing statute was not
implicated, Wisconsin was free to apply its own six-year statute of
limitations.
In 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted Terranova's reasoning.
In Abraham v. General Casualty Co.,17 Abraham, a
Florida resident, was insured by General Casualty, a company licensed to
do business and having its principal place of business in Wisconsin. He
was struck and injured by a vehicle while riding his bicycle in Florida.
General Casualty refused to provide certain underinsured benefits to
Abraham, prompting him to sue. General Casualty responded by raising
Florida's five-year statute of limitations that it claimed applicable
under Wisconsin's borrowing statute.18
The court first held that even though the present statute does not
specifically mention contract causes of action, its legislative history
clearly makes the statute applicable in contract actions. Next, the
court affirmed the Guertin test for determining when the state's
borrowing statute applies in tort cases: "[T]he place of the tortious
injury ... is the decisive factor for causes of action sounding in tort:
If a party is injured outside the state of Wisconsin, the injured's
claim in tort is a 'foreign cause of action.'"19 For
contract cases, "a claim sounding in contract is a 'foreign cause of
action' when the final significant event giving rise to a suable claim
occurs outside the state of Wisconsin." The court recognized that "in
certain factual situations ... even this test would not be without
ambiguity."20 Nevertheless, the court opted for a test
that would yield certainty in most circumstances.
Turning to the facts in the case, the court found that the breach of
contract occurred in Wisconsin, where the insurer rejected the
plaintiff's claim. The cause of action was not foreign, and Wisconsin
was free to apply its own statute of limitations. Thus, whether a cause
of action is foreign depends entirely upon where the last event takes
place that gives rise to a cause of action; for tort, the place of
injury, and for contract, the breach.
Relationship of the Borrowing Statute to Tolling and Repose
Statutes
Another
question now answered by Wisconsin courts is whether laws that relate to
statutes of limitation, for example, statutes of repose or tolling
statutes, accompany the foreign statute of limitations when it is
borrowed.
Statutes of limitation and statutes of repose frequently are
confused. Unlike a statute of limitations that bars the filing of an
action if the plaintiff does not file suit within a specified period of
time after a cause of action accrues, "a period of repose bars a suit a
fixed number of years after an action by the defendant (such as
manufacturing a product), even if this period ends before the plaintiff
suffers any injury." 21 Thus, the plaintiff may be
time-barred from filing a cause of action even before it accrues.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has yet to address the issue,
decisions by Wisconsin's state and federal courts of appeals suggest
that foreign statutes of repose do not follow foreign statutes of
limitation under section 893.07.
In 1987 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Beard v. J.I. Case
Company22 held that the borrowing statute required use
of the foreign statute of limitation, but not the foreign period of
repose. In Beard, a Tennessee farmer was injured in Tennessee by a corn
picker allegedly defectively designed in Wisconsin. Although he filed
his action only four months after his injury, a Tennessee statute of
repose bars product liability actions if they are not filed within 10
years from the date the product was first purchased for use or
consumption. In the case of this specific corn picker, no action could
have been brought after 1960, because the corn picker was first
purchased in 1950.
The defendant argued that because Wisconsin would apply the Tennessee
statute of limitations under its borrowing statute, it must also apply
the Tennessee statute of repose. The Seventh Circuit disagreed. It noted
that Wisconsin courts had long demonstrated resistance to statutes of
repose, finding that they presented "grave constitutional concerns"23 under the Remedy for Wrongs provision of the Wisconsin
Constitution. Article I, section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution
guarantees "[e]very person ... a certain remedy in the laws for all
injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or
character...." On more than one occasion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
had avoided applying even its own statutes of repose on this ground.24 The Seventh Circuit therefore followed Wisconsin's
lead, holding that although the Tennessee statute of limitations applied
in this case, the Tennessee statute of repose did not. The case was
therefore not time-barred.
It is important to note that statutes of repose may receive more
favorable treatment today. In Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation
Fund,25 decided just last year, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court demonstrated great deference to a statute of repose, finding that
"the legislature may sever a person's claim by a statute of limitations
or a statute of repose when the person has had no possibility of
discovering the injury - when the person has been blameless in every
respect. These decisions represent judicial deference to the stated
policy of the legislature."26 The effect of this
ruling was to reject suggestions in other recent opinions that statutes
of repose might be unconstitutional.27 It is thus
possible that courts in the future will be more amenable to accept
foreign statutes of repose, but likely not. Wisconsin courts apparently
are willing to give deference to the Wisconsin Legislature, but they may
not be willing to do so to foreign legislatures.
A court of appeals decision offers an additional ground for courts to
reject foreign statutes of repose. In Leverence v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty,28 decided in 1990, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, citing Beard approvingly, held that foreign
statutes of repose would not accompany a borrowed statute of
limitations. It noted that Wisconsin's borrowing statute refers to
periods of "limitation," not periods of "repose," so by definition and
in plain language it necessarily does not include foreign statutes of
repose.
Tolling statutes have received similar treatment. Scott v. First
State Insurance Company29 involved the interplay
between section 893.07
and 893.16(1),
which provides, "If a person entitled to bring an action is, at the time
the cause of action accrues, ... under the age of 18 years ... the
action may be commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases...."
In this case, an 11-year-old was injured on his family's Canadian farm
by a barn cleaner designed, manufactured, or sold in Wisconsin. He filed
suit six years later at the age of 17. The tolling statute of Alberta,
Canada, did not apply to minors in the actual custody of a parent, so it
did not toll the limitations period. There was little doubt that the
Canadian statute of limitations applied to this foreign cause of action.
The only question was whether or not Wisconsin was also obligated to
borrow the Canadian tolling statute.
The court examined the language of the tolling statute and concluded
that "[s]ection 893.16(1) makes no distinction between a domestic and
foreign cause of action; it expressly states that the tolling provisions
apply to a person entitled to bring an action who is a minor when the
cause of action accrued."30 Rejecting the holdings of
numerous courts in other states,31 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that Wisconsin's borrowing statute, section 893.07,
borrows only a foreign statute of limitations and not its tolling
statute. Thus, the applicable Wisconsin tolling statute tolled Alberta's
two-year period of limitation until the plaintiff reached the age of
majority, and the action remained viable.
Unresolved Questions
Although the borrowing statute has been clarified, it remains subject
to criticism. First, results reached by the statute's application may
appear illogical and unfair. Why should a Wisconsin plaintiff suing a
Wisconsin defendant for an injury that fortuitously occurred just across
the Wisconsin border lose the benefit of a longer Wisconsin statute of
limitations?
Second, locating the place of the final event that gives rise to a
claim may be difficult. Where does a contract breach occur? One might
imagine an airline passenger in flight above Lake Michigan between
Milwaukee and Detroit telephoning or emailing a message that constitutes
a breach. Where does the breach occur? Is an action on the breach a
foreign cause of action? In a breach conveyed by mail, where does the
breach occur - where it is sent or where it is received?
Two examples illustrate the problem. In Faigin v. Doubleday Dell
Publishing Group,32 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals had to determine where the tort of defamation arises. A sports
agent claimed he had been defamed by one of his former clients, a
football player, in the athlete's autobiography. He sued Doubleday Dell
Publishing Group in Wisconsin's federal court. If the borrowing statute
were found applicable, the one-year statutes of limitations found in
other relevant states might apply. Otherwise, Wisconsin's two-year
statute of limitations would permit the case to be brought. The court
had to determine if the cause of action was foreign.
The plaintiff lived in California; Doubleday is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in New York. (Two other
defendants, the football player and his cowriter, both from New York,
had been dismissed previously for lack of personal jurisdiction.) Both
California and New York have one-year statutes of limitation for
defamation. The district court found that the plaintiff had received
injury in Wisconsin; at least 41 copies of the book had been sold there
and the sports agent conducted some business there; thus, his reputation
in the state had been harmed. But the district court had noted that most
of the harm occurred outside Wisconsin; of all books sold, "less than
two-tenths of one percent were sold to Wisconsin's bookstores.... [T]he
district court concluded that when the plaintiff's injury has occurred
in more than one state, it amounts to a 'foreign' cause of action
governed by Wisconsin's borrowing statute, notwithstanding the fact that
Wisconsin is one of the states in which injury occurred."33 The district court therefore had applied the borrowing
statute and dismissed the action as untimely filed.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed. The borrowing statute "asks one
question: did the injury occur inside Wisconsin? The answer here is yes,
if not exclusively." That makes the borrowing statute inapplicable and
Wisconsin's statute of limitations applicable. The dissenting judge
noted that the plaintiff was clearly engaging in forum shopping in this
case; the majority agreed. Nevertheless, the court noted that forum
shopping was "nothing new" in libel cases. Furthermore, Wisconsin could
legislatively shorten its two-year statute of limitations if it so
chose.34
Contract cases can present the same interpretive difficulties. In
Ristow v. Threadneedle Insurance Company,35 the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals was called upon to determine where the last
suable event took place in a contract dispute. A Wisconsin resident was
injured in South Carolina. He settled with a South Carolina insurer for
$75,000 but never received the settlement check. In determining whether
or not the borrowing statute applied, the court had two choices. Did the
cause of action arise in South Carolina when the insurance company
failed to send the check, or did it arise in Wisconsin when Ristow
failed to receive the check? The court chose the former, relying in part
upon the wording of the complaint itself, which read: Defendants
"breached the oral contract ... by failing to forward a check to the"
plaintiff.36 One wonders whether the result would have
been the same had the plaintiff alleged that "Plaintiff failed to
receive payment, constituting a breach of the oral contract."
Conclusion
Under section 893.07,
courts have determined that a tort cause of action is foreign if the
injury takes place outside of Wisconsin. A contract cause of action is
foreign if the final significant event that gives rise to a suable
claim, generally the breach, occurs outside of Wisconsin. Courts also
have determined that when they borrow a foreign statute of limitation,
they do not borrow the foreign statute of repose or tolling statute.
Although the courts' interpretation of section 893.07
cannot provide clear and certain resolution in all cases, it
significantly facilitates early resolution in the majority of cases in
which a place of injury (for tort) or breach of contract can be
accurately located. If one values certainty, predictability, and
efficiency, section 893.07
as interpreted marks a substantial improvement over Wisconsin courts'
past choice of law analysis. If one values rationality, it falls short
on occasion, though it demonstrates a marked improvement over the
parochial application of forum law. Courts appear to be quite
comfortable with the choice the Legislature has made to favor certainty
and efficiency over rationality and therefore not to treat statutes of
limitation as substantive and subject to choice of law analysis. Their
decisions over the past 20 years have clarified the law and provided
needed guidance to practitioners.
Endnotes
1 Unif. Confl. of
Laws-Limitations Act § 2, 12 ULA 158 (1996).
2 For a thorough discussion
of Wisconsin's choice of law development, see Shirley A. Wiegand,
Officious Intermeddling, Interloping Chauvinism, Restatement
(Second), and Leflar: Wisconsin's Choice of Law Melting Pot, 81
Marq. L. Rev. 761 (1998).
3 Wisconsin Statutes section
893.205 provided that "no action to recover damages for injuries to the
person, received without this state," could be brought in a Wisconsin
court if the limitations statute of the state in which the injury
occurred had expired, "unless the person so injured shall, at the time
of such injury, have been a resident of this state. Wis. Stat. §
893.205(1)(1977), repealed by 1979 Wis. Chap. 323.
4 Wis. Stat. § 893.07.
5 Guertin v. Harbour
Assur. Co., 141 Wis. 2d 622, 631-32, 415 N.W.2d 831 (1987).
6 735 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/13-202 (2000).
7 Office Supply Co. v.
Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
8 See Wiegand, supra
note 2, for a discussion of Wisconsin's choice of law analysis.
9 Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1928); Klaxon v. Stentor Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941); McMahon v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 891
F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1989).
10 Johnson v.
Deltadynamics Inc., 813 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1987).
11 Beard v. J.I. Case
Co., 823 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1987).
12 Guertin v. Harbour
Assurance Co.,141 Wis. 2d 622, 415 N.W.2d 831 (1987).
13 "All people are borne
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed."
14 Guertin, 141
Wis. 2d at 634-35, 415 N.W.2d at 835-36.
15 Terranova v.
Terranova, 883 F. Supp. 1273 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
16 Id. at
1277.
17 Abraham v. General
Casualty Co., 217 Wis. 2d 294, 576 N.W.2d 46 (1998).
18 Id. at 297-98,
576 N.W.2d at 48.
19 Id. at 304, 576
N.W.2d at 51.
20 Id. at 311 n.7,
576 N.W.2d at 54 n.7.
21 Beard v. J.I. Case
Co., 823 F.2d 1095, 1097 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
22 Id. at
1095.
23 See United States
Fire Ins. Co. v. E.D. Wesley Co., 105 Wis. 2d 305, 313 N.W.2d 833
(1982).
24 See, e.g., Rosenthal
v. Kurtz, 62 Wis. 2d 1, 213 N.W. 2d 741 (1974); Kallas Millwork
Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975);
United States Fire Ins. Co., 105 Wis. 2d at 305, 313 N.W.2d at
833. See also Makos v. Wisconsin Masons
Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997),
overruled by Aicher v. Wisconsin
Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 98, 40; 237 Wis. 2d 99,
120; 613 N.W.2d 849, 862.
25 Aicher, 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99,
613 N.W.2d 849 (2000).
26 Id. at 50, 237
Wis. 2d at 125; 613 N.W.2d at 864.
27 See Makos v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care
Fund, 211 Wis. 2d at 41, 564 N.W.2d at 662.
28 Leverence v. United
States Fidelity & Co., 158 Wis. 2d 64, 462 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App.
1990).
29 Scott v. First State
Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 608, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990). See also
Jarrett v. Andrews, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1603 (7th Cir.
1999).
30 Scott at 615,
456 N.W.2d at 155.
31 Id. at 616-17,
456 N.W.2d at 156, citing cases from the Second, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals and from Illinois, New York, and Michigan. The
court noted that "the various borrowing statutes are dissimilar." 155
Wis. 2d at 617, 456 N.W.2d at 156.
32 Faigin v. Doubleday
Dell Publishing Group, 98 F.3d 268 (7th Cir. 1996).
33 Id. at
269-70.
34 Id. at 272.
35 Ristow v. Threadneedle Ins.
Co., 220 Wis. 2d 644, 583 N.W.2d 452 (Ct. App. 1998).
36 Id. at 652, 583
N.W.2d at 455.
Wisconsin
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