Supreme Court Digest
This column summarizes all decisions of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court (except those involving lawyer or judicial
discipline, which are digested elsewhere in the magazine). Profs. Daniel
D. Blinka and Thomas J. Hammer invite comments and questions about the
digests. They can be reached at Marquette University Law School, 1103 W.
Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53233, (414) 288-7090.
by Prof. Daniel D. Blinka & Prof. Thomas J. Hammer
Criminal Procedure
Warrantless Searches - Probation Searches
State v. Hajicek, 2001 WI 3
(filed 17 Jan. 2001)
The defendant was on probation for a drug-related offense. When
police learned of his possible involvement in further drug dealing, they
conducted a warrantless search of his residence in the company of
probation authorities. Prior to the search, police had been unable to
obtain a search warrant. The search uncovered evidence of drug
trafficking and a later search, conducted with a warrant, unearthed
still more evidence. The defendant was charged with felony drug
offenses, but the circuit court suppressed the physical evidence because
the warrantless search was invalid. The court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court, in a decision authored by Justice Crooks,
reversed. The court held that "the determination of whether a search is
a police or probation search is a question of constitutional fact
reviewed according to a two-step test." First, findings of historical
fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Second, findings
of constitutional fact are reviewed de novo. In particular, whether a
search is a police or probation search is itself a question of
constitutional fact. Here, the circuit court's finding that this was a
police search, not a probation search, was erroneous because the
historical facts demonstrated that police were present solely for
"protection" while probation authorities conducted the search ( 29).
Moreover, the probation search was conducted in a reasonable manner
under the "special needs" doctrine. Probation agents had "reasonable
grounds" for the search, which was conducted in accordance with
administrative regulations.
Chief Justice Abrahamson dissented on three grounds: 1) the majority
applied the wrong standard of review; 2) the search was an invalid,
warrantless police search; and 3) even if it was a probation search, it
was conducted unreasonably. Justices Bablitch and Bradley joined the
dissent.
Searches - Cars - Consent - Passenger's Property
State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5
(filed 6 Feb. 2001)
The sole issue in this case was whether "under the consent exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, a driver's consent to a
police officer's search of a vehicle extends to a passenger's jacket
left in the vehicle at the time of the search" ( 1). The trial court
suppressed evidence found in a van during a traffic stop. The defendant
was a passenger riding in the van. Officers obtained the driver's
consent to search the van, ordered everyone out, and found contraband in
defendant's jacket, which had been left inside the van. The court of
appeals reversed the suppression order.
The supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Sykes, affirmed.
The case presented a "hybrid" issue, as it involved neither probable
cause to search an automobile nor a third-party consent to search
premises ( 21). The automobile search cases clearly hold that privacy
expectations in automobiles are greatly diminished, that such searches
are ordinarily of "slight" intrusiveness, and governmental interests
often outweigh the individual's. The consent search cases focus less on
the third-party's authority over a specific object (here the jacket) and
more on the third-party's authority over the place where it is located.
In this case, the driver's consent extended to the defendant's jacket,
which she left in his van ( 41).
Justice Bradley, joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice
Bablitch, dissented.
Torts
Tortious Interference - Mental Health Expenses - Compensatory
Damages - Punitive Damages
Musa v. Jefferson County
Bank, 2001 WI 2 (filed 17 Jan. 2001)
Musa owned a hotel on which a bank held a mortgage. In the early
1980s, Musa unsuccessfully attempted to sell the hotel and eventually
lost it to the bank through foreclosure. In 1989 Musa sued the bank for
bad faith and also sued Buelow, the bank officer assigned to the
account. Eventually, a jury found that Buelow and the bank were liable
for international interference with contractual relationships between
Musa and several potential buyers. It awarded Musa $4,000 in
compensatory damages for "mental health treatment" and $50,000 in
punitive damages. (The jury also found that the bank had behaved in bad
faith and awarded nearly $400,000 for pecuniary losses, which are not
subject to this appeal.)
The trial judge set aside the damages against Buelow in post-verdict
proceedings. The court of appeals affirmed, based on its conclusion that
the "substantial other damages" requirement of Anderson v. Continental
Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675 (1978), which applies to recovery of emotional
distress damages, also applies to damages for mental health
expenses.
The supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Bradley, reversed
and upheld the award for mental health treatment costs as well as
punitive damages. The court held that recovery of damages for mental
health treatment expenses under a tortious interference with contract
theory is not subject to the "substantial other damages" requirement.
Such a requirement would demand that such expenses be treated
differently than medical, hospital, and related expenses ( 18). Claims
for emotional distress excite fears of unauthenticated claims and
unlimited liability. Mental health treatment expenses are far more
easily authenticated and verified through documentation ( 21). The court
declined, however, to address whether an award of mental health care
costs might constitute "substantial other damages" that support an award
for emotional distress damages because the issue had not ripened in this
case.
Buelow also contended that the award of mental health treatment costs
ran afoul of the "general rule" that special damages must be predicated
upon general damages. Expressing its discomfort with those terms, the
court nonetheless held that Wisconsin does not predicate "special"
damages on a finding of "general" damages, however defined ( 31).
Finally, the court rejected Buelow's argument that mental health
treatment costs are subject to the same "foreseeability" requirement
that applies to emotional distress claims.
Justice Sykes, joined by Justice Wilcox, dissented.
Wisconsin Lawyer
