Supreme Court Digest

by Prof. Daniel D. Blinka &
Prof. Thomas J. Hammer

• Criminal Prodedure
• Torts

Criminal Procedure

Warrantless Searches - Probation Searches

State v. Hajicek, 2001 WI 3 (filed 17 Jan. 2001)

The defendant was on probation for a drug-related offense. When police learned of his possible involvement in further drug dealing, they conducted a warrantless search of his residence in the company of probation authorities. Prior to the search, police had been unable to obtain a search warrant. The search uncovered evidence of drug trafficking and a later search, conducted with a warrant, unearthed still more evidence. The defendant was charged with felony drug offenses, but the circuit court suppressed the physical evidence because the warrantless search was invalid. The court of appeals affirmed.

The supreme court, in a decision authored by Justice Crooks, reversed. The court held that "the determination of whether a search is a police or probation search is a question of constitutional fact reviewed according to a two-step test." First, findings of historical fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Second, findings of constitutional fact are reviewed de novo. In particular, whether a search is a police or probation search is itself a question of constitutional fact. Here, the circuit court's finding that this was a police search, not a probation search, was erroneous because the historical facts demonstrated that police were present solely for "protection" while probation authorities conducted the search ( 29). Moreover, the probation search was conducted in a reasonable manner under the "special needs" doctrine. Probation agents had "reasonable grounds" for the search, which was conducted in accordance with administrative regulations.

Chief Justice Abrahamson dissented on three grounds: 1) the majority applied the wrong standard of review; 2) the search was an invalid, warrantless police search; and 3) even if it was a probation search, it was conducted unreasonably. Justices Bablitch and Bradley joined the dissent.

Searches - Cars - Consent - Passenger's Property

State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5 (filed 6 Feb. 2001)

The sole issue in this case was whether "under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, a driver's consent to a police officer's search of a vehicle extends to a passenger's jacket left in the vehicle at the time of the search" ( 1). The trial court suppressed evidence found in a van during a traffic stop. The defendant was a passenger riding in the van. Officers obtained the driver's consent to search the van, ordered everyone out, and found contraband in defendant's jacket, which had been left inside the van. The court of appeals reversed the suppression order.

The supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Sykes, affirmed. The case presented a "hybrid" issue, as it involved neither probable cause to search an automobile nor a third-party consent to search premises ( 21). The automobile search cases clearly hold that privacy expectations in automobiles are greatly diminished, that such searches are ordinarily of "slight" intrusiveness, and governmental interests often outweigh the individual's. The consent search cases focus less on the third-party's authority over a specific object (here the jacket) and more on the third-party's authority over the place where it is located. In this case, the driver's consent extended to the defendant's jacket, which she left in his van ( 41).

Justice Bradley, joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bablitch, dissented.

Torts

Tortious Interference - Mental Health Expenses - Compensatory Damages - Punitive Damages

Musa v. Jefferson County Bank, 2001 WI 2 (filed 17 Jan. 2001)

Musa owned a hotel on which a bank held a mortgage. In the early 1980s, Musa unsuccessfully attempted to sell the hotel and eventually lost it to the bank through foreclosure. In 1989 Musa sued the bank for bad faith and also sued Buelow, the bank officer assigned to the account. Eventually, a jury found that Buelow and the bank were liable for international interference with contractual relationships between Musa and several potential buyers. It awarded Musa $4,000 in compensatory damages for "mental health treatment" and $50,000 in punitive damages. (The jury also found that the bank had behaved in bad faith and awarded nearly $400,000 for pecuniary losses, which are not subject to this appeal.)

The trial judge set aside the damages against Buelow in post-verdict proceedings. The court of appeals affirmed, based on its conclusion that the "substantial other damages" requirement of Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675 (1978), which applies to recovery of emotional distress damages, also applies to damages for mental health expenses.

The supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Bradley, reversed and upheld the award for mental health treatment costs as well as punitive damages. The court held that recovery of damages for mental health treatment expenses under a tortious interference with contract theory is not subject to the "substantial other damages" requirement. Such a requirement would demand that such expenses be treated differently than medical, hospital, and related expenses ( 18). Claims for emotional distress excite fears of unauthenticated claims and unlimited liability. Mental health treatment expenses are far more easily authenticated and verified through documentation ( 21). The court declined, however, to address whether an award of mental health care costs might constitute "substantial other damages" that support an award for emotional distress damages because the issue had not ripened in this case.

Buelow also contended that the award of mental health treatment costs ran afoul of the "general rule" that special damages must be predicated upon general damages. Expressing its discomfort with those terms, the court nonetheless held that Wisconsin does not predicate "special" damages on a finding of "general" damages, however defined ( 31). Finally, the court rejected Buelow's argument that mental health treatment costs are subject to the same "foreseeability" requirement that applies to emotional distress claims.

Justice Sykes, joined by Justice Wilcox, dissented.