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Sued for Speaking Out

First, Noerr-Pennington offers an objective standard. The intent of the defendant is irrelevant if the petitioning is not objectively baseless. The petitioner's knowledge or motivation is typically not subject to scrutiny, and the issue often can be decided as a matter of law.³⁶ The actual malice standard, on the other hand, is predominantly subjective, based upon intent, knowledge, or motivation of the defendant.³⁷ Actual malice is shown where the statement was published "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," which typically is a question of fact for the jury.³⁸ Thus, trial often is required under the actual malice test; trial generally is not required under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

Second, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is applied with its own procedural rules. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of petitioning immunity, immunity will be presumed, and the plaintiff will bear the burden of proving that the sham exception applies to allow the case to move forward.³⁹ The Ninth Circuit has stated that, to avoid the chilling effect of litigation on the right to petition, there is a heightened pleading standard where Noerr-Pennington immunity is implicated, such that the complaint must include specific allegations of defendant's conduct demonstrating that the sham exception applies.⁴⁰ The Seventh Circuit has recognized the justification for such a standard, but has provided a more limited application.⁴¹ The heightened pleading standard allows resolution of petitioning cases on a motion to dismiss on the pleadings.⁴² Due to the high cost of litigation, ultimately prevailing at trial may not be much of a victory for your client. Dismissal on the pleadings would be.

Would Noerr-Pennington Immunity be Justified in Tort Suits?

The mere threat of protracted litigation often is enough to prevent individuals and institutions from seeking governmental assistance or intervention. In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the Supreme Court attempted to balance the interests of remediating wrongs with the competing concern that allowing liability for petitioning will significantly chill citizens' willingness to engage in this protected activity. The proper balance, as found by the Court, was application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,⁴³ with its protective objective standard and opportunity for early decision.

The greater protections afforded by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine make the Supreme Court's use of the doctrine to date paradoxical. For example, Noerr involved egregious predatory activity, intended to cause harm, and pursued solely for economic gain.⁴⁴ McDonald involved purely political activity, for no apparent personal gain, directed to the person responsible for making the political decision.⁴⁵ The Court's limitation of the more protective Noerr-Pennington doctrine to antitrust cases (involving only commercial and economic interests), and its application of the less protective actual malice standard to cases involving political participation, inverts long-held constitutional principles that political interests are entitled to greater constitutional protection than economic interests.46

Aaron R. Gary, University of California-Davis 1992, practices commercial litigation with the Madison firm of Axley Brynelson LLP.

After McDonald was decided, several courts reversed prior decisions that had applied Noerr-Pennington immunity in tort cases.⁴⁷ The recent trend, however, appears to recognize the broader protections afforded by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and to make efforts to apply Noerr-Pennington immunity rather than the actual malice standard.⁴⁸ For example, the Tenth Circuit, deeming Noerr-Pennington a constitutional doctrine that merely originated in antitrust law, recently rejected McDonald's actual malice test and instead applied the Noerr-Pennington sham exception, with its objective standard and procedural advantages, to affirm early dismissal of the action.⁴⁹

Conclusion

If your client has been sued based upon communications to a governmental body, the First Amendment Petition Clause may provide a strong defense to liability. The scope of the defense is subject to dispute and may vary depending upon the claim. You may argue for dismissal on the pleadings or summary judgment based upon the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its nearly insurmountable sham exception. At a minimum, the plaintiff must prove actual malice. Because the mere fact of litigation often is as damaging to a client as the result of litigation, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine may be a powerful tool in defending lawsuits based upon petitioning activity.

Endnotes

¹ Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-37 (1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).

² Havoco of America Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1983).

³ State ex rel. Thomas v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 343, 352-53, 198 N.W.2d 675 (1972); Wisconsin P&L Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 5 Wis. 2d 167, 168, 177, 92 N.W.2d 241 (1958).

⁴ See infra note 11.

⁵ See Westfield Partners Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 524-25 (N.D. Ill. 1990). See infra note 11.

⁶ Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 129, 133-36 (1961).

⁷ United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).

⁸ California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).

⁹ Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144; Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 51 (1993).

¹⁰ Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 57-66; City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver. Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380-84 (1991); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n. 4 (1988); Whelan v. Abell, 827 F. Supp. 801, 803 (D.C.D.C. 1993).

¹¹ See Eaton v. Newport Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1992); Boulware v. Nevada Dep't of Human Resources, 960 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1992); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1991); Christian Gospel Church v. San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1990); King v. Idaho Funeral Service Ass'n, 862 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1988); Ottensmeyer v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 756 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1985) (suit over petitioning by AT&T); United States v. Hylton, 710 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1983); Havoco of America Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1983); Forro Precision Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1982) (suit over petitioning by IBM); Missouri v. Nat'l Org. of Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980); Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978); Stern v. United States Gypsum Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1977); Gibson v. City of Alexandria, 855 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Va. 1994); Westfield Partners Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 525-26 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Zavaletta v. American Bar Ass'n, 721 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Va. 1989); Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology Inc., 625 F. Supp. 800 (D. Minn. 1986); Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Chavez v. Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor Law, 148 Cal. Rptr. 278 (Cal. App. 1978); Protect Our Mountain Env't v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984); Arim v. Gen. Motors Corp., 520 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. App. 1994) (suit over petitioning by GM); Bond v. Cedar Rapids Television Co., 518 N.W.2d 352 (Iowa 1994). See also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver. Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 367-70 (1991).

¹² See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources, 944 F.2d at 533-34; Video Int'l Prod. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communication, 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988); Havoco of America, 702 F.2d at 650; Suburban Restoration Co. Inc. v. ACMAT Corp., 700 F.2d 98, 100-01 (2nd Cir. 1983). See also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); Desnick v. American Broad. Companies Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995).

¹³ Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1996); Wright v. DeArmond, 977 F.2d 339, 346-48 (7th Cir. 1992); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1263 (7th Cir. 1984); Havoco of America Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1983); Stern v. United States Gypsum Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1977); Badger Cab Co. v. Soule, 171 Wis. 2d 754, 762-65, 492 N.W.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1992).

¹⁴ Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136-37.

¹⁵ Id. at 132 n. 6.

¹⁶ Id. at 137-40, 143-45.

¹⁷ California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510-11, 513-15.

¹⁸ City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver. Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379-84 (1991).

¹⁹ FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990).

²⁰ NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911-14 (1982).

²¹ Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 51, 53-54 n.2, 56-58 (1993).

²² Id. at 59.

²³ Bill Johnson's Restaurants Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741, 743-45 (1983).

²⁴ McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 480-82 (1985). See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).

²⁵ McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484. See White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).

²⁶ See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).

²⁷ McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482-83. The McDonald Court's attempt to avoid "elevat[ing] the Petition Clause to special First Amendment status," 472 U.S. at 485, by alluding to the "historical roots of the Petition Clause," id. at 482, has been criticized by several commentators as cursory, unsupportable, and historically inaccurate. See Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 15, 37-38, 52, 68-69 (1993); Norman B. Smith, Shall Make No Law Abridging ...: An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1153, 1175-77, 1180-81, 1186-88 (1986); Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 Yale L.J. 142, 155-57, 165-66 (1986).

²⁸ United Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois State Bar, 389 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1967).

²⁹ Forro Precision Inc. v. IBM, 673 F.2d 1045, 1060 (9th Cir. 1982).

³⁰ Stern v. United States Gypsum Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1343 (7th Cir. 1977).

³¹ Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 743. See also Stern, 547 F.2d at 1345.

³² United Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois State Bar, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 441-44 (1963).

³³ McDonald, 472 U.S. at 480, 484.

³⁴ Smith v. McDonald, 562 F. Supp. 829, 835-42 (M.D.N.C. 1983); Smith v. McDonald, 737 F.2d 427, 428-30 (4th Cir. 1984).

³⁵ Attempting to reconcile McDonald and Noerr-Pennington, the Third Circuit applies the actual malice standard where the petitioning activity looks like mere speech, as in McDonald, and applies the Noerr-Pennington doctrine where the petitioning activity serves interests distinct from speech. See San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 435, 438-39, 443 (3rd Cir. 1994).

³⁶ Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 63.

³⁷ Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989).

³⁸ Masson v. New Yorker Magazine Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 508-09, 511, 521 (1991); Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 659, 661, 668, 681, 685-86, 688-90; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).

³⁹ Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. 49, 54-56, 65-66 (1993). See also Bond v. Cedar Rapids Television Co., 518 N.W.2d 352, 354-55 (Iowa 1994).

⁴⁰ Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Boulware v. State of Nevada Dep't of Human Resources, 960 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1992); Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. Inc. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1985); Franchise Realty Corp. v. San Francisco Local, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1976); Protect Our Mountain Env't v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1368-69 (Colo. 1984).

⁴¹ See Stern v. United States Gypsum Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1345 (7th Cir. 1977).

⁴² See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources, 944 F.2d at 533. There also are certain procedural protections under the actual malice standard, see Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 686-88; Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1986), but they do not eliminate the fact-intensive nature of the actual malice inquiry.

⁴³ Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740-41, 743-44 (1983).

⁴⁴ Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129-33.

⁴⁵ McDonald, 472 U.S. at 480-81.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622-24 (1995); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1995); Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n. 5 (1985); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762-63, 771 n. 24 (1976). Two pairs of cases demonstrate this principle best: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907, 911-12 (1982) and FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 426-28 & n. 10 (1990); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) and In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432-34 (1978).

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1993), overruling Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981); Miner v. Novotny, 498 A.2d 269 (Md. 1985), overruling Sherrard v. Hull, 456 A.2d 59 (Md. App. 1983).

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Hometown Properties Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996).

⁴⁹ Cardtoons LC v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 182 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1999).