Vol. 71, No. 3, March
1998
Government Immunity
for Professional Independent Contractors
By Jeffrey L. Janik & W. Wayne
Siesennop
Editor's Note: To view Wisconsin statutory materials
referenced in this article you must have and/or install Adobe
Acrobat Reader 3.0 on your computer.
In a case of first impression, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals extended
governmental immunity to an independent contractor, insulating it from liability
for injuries alleged to have been caused by defective
A professional independent contractor implementing
a reasonably precise governmental directive can document its concerns with
the government principal and enjoy the same immunity given the government
officer. By merely implementing an otherwise immune governmental decision,
the contractor will not have to risk liability solely because of its status
as a private entity. |
design work performed on a public roadway and bridge project.1 This decision provides protection to professional
independent contractors performing work on public improvement projects for
state and local governments when reasonably precise aspects of the work
are directed by the government principal after reviewing potential dangers.
To avail themselves of this defense, however, contractors must properly
document and inform the government principal of their concerns at the time
of the project.
The Lyons claim
In Estate of Lyons v. CNA Insurance
Companies the plaintiffs were victims of an automobile accident
that occurred when an uninsured driver failed to stop at a stop sign and
collided with the Lyons' vehicle in an intersection in Walworth County.
Theresa Lyons suffered serious injuries and died after an extended period
in a coma. Her estate and her widower brought a tort action against the
other driver, the State of Wisconsin, and the municipal subdivisions. All
of the governmental defendants were dismissed, leaving the uninsured driver
as the sole defendant.
Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their complaint and implead Strand
Associates Inc., a private engineering and design firm that had designed
the replacement roadway and bridge in 1978-79. Plaintiffs argued that Strand
negligently designed the bridge that the uninsured driver crossed just before
the intersection where the accident occurred. Plaintiffs' expert opined
that the bridge design was contrary to standards promulgated by the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) concerning vertical curves and lines-of-sight.
Plaintiffs contended that the design of the bridge's vertical curve
a measurement reflecting an engineered hill's length and height was
too short and high for its proximity to the intersection, thereby blocking
the uninsured driver's view of the intersection.
Strand denied the allegations of negligence, denied that the cited standard
was applicable to the intersection, affirmatively alleged it was entitled
to governmental immunity for the alleged design flaw, and entitled to immunity
under Wisconsin law as an agent of the government as that term is used in
the statute.2
The design work
Strand was hired by the municipal subdivisions in 1978 to design a bridge
and roadway to replace a dilapidated bridge that spanned a set of railroad
tracks. Evidence showed that the existing bridge was severely in need of
replacement. The municipalities secured federal highway money for the project,
which was administered and distributed by the Wisconsin
Department of Transportation (DOT). Strand's contract defined it as
an independent contractor and required it to abide by existing design standards,
wherever feasible, and DOT requirements.
The design of the bridge height initially was constrained by the requirements
for spanning the railroad tracks. A variance was secured allowing a bridge
18 feet above the tracks instead of the 22 feet required under the existing
standard.
Following the variance, Strand submitted its initial design to the DOT
and municipalities. This design provided a bridge with a 150-foot vertical
curve. To effect this design, portions of the roadway and adjacent intersection
would have needed razing, filling, and repaving.
In May 1979 Strand met with DOT and municipal government officials at
the proposed construction site. The DOT recognized that the 150-foot vertical
curve bridge design would have resulted in significant additional costs
associated with raising the elevation of the adjoining roadways. To control taxpayer expense, the DOT directed Strand to
submit a new bridge design with a shorter vertical curve, thereby eliminating
the need for elevating the adjacent roadways. Strand responded by reminding
the DOT that it followed the 150-foot vertical curve criteria for the roadway,
and, with the nearby intersection, a reduced roadway speed from 40
m.p.h. to 25 m.p.h. was appropriate. Strand also indicated that it
was submitting a new design with a 70-foot vertical curve, based on the
directives of DOT officials, and as a further exception to design criteria.
The DOT approved the revised plans, and the bridge was constructed with
a 70-foot vertical curve an engineered hill with a shorter length
and steeper grade than the 150-foot original design.
Immunity
Strand moved for summary judgment at the trial court, arguing that it
should be immune for merely implementing in a nonnegligent manner a governmental
decision made by immune state officials entrusted with the duty to make
such discretionary decisions for the good of the citizens. In the alternative,
Strand argued that it should be afforded statutory immunity as a government
agent for performing a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative function, 3 and should be dismissed for plaintiffs' failure
to name Strand in the requisite Notice of Claim. 4
Plaintiffs argued that, as a professional designer, Strand had a professional
duty to design the bridge and roadway to then-existing standards. Plaintiffs'
expert opined that Strand had a duty "not to proceed" with a design
that did not comply with professional standards. Plaintiffs also contended
that no governmental immunity should be available to Strand. Citing A.E.
Investment Corp. v. Link Builders Inc., 5
plaintiffs argued that Strand was a private entity with a professional duty
to the public, and its status as a professional independent contractor took
it out of the realm of a master-servant relationship with the government.
Plaintiffs cited the fact that no previous Wisconsin decision has ever extended
governmental immunity to a private independent contractor.
The Hon. John R. Race, Walworth County circuit court judge, granted summary
judgment to Strand, finding no dispute on the material fact that plaintiffs'
only criticism of Strand's design work involved the use of a 70-foot rather
than a 150-foot vertical curve. The court also found no dispute concerning
the fact that Strand submitted an original design with a 150-foot vertical
curve, but was directed by the DOT to redesign the bridge with a shorter
vertical curve.
The trial court explored Wisconsin precedent holding government officials
immune for discretionary decisions made in the course of their government
employment. The court cited Pavlik v. Kinsey 6
for the rule that public officers are immune for injuries resulting from
their discretionary official acts. The immunity rationale, the court reiterated,
is to avoid influencing government officials' performance with the threat
of lawsuits, avoid the deterrent effect for those considering public service,
avoid having public officials use their official time responding to and
defending lawsuits, unfairness in subjecting government officers to liability
for their subordinates' actions, and that the ballot box is the proper forum
for dealing with official misconduct. 7
The trial court held that the decision to design the bridge with a shorter
vertical curve was an immune discretionary decision made by a government
official, and plaintiffs were attempting to impute onto Strand this allegedly
negligent discretionary governmental decision. Therefore, the court held,
Strand was entitled to immunity "when faithfully executing the discretionary
act of the state." 8
Plaintiffs appealed the granting of summary judgment and Strand cross-appealed
on the undecided issue of whether it was a government agent for purposes
of the statutory Notice of Claim requirements.
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