Public Reprimand of Angela Dawn Dirden

The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Angela Dawn Dirden, Green Bay, agreed to the imposition of a public reprimand pursuant to SCR 22.09(1). A Wisconsin Supreme Court-appointed referee approved the agreement and issued the public reprimand on June 2, 2014, in accordance with SCR 22.09(3).

Dirden was charged with one count of resisting or obstructing an officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Wis. Stat. section 946.41(1), related to her interactions with a police officer investigating potential crimes allegedly committed by Dirden’s then boyfriend and another man. According to the criminal complaint, in July 2011, Dirden’s boyfriend and another person broke into the home of a third man and kicked and punched him several times, causing physical injuries. Dirden drove the two men to the apartment and drove them away from the apartment after the attack. Dirden asserted that she was unaware that the men intended to break into the apartment and attack the man, and that she was not immediately aware after the attack that it had occurred. Dirden and the two men agreed to provide false information to the police, should they be questioned about the night’s events.

Dirden made intentional misrepresentations to the investigating police officer regarding the two suspects’ involvement and her own actions in driving them to and from the scene of the attack. Police officers obtained telephone and text-message records that the investigating officer believed contradicted Dirden’s version of events. In April 2012, Dirden admitted to the investigating officer that she had made false statements and she then provided a more accurate account. On June 21, 2012, Dirden pleaded guilty to the complaint as filed.

By engaging in the course of conduct leading to her conviction for resisting or obstructing an officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Wis. Stat. section 946.41(1), Dirden committed a criminal act that reflects adversely on her honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(b).

Dirden had no prior discipline.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against William J. Grogan

On June 19, 2014, the supreme court revoked the law license of William J. Grogan and ordered that Grogan pay restitution totaling $11,460, as well as the $37,718.88 cost of the disciplinary proceeding. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grogan, 2014 WI 39.

Grogan’s revocation was based on 33 counts of misconduct pertaining to eight separate matters.

Contrary to SCR 20:1.3, Grogan willfully failed to act with diligence and promptness during his representation of three clients. Contrary to SCR 20:1.5(b)(3), Grogan failed to respond to a client inquiry that included a request for a copy of the fee agreement, a billing statement, and the return of funds intended for a third party.

Contrary to SCR 20:1.15(b)(1), Grogan failed to hold in trust, separate from his own property, the property of clients and third persons in his possession during his representation of two clients. Contrary to SCR 20:1.15(d)(1), Grogan failed to promptly disburse funds that a third party was entitled to receive during his representation of two clients. Contrary to SCR 20:1.15(d)(2), Grogan failed to provide a full written accounting of funds he received from one client.

Contrary to SCR 20:1.16(d), Grogan failed on termination of his representation of one client to refund any unearned portion of an advanced fee.

Contrary to SCR 20:3.4(c), Grogan knowingly disobeyed a court order during his representation of one client. Contrary to SCR 20:5.5(b)(2), Grogan held out to the public or otherwise represented that he was admitted to practice law while his law license was suspended.

Contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c), Grogan engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation during his representation of five clients.

In several instances, Grogan violated SCR 22.03(2) and (6) by failing to cooperate with OLR investigations.

Contrary to SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b), Grogan failed to notify two clients by certified mail of his license suspension and failed to advise them to seek legal advice of their choice elsewhere. Contrary to SCR 22.26(1)(c), Grogan failed to promptly provide written notification of his license suspension to the circuit court in one matter. Contrary to SCR 22.26(2), Grogan engaged in the practice of law after his license had been suspended during his representation of four clients.

Contrary to SCR 10.03(2), Grogan failed to report changes to his office address to the State Bar.

In 2007, Grogan was publicly reprimanded. In 2011, he received a 60-day suspension.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tim Osicka

The supreme court suspended the law license of Tim Osicka, Schofield, for 60 days, effective June 6, 2014. The court also ordered Osicka to pay restitution as well as the cost of the disciplinary proceeding. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 2014 WI 33.

In September 2008, a woman hired Osicka to represent her minor daughter in a delinquency petition. Osicka charged and collected from the client an advanced fee and placed the fee in his business account. Osicka did not follow the provisions in SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m) concerning alternative treatment of advanced fees. Osicka negotiated a consent decree, but he was unable to attend the court hearing on the consent decree because his law license was administratively suspended at the time of the hearing. The client had to hire a new attorney and she subsequently filed a grievance against Osicka. During the investigation of the grievance, Osicka failed to cooperate fully with the OLR.

By failing to deposit an advanced fee into his trust account, Osicka violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(4). Osicka charged an unreasonable fee for a representation that he did not complete, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a), and failed to refund unearned fees to the client, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d). By failing to cooperate with the OLR’s investigation of the grievance, Osicka violated SCR 22.03(2) and (6) and SCR 20:8.4(h). The court ordered Osicka to make restitution of $750 to the former client.

Oskica had prior discipline, including a 2002 public reprimand, a 2009 public reprimand, and a 2010 public reprimand.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tim Osicka

In a separate proceeding, the supreme court suspended the law license of Tim Osicka, Schofield, for 60 days, effective June 6, 2014. The court also ordered Osicka to pay the cost of the disciplinary proceeding. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 2014 WI 34. The suspension was concurrent to the 60-day suspension imposed by the court in Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 2014 WI 33.

In May 2011, a client hired Osicka to represent him in a divorce proceeding. Shortly thereafter, Osicka failed to comply with his continuing legal education requirements, and his law license was administratively suspended. Despite the suspension, Osicka filed a letter brief in the divorce proceeding. Osicka also neglected to inform his client, the circuit court, and opposing counsel of his suspension. Later, Osicka failed to cooperate with the OLR’s investigation of the matter.

By submitting a letter brief when his license was administratively suspended, Osicka violated SCR 31.10, as enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f). Osicka violated SCR 22.26(1) and (2), also enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f), by failing to notify clients, opposing counsel, and relevant courts of his suspension, failing to submit a required postdiscipline affidavit to OLR, and engaging in the practice of law while suspended. Finally, Osicka did not cooperate with the OLR’s investigation of the grievance, in violation of SCR 22.03(2) and (6) and SCR 20:8.4(h).

Osicka had prior discipline, including a 2002 public reprimand, a 2009 public reprimand, and a 2010 public reprimand.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Andrew Bryant

The supreme court suspended the law license of Andrew Bryant, Verona, for four months, effective June 24, 2014. The court also ordered Bryant to pay restitution and the cost of the disciplinary proceeding, and it set conditions for reinstatement. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant, 2014 WI 43.

Bryant engaged in 15 counts of professional misconduct involving three clients. He also practiced law while he was suspended.

In the first client matter, Bryant represented a couple in a joint divorce. Bryant charged $1,500 for the representation. However, Bryant did not prepare a conflict waiver or a written fee agreement. Bryant also deposited the fees directly into his business account without following the alternative advanced-fee procedures in SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m). After filing the joint petition, the petitioners requested that Bryant expedite the case because of one petitioner’s deteriorating health. Nonetheless, Bryant failed to advance the clients’ interests for more than a year. When successor counsel took over the case, Bryant delayed turning over the clients’ file. Bryant violated SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.5(b)(2), SCR 20:1.7(a), SCR 20:1.15(b)(4), and SCR 20:1.16(d).

In a second matter, Bryant represented a client in a personal injury case. The circuit court entered multiple scheduling orders requiring Bryant to provide expert witness reports. Bryant failed to comply with the scheduling orders and failed to conduct any discovery from any of the client’s treating physicians. In addition, Bryant failed to respond to sanction motions filed by opposing counsel. After the court entered a sanction order against Bryant’s client, Bryant did not tell the client about the sanction order or otherwise comply with the court order. When the court dismissed the client’s case for failure to comply with the court’s orders, Bryant did not tell the client that the case had been dismissed with prejudice and could not be refiled. Bryant violated SCR 20:1.1, SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) and (b), SCR 20:3.2, and SCR 20:3.4(c).

In a third matter, Bryant represented a client in a divorce. The court entered a judgment in the case and ordered distribution of certain retirement assets to the other party. Bryant filed a notice of appeal from the divorce judgment and convinced the company holding the assets to not distribute them. Later, after the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, Bryant falsely informed the company that he had filed a motion for rehearing and sought to delay transfer of the assets. Bryant violated SCR 20:3.1(a)(3), SCR 20:4.1(a)(1), and SCR 20:8.4(c).

Finally, Bryant was suspended from the practice of law in November 2010. Nonetheless, Bryant appeared in two circuit court proceedings while under suspension. Bryant violated SCR 10.03(6), SCR 20:1.15(i)(4), and SCR 22.26(2), as enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f).

Bryant had one prior private reprimand, issued in January 2012.

Public Reprimand of Laura R. Schwefel

The OLR and Laura R. Schwefel, Waukesha, agreed to the imposition of a public reprimand pursuant to SCR 22.09(1). A supreme court-appointed referee approved the agreement and issued the public reprimand on June 17, 2014, in accordance with SCR 22.09(3).

In September 2009, Schwefel was appointed guardian of the estate of a woman who had been adjudicated incompetent (the ward). Schwefel initially believed that the ward owned the apartment complex in which she lived, but learned no later than Oct. 12, 2009, that it was owned by the ward’s trust. Schwefel asserted that she was confused as to the scope of her authority with regard to the complex and as to the relationship between the trust and the estate. Schwefel asserted that the contentious relationship between the ward’s daughters, their inability to act in their mother’s best interest, the condition of the complex, Schwefel’s own contentious relationship with one of the daughters, and the ward’s precarious financial position necessitated that Schwefel assume management of the complex.

Between Oct. 12, 2009, and Dec. 9, 2009, Schwefel sometimes accurately asserted that the complex was owned by the trust and sometimes inaccurately asserted that the ward owned the complex. Schwefel also inaccurately asserted that she was authorized to act with regard to the complex and that she was the only individual authorized to enter into contracts related to the complex.

Schwefel filed a petition with the circuit court to remove the ward’s daughters as the co-trustees of the trust, and to appoint Schwefel as successor trustee. On Jan. 28, 2010, the court denied Schwefel’s petition, clarified that the complex was not an asset of the estate, and reduced Schwefel’s bill for time spent managing the complex.

Schwefel continued to act with regard to the apartment complex until the court ordered her to cease in April 2010. Schwefel asserts that she did not intend to violate any supreme court rules. There is no evidence that Schwefel acted in a dishonest or deceitful manner with regard to safeguarding funds she received on behalf of the estate or of the trust.

Schwefel violated SCR 20:1.1 by 1) failing between Oct. 12, 2009 and Dec. 9, 2012 to clarify the ownership of the complex and the scope of her authority to act with regard to the complex; 2) failing during or after the January 2010 hearing to clarify with the court whether she was entitled to continue to collect rents; and 3) failing after the January 2010 hearing to take the steps necessary to understand that rental income from an asset owned by the trust would also constitute trust property.

Schwefel violated SCR 20:1.15(j)(8)(a) and (c) by 1) failing to make a thorough inventory and create an accurate and complete ledger of the ward’s personal property before allowing one of the ward’s daughters to clean out the ward’s apartment; and 2) failing to document the disposition of all such property.

Schwefel had no prior discipline.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Geneva E. McKinley

On July 1, 2014, the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved a stipulation filed by the OLR and Geneva E. McKinley pursuant to SCR 22.12. In the stipulation, McKinley admitted that she committed two acts of professional misconduct and agreed that a 60-day suspension of her Wisconsin law license was the appropriate level of discipline for her misconduct. Having approved the stipulation, the court ordered McKinley’s license suspended for 60 days, effective July 31, 2014. Disciplinary Proceedings Against McKinley, 2014 WI 48. The court did not assess any costs against McKinley because the matter was resolved with the filing of a stipulation under SCR 22.12 and without the appointment of a referee.

In tax years 2005 and 2006, McKinley filed tax returns that failed to report as income attorney fees paid to her. In May 2013, McKinley pleaded no contest to, and was convicted of, two misdemeanor counts of filing a tax return that she believed was not true and correct, in violation of Wis. Stat. section 71.83(2)(a)2. In each instance, the conduct leading to McKinley’s conviction violated SCR 20:8.4(b). McKinley was sentenced to five days in jail and 18 months’ probation. McKinley claimed to have been suffering from depression at the time of the misconduct. By the time of her sentencing, McKinley had paid substantially all the back taxes she owed. She self-reported her misconduct to the OLR.

McKinley had no prior discipline.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mark Alan Ruppelt

On July 8, 2014, the Wisconsin Supreme Court publicly reprimanded Mark Alan Ruppelt, Milwaukee, based on a stipulation in which Ruppelt pleaded no contest to three counts of professional misconduct. The court also ordered Ruppelt to pay one-half the cost of the disciplinary proceeding. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ruppelt, 2014 WI 53.

In 2007, T.W. hired Ruppelt’s former firm (the firm) to represent her in two legal matters. Ruppelt represented T.W. with regard to a civil matter, including attempting without success to settle T.W.’s civil claims, filing a lawsuit on T.W.’s behalf, filing numerous pleadings, and appearing as T.W.’s counsel at hearings and scheduling conferences. In August 2008, Ruppelt also appeared as counsel of record for T.W. at a sentencing hearing in a related criminal case in which T.W. was the victim.

In April 2009, while the civil case was still pending, Ruppelt and T.W. began a sexual relationship. In mid-April 2009, the firm became aware that Ruppelt may have been engaging in a sexual relationship with T.W. On April 19, 2009, Ruppelt met with his former partner and another senior attorney at the firm to discuss their concerns about Ruppelt’s relationship with T.W. At the meeting, Ruppelt misrepresented the nature of his relationship with T.W. and stated that he had not received from or exchanged with T.W. any texts, email, or voicemail messages of any kind that were of a personal nature and unrelated to the firm’s representation of her. Ruppelt agreed not to have contact with T.W. after the April 19 meeting. On several occasions after April 19, 2009, Ruppelt denied to his former partner that he was involved in a romantic relationship with T.W., but in May or June of 2009, Ruppelt acknowledged that he was engaging in a sexual relationship with T.W.

Ruppelt and T.W. were married in June 2010.

By engaging in sexual relations with T.W. while he was representing her, when they had not engaged in a consensual sexual relationship before the commencement of the attorney-client relationship, Ruppelt violated SCR 20:1.8(j).

By providing false information to the firm regarding the nature and timing of his relationship with T.W., failing to disclose information to the firm regarding the nature and timing of his relationship with T.W., and engaging in a course of conduct to conceal from the firm the nature and timing of his relationship with T.W., Ruppelt violated SCR 20:8.4(f) and Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shea, 190 Wis. 2d 560, 527 N.W.2d 314 (1995).

By providing false information to the OLR and failing to provide relevant information to the OLR regarding the scope and timing of his representation of T.W. and regarding the firm’s investigation of his relationship with T.W., Ruppelt violated SCR 22.03(2) and (6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).

Ruppelt had no prior discipline.

Public Reprimand of Patrick J. Hudec

On July 1, 2014, the supreme court imposed a public reprimand on Patrick J. Hudec, East Troy, and ordered Hudec to pay the cost of the disciplinary proceeding.

Hudec’s misconduct occurred during his representation of a defendant in a civil lawsuit. Hudec filed submissions with the circuit court and the court of appeals that were frequently incomplete, contained multiple errors, and showed a lack of proofreading and attention to detail. In addition, the court of appeals criticized the accuracy of statements made by Hudec at a motion hearing in the circuit court and also criticized Hudec’s judgment in including inappropriate materials in the appeal.

By engaging in what the court of appeals later described as “a pattern of gross and inexcusable inattention to details,” including the signing and filing of an incomplete answer in the circuit court litigation; incorrectly informing the circuit court that he had filed an affidavit in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment; and stating a presumption that his “testimony” was under oath, while making an argument to the court (as opposed to testifying as a witness), Hudec violated SCR 20:1.1.

When, as described by the court of appeals, Hudec continued at the appellate level to engage in “egregious conduct,” including failing to ensure that a proper final order or judgment was in the record when he filed his notice of appeal; misstating the standard of review of a default judgment; filing a principal brief rife with grammatical and spelling errors; including in his principal brief a statement of facts that included facts not germane to the issues on appeal; and filing a reply brief that was struck as untimely and that was not served on opposing counsel, Hudec further violated SCR 20:1.1.

By including in his principal appellate brief facts that were described by the court of appeals as “salacious” and not germane to the issues on appeal and that “could only have been included to prejudice [the plaintiff],” Hudec violated SCR 20:3.1(a)(3). By failing to serve opposing counsel with a copy of the reply brief that he filed in the court of appeals, thereby engaging in an ex parte communication with the court, Hudec violated SCR 20:3.5(b).

Hudec received private reprimands in 1989, 1993, and 2001, and he received a public reprimand in 2008.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Elizabeth A. Ewald-Herrick

On June 19, 2014, the supreme court publicly reprimanded Elizabeth A. Ewald-Herrick, Merton, for violating SCR 20:8.4(b) by committing her fourth operating-while-intoxicated offense within a five-year period, a criminal act that reflected adversely on her fitness as a lawyer. The court declined to impose the conditions recommended by the referee (WisLAP monitoring and medical release authorizations for AODA or mental-health records) and instead granted Ewald-Herrick’s petition to voluntarily resign her Wisconsin law license, which Ewald-Herrick submitted to the court during the disciplinary proceeding.

The court further ordered that if Ewald-Herrick seeks readmission to the State Bar of Wisconsin, she must undergo an AODA evaluation to assess her substance abuse history and current status and make specific recommendations for any necessary continuing treatment, with the results of the evaluation to be submitted to the OLR for its review and consideration. Finally, the court ordered Ewald-Herrick to pay one-half the cost of the disciplinary proceeding. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ewald-Herrick, 2014 WI 40.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Richard A. Kranitz

On July 1, 2014, the supreme court suspended the law license of Richard A. Kranitz, Grafton, for two years. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kranitz, 2014 WI 47.

On April 16, 2013, Kranitz pleaded guilty to the felony offense of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1349, and 2. A federal court sentenced Kranitz to 18 months in federal prison and one year of supervised release. United States v. Kranitz, CR No. 11-10415-NMG (D. Mass.).

By engaging in the conduct leading to his conviction, Kranitz violated SCR 20:8.4(b).

Kranitz had no prior discipline.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against John M. Curin

On July 24, 2014, the supreme court publicly reprimanded John M. Curtin, Phoenix, Ariz., as discipline reciprocal to a May 13, 2013, Supreme Court of Arizona order publicly reprimanding him. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Curtin, 2014 WI 90.

The Arizona reprimand arose from Curtin’s failure to maintain adequate trust account records and failure to meet required standards of performance regarding trust account control and supervision after the staff member who maintained Curtin’s trust account records falsified, destroyed, and stopped maintaining some trust account records to enable the staff member’s substantial theft from Curtin’s trust account. Curtin’s conduct violated ER 1.15(a) of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct and Rules 42, 43(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)-(C), and (2)(A)-(D) of Arizona’s Rules of the Supreme Court.

Curtin had no prior public discipline in Wisconsin.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Daynel L. Hooker

On June 19, 2014, the supreme court revoked the law license of Daynel L. Hooker based on her petition for consensual revocation, in which she stated that she could not successfully defend against seven OLR investigations in which cause to proceed was found on 35 counts of misconduct. Hooker’s petition also stated that she could not successfully defend against the misconduct described in an Oct. 18, 2013, opinion and decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, which disbarred Hooker for misconduct in various client matters. Hooker was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 2001 and primarily practiced in Colorado, where she was unlicensed but maintained a federal law practice. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hooker,2014 WI 41.

The misconduct in the seven OLR matters involved violations of the following rules, some more than once: SCR 20:1.1, SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4), SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) and (2), SCR 20:1.15(b)(4), SCR 20:1.16(d), SCR 20:5.5(a)(1), SCR 20:8.4(a) and (c), and SCR 22.03(2) and (6). The Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered Hooker to pay restitution to five former clients but it did not impose costs.

Hooker’s Colorado disbarment was based on violations of various ethical rules, including some Hooker committed on multiple occasions: unauthorized practice of law; failing to hold client property separate from the lawyer’s own property; failing on a client’s request to promptly render a full accounting regarding funds; failing to surrender papers and property to which the client was entitled and to refund unearned fees or expenses; committing conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; neglect of client matters; failing to keep clients informed; failing to respond to client requests for information; failing to communicate to a client in writing a basis or rate of fee and expenses; and failing to respond to disciplinary authority. Colorado v. Hooker, No. 11PDJ084 (consolidated with Nos.12PDJ004, 12PDJ088, and 12PDJ002).

Hooker had two prior six-month reciprocal suspensions in Wisconsin, each based on discipline first imposed in Colorado. See Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hooker,2012 WI 100; Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hooker,2010 WI 13.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Joseph Sommers

On Aug. 5, 2014, the supreme court issued a public reprimand of Joseph Sommers, Oregon. The court also ordered Sommers to pay the cost of the proceeding. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers, 2014 WI 103.

In January 2007, Sommers announced his candidacy for the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Sommers sent to Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson a letter, dated Jan. 4, 2007, expressing his intention to run for election to the court. In that letter, however, Sommers claimed that Assistant District Attorney Paul Humphrey, with whom Sommers had tangled in a previous criminal case, had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in multiple cases. Sommers sent copies of the letter to the other justices, as well as to the OLR, but did not send a copy to Humphrey’s counsel, who was defending Humphrey on other pending disciplinary charges. Sommers then posted his letter to his campaign website.

On Feb. 5, 2007, Sommers issued a press release titled “Corruption in Wisconsin Courts – Supreme Court Candidate Speaks Out.” In that press release, Sommers alleged, among other claims, that “innocent defendants plead out every day in Wisconsin courts” and “judges are permitted to get away with falsifying the record.”

In response to multiple grievances filed against Sommers, the OLR asked Sommers to respond to allegations that his Jan. 4, 2007, letter to the court, as well as his press release dated Feb. 5, 2007, violated rules of professional conduct. Sommers responded in a letter sent directly to the supreme court rather than to the OLR. Later, Sommers responded to an OLR preliminary investigative report by writing directly to the chief justice and sending copies of the letter to other justices, individuals, and entities, as well as the OLR.

The supreme court found that Sommers engaged in impermissible ex parte communications with a judge or other official, in violation of former or current SCR 20:3.5(b), when he sent the letters dated Jan. 4, 2007, May 21, 2007, and Jan. 24, 2008 to the supreme court justices and did not immediately send a copy to Humphrey’s counsel. In addition, the court determined that Sommers made impermissible extrajudicial statements, in violation of former SCR 20:3.6(a), when he published the Jan. 4, 2007 letter to the court on his campaign website. Finally, the court concluded that Sommers violated the Attorney’s Oath, SCR 40.15, as enforced via SCR 20:8.4(g), when he published on the Internet the Feb. 5, 2007 press release criticizing the court system and judicial officers.

Sommers’ Wisconsin law license was previously suspended for 30 days in 2012 and currently is administratively suspended for nonpayment of State Bar of Wisconsin dues and for noncompliance with continuing legal education requirements.

Public Reprimand of Dean P. Delforge

Dean P. Delforge represented a personal representative in an estate. The decedent died in December 2007.

Delforge applied for an extension to file the decedent’s 2007 federal income tax returns, but he never prepared or filed state and federal income tax returns for 2006 or 2007. Delforge also failed to file fiduciary returns for 2008–2010.

An order to show cause hearing was scheduled in October 2008 for failure to file an inventory. In October 2009, another order to show cause hearing was scheduled for failure to close the estate. Delforge requested an adjournment to January 2010, but he failed to appear at the January 2010 hearing. The hearing was rescheduled for February 2010.

In January 2010, Delforge filed a petition with an accompanying letter to extend the time to close the estate. In the letter, Delforge indicated that the tax returns were almost complete and would be filed by Feb. 9, 2010. The judge granted an extension to April 2010. The hearing was later adjourned to May 2010 and then to August 2010. Delforge failed to appear at the August 2010 hearing.

The court removed the personal representative in March 2011 and appointed a successor. The new personal representative stipulated with Delforge and the bonding company for the first personal representative that Delforge was responsible for $12,244.64 in interest, penalties, and assessments paid by the estate to the IRS and the Wisconsin Department of Revenue for the decedent’s 2006 and 2007 personal income tax returns; $10,000 of the total $21,280 in fees for the successor personal representative; $1,500 of the total $5,190 in accountant’s fees incurred subsequent to appointment of the successor personal representative; and $3,500 in fees for the bonding company’s attorney. Delforge promptly paid these amounts.

By failing to properly calendar and appear at two court hearings, thus delaying the processing and closing of the estate; failing to complete and file the decedent’s state and federal income tax returns for 2006 and 2007, resulting in penalties and interest being assessed; failing to take any steps to file fiduciary returns for 2008-2010; and, notwithstanding repeated warnings from the court, otherwise failing to perform sufficient work during the period of his representation to bring the estate matter to a close, Delforge violated SCR 20:1.3.

By failing to implement appropriate organizational and calendaring systems to ensure he would not miss court appearances or tax deadlines and would otherwise be able to complete the estate work, Delforge violated SCR 20:1.1.

By representing to the court in his letter accompanying the January 2010 petition for an extension that the tax returns were almost complete and would be filed by Feb. 9, 2010, when in fact Delforge had done little or no work on the returns and was in no position to file any returns when so informing the court, Delforge violated SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) and SCR 20:8.4(c).

Delforge was privately reprimanded in 2003.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against John R. Dade

On Aug. 21, 2014, the supreme court suspended the law license of John R. Dade, Whitewater, for 90 days, effective Sept. 25, 2014, and ordered, as a condition of reinstatement, that Dade complete six continuing legal education credits in law office management, to be approved by the OLR. The court also ordered Dade to pay the cost of the proceeding. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dade, 2014 WI 108.

Dade represented a client who was a defendant in a real estate dispute. In a decision issued in January 2007, the circuit court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to ownership by adverse possession of the piece of land at issue in the dispute. Dade filed a notice of appeal.

In a May 31, 2007 order, the court of appeals found that Dade had not filed a docketing statement and informed him that unless it was filed within five days, the court would dismiss the appeal or impose other sanctions.

In a June 27, 2007 order, the court of appeals noted the docketing statement had still not been filed and indicated that if the original and one copy of the statement were not filed on or before July 9, 2007, the court would impose a penalty of $25 per day on Dade as counsel for the appellant until such time as the docketing statement was filed. Dade did not file a docketing statement. Ultimately, the client’s successor counsel filed a docketing statement, and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.

In the disciplinary proceeding, the supreme court found that by failing to file a docketing statement in the client’s appeal, even after receiving orders from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Dade violated SCR 20:1.3, and by failing to provide a timely written response to the client’s grievance, Dade violated SCR 22.03(2) and (6), as enforced via 20:8.4(h).

Dade received a private reprimand in 1991, a public reprimand in 2007, a 60-day suspension in 2007, a public reprimand in 2012, and a 60-day suspension in 2013.

Disciplinary Proceedings Against John J. Balistrieri

On Aug. 12, 2014, the supreme court denied the reinstatement petition of John J. Balistrieri, Milwaukee. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Balistrieri, 2014 WI 104.

In 1984, the supreme court summarily suspended Balistrieri’s license following his conviction in federal district court of conspiracy to obstruct commerce by extortion. In 1987, after the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, the supreme court revoked Balistrieri’s license. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Balistrieri, No. 84-970-D.

In 2012, Balistrieri filed a petition for reinstatement. Following a hearing, a supreme court-appointed referee filed a report recommending reinstatement. Although the OLR opposed Balistrieri’s petition before the referee, it did not appeal the referee’s recommendation.

After reviewing the referee’s report and recommendation, the supreme court concluded that Balistrieri did not satisfy the criteria required to resume the practice of law in Wisconsin, and it denied his petition. The court also determined that Balistrieri should be required to pay the full cost of the reinstatement proceeding.

The court gave the following reasons for finding that Balistrieri did not meet his burden on the requirements for reinstatement: Balistrieri’s grudging acceptance of his conviction and his attempts to besmirch individuals who investigated and prosecuted him were evidence that Balistrieri did not possess the requisite moral character and proper attitude toward the standards that are imposed on members of the bar. Balistrieri’s failure to report as taxable income the draws he received from a family business after his revocation raised serious questions of propriety, and Balistrieri failed to demonstrate that his conduct since revocation had been “exemplary and above reproach.” With respect to Balistrieri’s misrepresentations in business dealings and subsequent litigation with “a less sophisticated person,” with whom Balistrieri had a fiduciary relationship, Balistrieri did not demonstrate the requisite moral character to practice law or that his conduct was exemplary and above reproach.

The court concluded that such conduct “does not befit a person who can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence.”

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Michael D. Mandelman

On Aug. 1, 2014, the supreme court revoked the law license of Michael D. Mandelman, Milwaukee, pursuant to a stipulation between Mandelman and the OLR, and ordered Mandelman to pay the full cost of the disciplinary proceeding. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman, 2014 WI 100. The revocation was made retroactive to May 29, 2009, the effective date of a prior one-year suspension from which Mandelman had not been reinstated. The court noted that a retroactive effective date of a suspension or revocation may be appropriate when the misconduct occurred before the attorney’s earlier disciplinary proceeding and the attorney’s license has remained suspended well beyond the period of suspension previously imposed.

The OLR alleged 22 counts of misconduct. Mandelman violated SCR 20:7.1(a) and 20:7.5(a) by making false or misleading communications regarding the name and organizational status of his law firm. In one client matter, Mandelman violated SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:3.4(c), SCR 20:1.15(d)(1), and SCR 20:8.4(c). In another client matter, Mandelman violated SCR 20:1.3, former SCR 20:1.15(b), and current SCR 20:1.15(d)(1).

Mandelman violated the trust account rule, SCR 20:1.15, in multiple other instances, and violated SCR 20:8.4(c) when he paid to his law firm money from the firm’s trust account that the firm was not entitled to receive. Mandelman further violated SCR 20:8.4(c) when he used a particular trust account to make unrecorded and unexplained personal and business deposits and withdrawals after his 2006 license suspension.

In addition, by failing to report certain income, Mandelman violated SCR 20:8.4(c) and a standard of conduct set forth in disciplinary case law, and thus also violated SCR 20:8.4(f). By recklessly claiming a particular business expense on a tax return, Mandelman violated the same rules, as he did by underreporting certain income on a return. Mandelman failed to inform a personal injury client of his law license suspension, contrary to SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f), and falsely stated in an affidavit filed with the OLR that he had provided such notice to all clients, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) and SCR 22.26(1)(e), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f). Finally, Mandelman violated SCR 20:1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in another personal injury matter.

The court ordered Mandelman to work with a former colleague and with the OLR to ascertain the amounts, if any, in trust accounts controlled by Mandelman that should be paid to individuals and entities, and to make such payments.

Mandelman received a one-year suspension in 1990, an 18-month suspension in 1994, a private reprimand in 1999, a private reprimand in 2006, a nine-month suspension in 2006, and a one-year suspension in 2009.

Because Mandelman’s revocation was ordered to commence retroactive to 2009, he was immediately eligible to file a reinstatement petition, and he did so on Aug. 5, 2014.