Whistleblower and related enforcement actions continue to escalate across a wide swath of industry sectors with claims being directed at health care companies, financial institutions, defense contractors, and manufacturers. Those who have experienced the costs, distraction, and other consequences of enforcement or litigation involving whistleblowers will attest to the pain associated with these controversies.

As news headlines trumpet settlements and cases instituted by whistleblowers, enforcement authorities and lawyers who bring whistleblower cases continue to promote filings. As the numbers and types of cases increase, there is growing acceptance that whistleblowers will continue to confront management teams with claims carrying significant risk of legal, financial, and business reputational costs and damage.

These cases have prompted predictions that companies will have less ability to identify and correct problems using traditional compliance tools. And frustration mounts over the further challenge of getting employees to work through internal channels to address problems.

This article surveys the arsenal of tools available to whistleblowers and offers suggestions for managing risk based on the hard lessons learned by companies exposed to enforcement action. While by no means easy, there are practical measures that can be used to address this risk effectively and reduce whistleblower claims and their consequences.

Overview of Notable Whistleblower Laws

The False Claims Act. The False Claims Act (FCA)¹ was enacted during the Civil War² and generally prohibits knowingly making false claims (or causing false claims to be made) to get the government to pay claims for goods or services. Although the FCA provides for the criminal enforcement of knowing false claims, the majority of FCA cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) involve alleged civil violations and seek actual damages, exemplary penalties, and other collateral remedies such as exclusion. The FCA also protects individuals who are subjected to retaliation for reporting suspected FCA violations, and there is growing use of that portion of the law by whistleblowers.³

The FCA rewards whistleblowers (known as relators) with up to 30 percent of the funds recovered on behalf of the government. There are two ways for the whistleblower to get that reward: 1) the whistleblower’s complaint prompts the government to intervene in an enforcement action (usually following a lengthy investigation); or 2) the government declines to do so, and the relator “steps into the government’s shoes” and litigates on behalf of the government.⁴ While the number of FCA cases in which the government elects to intervene has not grown substantially, there is an increasing willingness on the part of relator lawyers to invest in the continued prosecution of whistleblower claims without regard to DOJ intervention.

The FCA might be the most effective whistleblower statute in existence, but it is far from the only law whistleblowers can use. For example, approximately 30 states have enacted false claims laws that are similar to or modeled on the FCA.⁵ These state laws contain similar protections against retaliation, and retaliation claims are being increasingly added to FCA complaints filed in federal court or filed alone in state courts. Notably, on July 12, 2015, Gov. Scott Walker signed into law the biennial budget bill, which eliminates private individuals’ authority to bring qui tam actions for false claims for medical assistance.⁶

FCA Whistleblower Case Recovery and Related Issues. In 2014, the DOJ announced a record-setting $5.69 billion in FCA recoveries, including nearly $3 billion in whistleblower actions.⁷ The government paid $435 million to whistleblowers in fiscal year 2014, and reported 713 filed qui tam lawsuits, a new record. “The growing number of qui tam lawsuits filed since 2009 has led to increased recoveries, which exceeded $2 billion for the first time in fiscal year 2010, and has approached or exceeded $3 billion ever since.”⁸

The DOJ increasingly relies on whistleblowers to assist in the detection and reporting of fraud. Whistleblowers are viewed as important sources in connection with governmental contract and other regulated activity. Understanding the typical lament that false-claims allegations are the product of “disgruntled employees,” the government scrutinizes whistleblower motivation but in reality is most concerned with whether a relator is providing cogent evidence of wrongdoing. In addition, the government is increasingly interested in understanding management actions by a whistleblower-targeted company in response to reported problems and carefully evaluates internal handling of whistleblower complaints and related compliance efforts.

As the government increasingly relies on whistleblowers and relator counsel to assist in these cases, the government is advancing its fraud enforcement agenda without the need to invest its own investigative time and other limited resources. (Please see the accompanying sidebar, “Recent FCA Whistleblower Case Settlements.”)

New DOJ Enforcement Policy on Whistleblower Claims. Leslie R. Caldwell, assistant attorney general for the DOJ’s Criminal Division, recently announced⁹ that the Criminal Division would begin to review filed civil FCA actions for purposes of potential parallel criminal investigation and enforcement. Caldwell noted that “[q]ui tam cases are a vital part of the Criminal Division’s future efforts” to combat fraud on the government.¹⁰ Addressing the DOJ’s involvement in parallel investigations, Caldwell stressed that even when misconduct could be pursued civilly under the FCA, “criminal investigation and prosecution is often appropriate.”¹¹

While these pronouncements are consistent with the high priority being assigned to enforcement of whistleblower and other claims under the FCA, it is unclear whether the DOJ will conduct more parallel investigations. However, criminal prosecutors’ additional scrutiny of filed cases should at least give pause to companies that might not have previously taken the threat of whistleblower cases as seriously as they should have. Although there is a stark difference between civil FCA cases and those satisfying the exacting standards required to support a criminal action, experience suggests that more DOJ eyes on the same reported claims pose at least some additional risk to targets of whistleblower filings.

The Dodd-Frank Act Whistleblower Provisions

The Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)¹² added a section entitled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections” to the U.S. Code.¹³ The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is now required to reward whistleblowers who report “original information” relating to violations of the securities laws that result in enforcement and sanctions in excess of $1 million.¹⁴ The Dodd-Frank Act requires awards ranging from 10 percent up to a maximum of 30 percent of the sanctions collected in qualifying cases.

The Dodd-Frank Act also prohibits termination, demotion, or retaliation “because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower” in providing information to the SEC, assisting in the SEC investigation or enforcement action relating to the reported matters, or for “making disclosures that are required or protected” under the securities laws.¹⁵ Under Dodd-Frank, whistleblowers who are subjected to retaliation for reporting are entitled to double back pay plus interest, reinstatement, costs of litigation, and attorney fees.¹⁶

The SEC created an Office of the Whistleblower and a reporting program and adopted final rules implementing the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank.¹⁷ Those rules have greatly increased reporting of potential corporate wrongdoing, with approximately 3,000 tips being made per year.

The SEC whistleblower program has generated thousands of reports of suspected wrongdoing but made only 15 awards through early 2015, suggesting that the SEC is being cautious and selective in connection with the whistleblower reports it elects to investigate.¹⁸ However, considering the time typically required for the investigation of significant violations of the securities laws, the handful of awards to date might be just the tip of a coming wave of whistleblower-inspired SEC enforcement actions. Indeed, the SEC and other governmental representatives continue to so suggest.¹⁹ Given that the SEC’s Investor Protection Fund, the fund containing monies available for award to qualifying whistleblowers, contained nearly $440 million as of the end of fiscal year 2014, there may be something to these predictions.²⁰

The FCA rewards whistleblowers (known as relators) with up to 30 percent of the funds recovered on behalf of the government.

The Dodd-Frank whistleblower program has been criticized for encouraging employees to report suspected violations without first resorting to internal reporting and related compliance procedures. The SEC has attempted to address this concern by indicating that it will award credit to whistleblowers who previously or simultaneously reported their concerns internally.

However, SEC whistleblower awards are not conditioned on parallel internal reporting or even cooperation by the whistleblower in connection with internal investigations of the reported matter. In an amicus filing in 2014, the SEC asserted that the term “whistleblower” encompasses individuals who report suspected securities violations through internal reporting mechanisms or to the SEC itself.²¹ The additional protections against retaliation offered by the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions arguably serve as further encouragement to employees to bypass internal reporting and compliance mechanisms. (Please see “Notable Whistleblower Awards Under Dodd-Frank” in the accompanying sidebar.)

The SEC 2014 Annual Report on the whistleblower program, SEC press releases on whistleblower awards, and SEC representatives have emphasized that a significant number of awards to date involve instances in which suspected wrongdoing was initially reported internally by individuals who ultimately became whistleblowers. This comports with the experience of many counsel involved in the investigation and defense of whistleblower claims and suggests again that some corporate compliance programs and mechanisms intended to allow for the identification and correction of problems are not working.

While the SEC whistleblower program is still in its infancy, and rewards are only available for reported violations of federal securities laws, the level of reporting to the SEC and the SEC’s stated intention to further intensify its enforcement efforts suggest that there will be much Dodd-Frank whistleblower action going forward. (See the “Notable Whistleblower Awards Under Dodd-Frank” sidebar for a list of significant awards.)

Internal Revenue Service Whistleblower Program

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also has a whistleblower program, operating under the IRS Whistleblower Office, which was created by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006.²²

I.R.C. § 7623(b) sets forth the rules attendant to the IRS whistleblower program, including the provision for awards ranging between 15 percent and 30 percent of proceeds collected by the IRS as a result of information provided.²³ For a whistleblower to receive a percentage of the proceeds, the unpaid tax amounts identified and reported by the whistleblower must exceed $2 million (inclusive of taxes, penalties, and interest).²⁴

In fiscal year 2014, the last year for which information about the IRS program is available,²⁵ the IRS reported paying $52 million to 101 whistleblowers, approximately the same amount paid out in 2013, and a marked decrease from the $125 million paid out to 128 whistleblowers in 2012. The IRS program has been dogged by slow evaluation and processing of whistleblower claims, with more than 8,000 claims reported as remaining open, and significant numbers of open claims remaining from years back to 2007.²⁶ The single largest whistleblower award remains the $104 million paid in 2012 to Bradley Birkenfeld, a former UBS bank executive convicted in 2009 for his role in the tax-evasion scheme that he reported.²⁷ Birkenfeld provided information on UBS’s assistance to U.S. taxpayers with undeclared accounts held overseas and has been credited for driving a 2009 settlement between the DOJ and UBS that imposed nearly $800 million in penalties and required the disclosure of account information for thousands of U.S. clients of UBS.

As awards under the IRS whistleblower program dip, and relators’ counsel and members of Congress express concerns over the interest and ability of the IRS to administer the program effectively, it is less clear that this program will continue to generate significant numbers of whistleblower reports and awards.

Proactive Management of Whistleblower Risk

If one understands the tools available to whistleblowers, it is simplistic to observe that companies exposed to risk must ensure they have effective compliance programs. Everyone knows that. The challenge is to address the peculiar area of whistleblowers with the benefit of meaningful insights on what will
really serve to reduce the risk of claims and exposure to penalties and other adverse consequences.

Much guidance and other information concerning the definition of effective corporate compliance is available,²⁸ and the basic elements of good compliance are beyond the scope of this article. However, the problem illustrated by companies subjected to whistleblower controversy is typically not that the organization lacked a corporate compliance program. Indeed, it is now relatively rare for a significant company to lack an operating compliance program that generally satisfies the federal sentencing guidelines and other key compliance guidance. What tends to be missing falls within a fairly narrow set of common factors or circumstances that allow significant problems to go without appropriate response or resolution.

The following are observations based on the author’sexperience in the handling or evaluation of many whistleblower cases. Attention to each of these subjects will offer real and meaningful benefit to companies and responsible officers who are committed to avoiding these difficult claims.

Understanding What Prompts Whistleblowers. My experience with the investigation and defense of cases involving whistleblowers across a wide span of industry segments confirms a nearly ever-present reason for resorting to qui tam filings or whistleblowing: employees’ actual or perceived inability to report a matter of concern internally and obtain feedback that comports with their expectations of fairness and nonretaliation.

Without question, some budding whistleblowers cannot or will not work with the company to address perceived problems. Everyone has encountered the truly “disgruntled” current or former employee situation. However, most whistleblowers resort to FCA qui tam filings and external reporting only after they attempted to raise problems internally and were rebuffed or ignored or subjected to even worse treatment.²⁹

Notwithstanding much corporate attention to compliance, many managers do not understand and are not trained in the proper handling of employee concerns or reported issues. In many instances this stems from a lack of appreciation of the risks associated with improperly handled compliance reports. In other instances, there is a failure to communicate reported concerns to other appropriate company officials for further evaluation and response.

Managers looking to reduce risk in this field are devoting more attention to ensuring that potential whistleblowers are encouraged to bring forward concerns and see that those matters are appropriately addressed. A major emphasis is on ensuring that the reporting employee is satisfied that his or her concern has been heard and taken seriously, regardless of whether the report reflects a valid problem requiring corrective action or further response. A further emphasis is on ensuring that employees are not dissuaded from or fearful of reporting to their immediate supervisors, a recurring problem that is aggravated in cases in which the supervisors themselves are connected to the employee concern.

Again, identifying the principal problem that propels employees to resort to whistleblowing is far easier than offering practical and effective solutions. That said, I offer the following additional thoughts on managing the whistleblower dynamic.

Fleshing Out Potential Problems and Whistleblowers. The growing numbers of enforcement programs seeking to reward whistleblowers is making it ever more difficult to convince employees to report problems internally. Without an advertised and true commitment to compliance, and a supportive environment that convinces employees that the reporting of concerns is welcome and expected, there is little chance of success. Companies interested in better facilitating internal reporting should consider the following tactics:

• Internal promotion of the company’s commitment to compliance and its openness to receiving reports of concerns at all levels.

• Incentives for the reporting of compliance-related concerns or problems, including the addition of compliance reporting to performance- and compensation-review criteria for managers.

• Internal communication, from the company’s leaders and top managers, emphasizing that reported concerns will be addressed properly and without retaliation of any kind at any level of the company.

• Tracking and documentation of hotline and other reporting by employees and monitoring of reporting mechanisms to ensure reporting is at levels commensurate with the company’s size and risk profile.

• Education of managers on the reasons employees are reluctant to report matters, and training to assist managers in the proper handling and appropriate further internal communication of reported concerns.

• Institution of compliance-related employee-reporting review processes to ensure that matters that are raised are appropriately considered and addressed by qualified company officers.

• Expansion of reporting mechanisms and features, including externally hosted hotlines, to ensure employees have multiple options and places to lodge concerns, anonymously if desired, and with options allowing for responses to reported concerns.

These efforts, in my experience, have been successful in encouraging employees to come forward and increase reporting. But still more can be done.

Managers must ensure that all appropriate steps are taken to generate reports of problems regardless of whether employees desire to come forward or feel comfortable doing so. For example, rather than soliciting the typical one-time orientation certification that an employee agrees to comply with the compliance program and code of conduct, consider an annual recertification process. In this process, employees are required to confirm (by checking off on the form) that they are not aware of any problems or conduct that is not in conformance with the company’s commitment to compliance or has not previously been reported to a manager. In other cases in which an individual has information or concerns that have not been reported internally, the form requires the disclosure of such matters.

These additional compliance checks and certifications have been found to be very effective in ferreting out unreported concerns that could develop into whistleblower claims.

Additional Risk-management Measures

The following efforts have also been proved to help reduce instances in which employees resort to the external reporting of matters that might be ultimately successfully resolved but only after prolonged and costly enforcement review.

Evaluating the Whistleblower and Enforcement Risk Environment. The risk of enforcement grows for all businesses as whistleblowers and the government pursue cases in a wider variety of fields, under the FCA as well as anti-corruption, tax, securities, consumer fraud, and environmental laws. Determining the effective compliance measures that will truly reduce exposure to whistleblowers and related enforcement action is another daunting task. And not all risks warrant the same level of attention.

The current enforcement climate, however, offers little comfort even to a smaller company, operating only domestically, and with fewer resources than the companies in the headlines. Today, companies are devoting more time to the evaluation of risk associated with their business and practices, with a keener eye on ensuring that priority enforcement risk areas are properly identified, evaluated, and tracked. This proactive risk assessment and tailoring of compliance efforts better protects against whistleblowers and related risks by allowing key risk areas and problems to be identified and corrective action taken as necessary to avoid problems before they can ripen into controversy.

The lack of appropriate risk identification and response significantly hampers companies’ ability to head off whistleblowers. The troubles befalling many companies relate to risks that were reported but not effectively evaluated, risks that were not understood, or situations in which risk was discounted.

The ability to demonstrate that a company has devoted appropriate effort to the handling of reported problems and identification of key risks is crucial to success in convincing the government that a whistleblower case is not tied to systemic problems or disregard of the law. The government understands that no compliance program or company is perfect, and well-developed records reflecting robust internal reporting process, risk identification, and compliance management are important ingredients to success in heading off or resolving whistleblower and enforcement matters.

Making Compliance a Priority. “Tone at the top” and “culture of compliance” are overused phrases but remain quite relevant to efforts to encourage internal reporting. In the past, too many managers and executives considered compliance a nonrevenue-generating and, at best, tolerated function. Today, the role that compliance plays in assisting managers in addressing potential whistleblower claims is changing rapidly.

Companies need qualified compliance personnel on board armed with the resources and authority needed to do their jobs. Employees view compliance personnel as trusted and unbiased individuals to whom concerns can be aired. In addition, top executives and board members should assist compliance personnel in promoting the commitment to doing what is right and correcting problems. Top-level assistance to compliance staff is particularly valuable in connection with communications that allow employees to better understand that they are encouraged, if not expected, to report concerns and can do so without fear of repercussions.

Adopting the Lessons of Whistleblower and Other Relevant Enforcement Actions. Reported cases and settlements offer valuable information that assist managers in understanding how whistleblower claims arose in similar settings and how those problems could have been avoided. These materials also allow a better understanding of the compliance expectations of enforcement authorities involved in the review of problems brought forward by whistleblowers.

Understanding which cases are being pursued, how they are resolved, and the sanctions that follow when compliance mechanisms are deficient helps similar companies avoid similar fates. Settlements often address the compliance program elements found lacking, such as deficiencies in or the absence of internal reporting mechanisms. These problems help drive whistleblowers and more onerous and costly settlement terms. The compliance requirements being imposed by the government enforcers in whistleblower cases also tell managers what is expected. Documented action of relevant changes to a company’s compliance efforts based on reported cases sends an important message to enforcers that can greatly assist in driving a more favorable outcome to an investigation triggered by a whistleblower.

Focusing Audits and Monitoring

Effective management of whistleblower risk includes focused audit and monitoring of priority risks. This documented activity, tied to the evaluation of internal reports, and annual compliance work plans, helps demonstrate good-faith efforts to operate in accordance with applicable law. In the competition for the resources available today for compliance, audit and monitoring must focus on red-flag issues identified internally and through other sources. Success in avoiding whistleblower claims and enforcement requires the correct prioritizing and monitoring of key risks.

Using Disclosures to Preempt Whistleblowers. In every business setting, compliance problems will be uncovered. Many problems can be caught early enough to head off potential whistleblower and enforcement risk. In some cases, for example, when claims or certifications have been incorrectly but unintentionally submitted, the company is able to make corrective filings or disclosures that cut off risk. In other cases, such as when possible bribery or other issues are identified in due diligence on a transaction, disclosures may be necessary to avoid subsequent litigation or enforcement risk. Disclosures in these and other circumstances are markedly increasing as companies strive to identify and remediate problems before they tempt reporting by whistleblowers or become the subject of enforcement.

Preparing for Internal and External Investigations. In companies confronting whistleblower and enforcement risk, managers are increasingly working to establish plans and mechanisms that allow for the prompt and effective evaluation of internally reported or discovered issues of concern. These plans ensure that internal reporters are engaged appropriately and are given feedback on the evaluation of the reported concern and its ultimate handling.

Plans for the internal investigation of significant matters include readying resources to quickly assess compliance problems, evaluate credibility, prepare for potential enforcement response, and identify appropriate solutions. An effective plan will also protect the organization and its managers from claims of improper internal investigation and issues such as bias. As the whistleblower and related enforcement stakes increase, these activities protect the company and allow it to better defend against matters that may become the subject of enforcement attention.

Conclusion

The sky is not falling on companies that take the opportunity to revisit and invigorate processes aimed at heading off whistleblower and enforcement risk. Notwithstanding headline-grabbing whistleblower cases and settlements, there are growing numbers of cases in which companies have avoided or mitigated enforcement risk and consequences through intensified internal reporting processes and related compliance measures as addressed in this article. When more effective and sophisticated approaches are taken to encourage internal reporting by employees, and reported problems are properly evaluated, documented, and addressed, companies reap substantial benefits.

Endnotes

¹ 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.

² The False Claims Act: A Primer (Apr. 22, 2011), www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf.

³ 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).

⁴ 31 U.S.C. § 3730; 31 U.S.C. § 3731.

⁵ See,e.g., Illinois False Claims Act, 740 ILCS 175/1 – 175/8 (including Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act).

⁶ David H. Chen, Wisconsin Repeals State FCA (July 15, 2015).

⁷ Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 20, 2014).

⁸ Id.

⁹ Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Remarks by Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Leslie R. Caldwell at the Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund Conference (Sept. 17, 2014).

¹⁰ Id.

¹¹ Press Release, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell Delivers Remarks at the Compliance Week Conference (May 19, 2015).

¹² See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (2010).

¹³ 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a – 78pp.

¹⁴ 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.

¹⁵ Id.

¹⁶ Id.

¹⁷ See Final Rule, 17 CFR Parts 240 and 249, Securities Act Release No. 34-64545, Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Aug. 12, 2011).

¹⁸ See SEC Whistleblower Program Information at www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Aug. 30, 2015); SEC Staff Annual Report to Congress on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program (Nov. 17, 2014).

¹⁹ See,e.g., Remarks at 31st International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Andrew Ceresney, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement (Nov. 19, 2014).

²⁰ SEC Staff Annual Report, supra note 18. 

²¹ Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae In Support of the Appellant, Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, No. 13-4385, 2014 WL 3953672 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 2014).

²² Whistleblower Office At-a-Glance, (last reviewed or updated Feb. 23, 2015).

²³ I.R.C. § 7623(b).

²⁴ Id.

²⁵ IRS Fiscal Year 2014 Report to the Congress on the Use of Section 7623 (June 11, 2014).

²⁶ Id.

²⁷ David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S., N.Y. Times (Sept. 11, 2012).

²⁸ See, e.g., Federal Principles of Prosecution of Organizations; Federal Sentencing Guidelines; FCPA Guidance. 

²⁹ See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim, David M. Studdert & Michelle M. Milla, Whistle-Blowers’ Experiences in Fraud Litigation Against Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 New Eng. J. Med. 1832 (2010).

³⁰ Press Release, Long-Term Care Pharmacy to Pay $31.5 Million to Settle Lawsuit Alleging Violations of Controlled Substances Act and False Claims Act (May 14, 2015).

³¹ Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Medical College of Wisconsin Inc. Pays $840,000 to Settle Alleged False Claims for Neurosurgeries (Jan. 9, 2015).

³² Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Defense Contractor Pleads Guilty to Major Fraud in Provision of Supplies to U.S. Troops in Afghanistan (Dec. 8, 2014).

³³ Press Release, supra note 7.

³⁴ Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Boeing Pays $23 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Oct. 10, 2014).

³⁵ Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Community Health Systems Professional Services Corporation and Three Affiliated New Mexico Hospitals to Pay $75 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Feb. 2, 2015).

³⁶ Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Government Files Complaint Against CA Inc. for False Claims on GSA Contract (May 29, 2014).

³⁷ Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Johnson & Johnson to Pay More Than $2.2 Billion to Resolve Criminal & Civil Investigations (Nov. 4, 2013).

³⁸ Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Prevea Clinic Inc. Agrees to Civil Settlement of $94,000 to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (April 2, 2013).

³⁹ Press Release, SEC Pays More Than $3 Million to Whistleblower (July 17, 2015).

⁴⁰ Press Release, SEC Announces Million-Dollar Whistleblower Award to Compliance Officer (Apr. 22, 2015).

⁴¹ U.S. SEC, Press Release, Former Company Officer Earns Half-Million Dollar Whistleblower Award for Reporting Fraud Case to SEC (Mar. 2, 2015).

⁴² Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Securities Act Release No. 73174, File No. 2014-10 (Sept. 22, 2014).

⁴³ Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Securities Act Release No. 72947, File No. 2014-9 (Aug. 29, 2014).

⁴⁴ Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Securities Act Release No. 70554, File No. 2013-4 (Sept. 30, 2013).